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THE

DEMOCRATIC

EVOLUTION

FROM SLAVERY

TO EQUALITY,

1828–2020

KENNETH JANDA

Evolution may be defined as any net directional change or any cumulative change in the characteristics of organisms or populations over many generations—in other words, descent with modification.

JOHN ENDLER, *NATURAL SELECTION IN THE WILD (1986)*

Comments from early reviewers

"There has been nothing like Janda's comprehensive new approach to American political parties. Janda chronicles Democratic Party political ideas and correlates them with political action. . . . Janda's new opus creates a unique and invaluable resource to understand the current dramatic contrast of political values and ideas that will shape American history in 2024 and beyond."

MARK SIEGEL, Executive Director, 1973-77, *Democratic National Committee*

"Too often, the theatrics of campaigns attracts all the attention while the prose—in this case the party platforms—are often treated as an afterthought. Ken Janda reminds us that party platforms matter and are key to tracing the evolution of parties and voters in American history. A must-read book!"

JOHN KENNETH WHITE, Professor of Politics, *Catholic University of America*

"An excellent analysis that breaks all kinds of new ground in the study of party politics, the structure of politics and history of the parties and change that explains and documents the analysis in depth. I can't think of anything that comes close to it."

WILLIAM CROTTY, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Chair in Public Life Emeritus, *Northeastern University*

"A contribution to the history of political thought as well as the ideological development of the American parties!"

IAN BUDGE, Emeritus Professor of Government, *University of Essex*

"a great contribution to the literature around the history of the party"

NATHAN DASCHLE, Executive Director, *Democratic Governors' Association, 2007-2010*

"Professor Janda is again to be applauded for the breadth and depth of his research on the major American political parties. His two books, ***The Republican Evolution*** and ***The Democratic Evolution***, especially taken together, present a cogent and thoughtful analysis of American political history."

JACK FLYNN, Professor Emeritus of Geography and History, *St. Catherine University*

"This manuscript is a companion to the author's *The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party*, this time focusing on the Democratic Party. Together, the manuscripts describe and marshal an impressive data collection on the content of both major parties? platforms. This is an impressive accomplishment that will be valuable to future scholars. I am excited to see the second volume join the first on my shelves."

Anonymous reviewer, *Columbia University Press*

The Democratic Evolution: From Slavery to Equality, 1828–2020

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Available at www.partypolitics.org

k-janda@northwestern.edu

Kenneth Janda is Payson S. Wild Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Northwestern University, where he taught from 1961 to 2001. He lives in Roseville, Minnesota.

Relevant academic positions and awards:

1981-1983	Chair, Political Organizations and Parties, Subfield of American Political Science Association
1993-1994	John Marshall Chair in Political Science, Budapest University of Economic Sciences
1995-2014	Co-Editor, *Party Politics*, an international journal published in the U.K.
2000	Samuel J. Eldersveld, Lifetime Achievement Award, Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association
2009	Frank J. Goodnow Award, American Political Science Association, for service to the discipline and profession

Related books on party politics and government in recent years:

2023	*The Challenge of Democracy: American Government in Global Politics, 15th Ed.* (Boston: Cengage—with others)
2022	*The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860-2020* (New York: Columbia University Press)
2021	*A Tale of Two Parties: Living Amongst Democrats and Republicans Since 1952* (New York: Routledge)
2016	*American Parties in Context: Comparative and Historical Analysis* (New York: Routledge—with Robert Harmel and Matthew Giebert)
2013	*The Social Bases of Political Parties: Democrats and Republicans, 1952-2012 and 2032.* (Apple iBook for Apple iPads)
2011	*Party Systems and Country Governance* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press—with Jin-Young Kwak)

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DEDICATED TO

The Illinois State Normal University faculty in the
Department of Social Sciences from 1953 to 1957,
particularly to these professors:

Russell Glasner, economics;

Leland Hess, history;

Ben J. Keeley, sociology;

John A. Kinneman, sociology;

Helen Marshall, history;

Earl Reitan, history;

Carol Rylander, psychology;

Theodore Sands, history; and

Leo Yedor, political science.

They opened my mind and prepared me for graduate study in
political science at Indiana University, which led me to a
lifetime of learning and teaching.

