Return to: Search Page or to: Table of Contents Vol. 21, Issue 2

Yen Pin-Su, "Party registration rules and party systems in Latin America" Party Politics, 21 (March 2015), 295-309. [Available at]

First paragraph:

Studies have shown that the design of electoral institutions involves a trade-off between representation of voters and accountability of governments (Powell, 2000). This insight might best be reflected in the difference between proportional representation (PR) systems and plurality systems (Carey and Hix, 2011Lijphart, 1999Powell, 2000): while a PR system facilitates better representation by including more parties that represent diverse interests, plurality rule reduces the number of parties but produces a stronger and more accountable government.

Figures and Table

Figure1: Average NSPR in Latin American countries
Figure 2: Correlation between the average NSPR and the average number of parties in Latin America
Table 1: Effects of party registration rules on the number of electoral parties
Figure 3: Predicted number of electoral parties at different levels of NSPR

Last Paragraph:

This study creates new opportunities for a broader research agenda for electoral systems. One extension of my analyses is to explore the interactive effects of party registration rules with other institutional factors on party systems. Are restrictive petition signature requirements more effective in reducing the number of parties in different institutional contexts? How do such requirements interact with other institutions to help soften the representation-accountability trade-off and achieve both objectives? These questions remain to be explored for a more nuanced understanding of how party formation costs condition party politics

Last updated March 2015