PREFACE

Books about party politics typically interpret facts and events from a partisan perspective. They often select data that support their arguments and opinions. Authors frequently succumb to that tendency. I am not immune to political bias. One way to combat bias is to examine all the evidence. This book about the evolution of the Democratic Party's principles examines all 3,392 planks culled from all 45 Democratic platforms since its first official platform in 1840.

Democratic politicians in the nineteenth century adopted planks that were both racist and opposed to national authority. Even in the second quarter of the twentieth century, they ignored racial segregation throughout the South, the party's stronghold. By cataloging and analyzing the party's platform planks over 175 years, *The Democratic Evolution* documents how the party of slavery morphed into the party of social equality. In pursuing social equality, the party also championed the authority of the nation over the rights of states. Consequently, this book is about both the Democratic Party and the U.S. government.

My earlier book, *The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860-2020*, examined 2,722 planks from 41 GOP platforms since 1856.[1] Scholars of all political persuasion agree that the Democratic and Republican parties of today are far different from the way they were at their origins, switching their positions concerning social policies and states' rights. Historians and political scientists have said that they "flipped" their ideologies[2] or have described the parties' "transformation."[3] TV networks even swapped their colors—without objection from the parties—in covering the 2000 election. Televisions once used red as the Democratic color to display that party's wins and blue for Republican victories. Historically, blue had been Republicans' color since the Civil War, while red marked leftist parties across history and the world. (Appendix A discuses political hues and the color switch.)

My conclusions about the parties' evolutions are not novel, but they are far more explicit, detailed, and backed by better evidence. Although this book is about the Democratic Party, I also draw on my database of Republican platform planks to compare the parties' different paths in light of contrasting evolutionary theories. Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution applies somewhat to the Democratic Party; Herbert Spencer's theory of social evolution fits better with changes in the Republican Party. Neither theory strictly applies to party politics over the last two centuries, but they offer useful, if imperfect, analogies for understanding of the evolution of party politics in America.

Two key political values—Equality and Freedom—figure prominently in each party's evolution. Democrats increasingly used government to enforce social equality. In 1964, Democratic President Lyndon sought "not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result." Democrats subsequently legislated to combat economic inequality and promote racial and gender equality. In 2016, their party platform proposed "to study reparations"—compensation for past actions—to overcome the lasting "economic effects" of slavery. Democrats' legislation for gender equality expanded beyond women's rights. The party's 2016 platform promised "that all transgender and non-binary people can procure official government identification documents that accurately reflect their gender identity." In 2022, Democratic lawmakers sought to increase gender-neutral bathrooms on Capitol Hill.

Republicans, in contrast, grew more interested in freedom—not "freedom now" as advocated by Blacks in the 1960s—but freedom from government regulations as advocated then by Barry Goldwater. When accepting the 1964 Republican presidential nomination, Goldwater said, "And this party, with its

every action, every word, every breath, and every heartbeat, has but a single resolve, and that is freedom—freedom made orderly for this nation by our constitutional government; freedom under a government limited by laws of nature and of nature's God." In 2015, Republicans in the U.S Congress formed the House Freedom Caucus to support "limited government." In 2023, Republican Senators introduced legislation permitting persons entitled to carry concealed guns in one state to carry them elsewhere, regardless of other states' laws.

Both words—Equality and Freedom—have positive valence in the English language and in American politics. They "ring true" in political discourse, leading to demands for more equality, or for more freedom. However—as explained in this book and as demonstrated in Democratic and Republican platform planks—policies that promote equality and those that promote freedom are often, if not usually, incompatible. Moreover, since neither Equality nor Freedom is an absolute governmental value, neither ought to be maximized. But given that those words ring true in political speech, extremists in both parties use them in siren songs of destructive politics.

According to Greek mythology, sirens were beautiful half-women, half-bird creatures sitting on rocks, singing songs, and luring sailors to destruction. Ballads lauding Equality and Freedom, seductively sung in political waters, can be treacherous too. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need," is an enchanting verse; sung aggressively in government, it lures citizens to accept the poverty of conformity and communism. "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice"—as Goldwater told the 1964 GOP convention—tempts listeners to abandon all government rules and regulations. Carried to the extreme, complete freedom is anarchy. Compete equality requires autocracy.

In life, Greek philosophers advised doing "everything in moderation, and "nothing in excess." That counsel applies to politics too.

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SYNOPSIS

This is not a standard history of the Democratic Party. That would describe the party's leaders, its election victories, and its government achievements. This book cites such facts and events in passing, but it focuses on the planks in all Democratic platforms—regardless of whether they figured in election campaigns or successfully became law. It documents changes in the party's principles over time.

A party's principles consist of the political thoughts—big and small—that unite party identifiers and activists. Thoughts on slavery and equality are fundamental and eternal. Opinions about education and tax policy are less central yet also enduring. Views on climate change and immigration are important but vary with the times. The full range of Democrats' political thinking is reflected in the platforms adopted at quadrennial Democratic National Conventions. My account of the party's evolution draws on planks extracted from all existing Democratic Party platforms.

The text is organized into four Parts:

PART 1: PARTY PRINCIPLES AND PARTY PLATFORMS

Part 1 consists of three chapters. The first one explains the nature of party platforms, how they vary across countries, how they are constructed in the United States, and what constitutes a platform "plank." The second chapter describes the process of identifying 3,392 planks in all 45 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 2016. The third briefly compares Democratic planks with 2,722 planks identified in all 41 Republican platforms since 1856.

PART 2: FROM SLAVERY TO EQUALITY

` The seven chapters in Part 2 focus on slavery and racial discrimination while tracing the party's evolution from slavery to equality.

PART 3: DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM PLANKS

The first chapter explains why Democratic platform planks were divided into three eras for analysis. The next three chapters report on Democratic planks tagged with the primary codes for Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods, and the last compares the Democrats' planks with Republican planks over time.

PART 4: COMPARING EVOLUTIONS

The first chapter draws on theories of biological and social evolution to explain changes in the Democratic and Republican paths. The second assesses the impact of party leaders on centralism versus decentralism in governance.

PART 1: PARTY PRINCIPLES AND PARTY PLATFORMS

Part 1 consists of two chapters. The first explains the nature of party platforms, how they vary across countries, how they are constructed in the United States, and what constituted a platform "plank." The second describes the process of identifying 3,392 planks in all 45 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 2016.

CHAPTER 1

Democratic Principles, Platforms, and Planks

Andrew Jackson, Senator from Tennessee, created the Democratic Party in 1828 to support his presidential campaign. He won election and re-election in 1832, which made his principles, the Democratic Party's principles. He emphasized limited government and states' rights, which meant preserving slavery in the South. Jackson died in 1837. In 1840, the party held a national convention and formally adopted a set of nine resolutions, eight of which revolved around limited government and states' rights. The ninth resolution praised the "principles embodied by Jefferson." Every four years since, Democrats held national conventions to nominate presidential candidates and adopt a party platform. Taken together, the 45 platforms from 1840 to 2016 run over 420,000 words. Embedded in those words are specific commitments popularly known as platform "planks." My assessment of the Democratic Party's evolution is based on planks I personally culled from all 45 Democratic platforms and from writings about the party's origin in 1828.

The platform planks were analyzed according to three eras during which Democrats held different views of federalism. I labeled the eras: "**States' Rights**," **Cooperative Federalism**," and "**National Authority**." Originally, Democrats feverishly defended "States' Rights" and held to that position through the nineteenth century. Under "Cooperative Federalism," they promoted national government checked by states' rights for the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, Democrats have favored "National Authority" in government. In the process, the Democratic Party evolved from supporting slavery to promoting social equality while relying on the authority of the nation over the rights of states. The evolutionary steps are reflected in the platform planks adopted at the party's national conventions.

This book on the Democrats' evolution largely parallels the analysis employed in my earlier book, *The Republican* Evolution, which analyzed 2,722 planks from all 41 Republican platforms since 1856.[4] That book examined the GOP's planks over that party's three eras. The Republicans' "Nationalism" era, from 1860 to 1924, featured the party governing for the public good. In their "Neoliberalism" era (1928 to 1960), Republicans downplayed government in favor of individualism. Republicans entered their present "Ethnocentrism" era in 1964, when they nominated Barry Goldwater for president and accepted his pure libertarian anti-government stance.

Most political observers discount the effects of a party's platforms on its electoral fortunes or governmental performance. Nevertheless, party scholars agree that national party platforms provide the best statements of the political principles embraced by the party's activists—the party's base—across the country.

Party Platforms[5]

A physical platform is an elevated place to stand. Centuries earlier in England, a platform also referred to a physical plan.[6] *Safire's Political Dictionary* said that as early as 1803 in the United States, the term described a set of political principles.[7] Afterward, scores of different political parties in the United States formally adopted platforms announcing their political values and policies. Today, all Democratic and Republican platforms, along with those of other important parties, are available on the internet, courtesy of the American Presidency Project.[8] Most platforms of past minor parties are available elsewhere on the internet or in books.[9]

Party platforms are supposed to declare "the principles, objectives, and promises of the national party as proclaimed by the national convention,"[10] to provide "the single avenue by which parties can make their comprehensive policy positions known to voters,"[11] to "articulate party policy commitments,"[12] and—simply—to tell "what the party stands for."[13] Writing in 1967, Gerald Pomper, the most prominent student of the subject, said that the platform adopted at a national party convention "most fully represents the party's intentions." Nevertheless, he continued, platforms "have received more scorn than attention.[14]

Observers' scorn for party platforms goes far back in American history. In 1888, James Bryce (later Britain's ambassador to the United States) wrote, "neither platforms nor the process that produces them have a powerful influence on the maturing and clarification of public opinion."[15] In 1902, Moisei Ostrogorsky, another foreign observer of American politics, said, "The platform, which is supposed to be the party's profession of faith and its programme of action is only a farce."[16] American Richard Browne, who in 1936 studied and cataloged all previous party platforms, found that nearly everyone who wrote prior to 1912 substantially agreed, "that the national party platform has had little or no significance."[17]

Thirty years later, Pomper still found writers who dismissed a platform as "meaningless"[18] frequently quoting the popular saying, "A platform is something to run on, not stand on." Pomper was one of the first researchers to demonstrate that political parties actually deliver on most of their platform pledges. Since Pomper's early work, a great deal of research (some cited below) has established that party platforms are reasonably good predictors of party behavior. While this book reviews some of that research, it does not rate Democrats' fidelity to their party platforms. Instead, it focuses on how principles of the Democratic Party have changed over time.

Platform Contents

Describing the contents of a modern party platform in the simplest terms, Browne said, "It consists of three general parts:

1. An elaboration of the record and achievements of the party. [known as pointing with pride]
2. A denunciation of the opposing party, its record, or its proposals. [viewing with alarm][19]
3. Various statements on the issues of the day, 'as to what the party believes in, approves, favors, advocates, stands for, demands, or pledges itself to do.'"[20]

Browne held that the platform's heart lies in point 3, typically its longest part, which includes:

a. Statements of general principles.
b. Expressions of sympathy. [e.g., for Armenians in 1920]
c. Actual statements of policy to be pursued, sometimes clearly stated, sometimes vague.[21]

Later scholars expanded on classifying platform contents. Most utilized Gerald Pomper's 1967 breakdown, given below (omitting Pomper's illustrative examples):

1. Rhetoric and Fact
2. Evaluations of the Parties' Records and Past Performances
   (a) General Approval
   (b) General Criticism
   (c) Policy Approval
   (d) Policy Criticism

3. Statements of Future Policies
    (a) Rhetorical Pledges
    (b) General Pledges
    (c) Pledges of Continuity
    (d) Expressions of Goals and Concerns
    (e) Pledges of Action
    (f) Detailed Pledges[22]

Pomper updated his research in 1980 to include the 1976 platforms,[23] and Lee Payne extended Pomper's analysis of party platforms through 2008.[24] Subsequent researchers have adopted or expanded on Pomper's classification, with special attention on how specific were the party's "pledges."[25] Others have modified how pledges were interpreted. For example, Royed and Borelli scored economic pledges for proposing a policy change, adhering to the status quo, expanding, cutting, or reviewing.[26] Clearly, the term platform "pledge" overlaps with platform "plank." I favor using plank for two reasons. First, a plank is an overt statement of a principle—my object of interest—while a pledge is a commitment to political action. Second, using plank helps separate my analysis from a worldwide body of research on party pledges.

Curiously, while virtually all American parties formulate platforms, parties in other countries do not write platforms; they issue "manifestos." The *Oxford Universal English Dictionary* says that "manifesto"—a public declaration of intentions—appeared in 17th century English. In 1848, the term famously appeared in German—*Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*. Perhaps the "Communist Manifesto" heritage led parties abroad to favor using that term.[27] Regardless, "manifesto" is not mentioned in the 800+ page *Safire's Political Dictionary*. This minor difference in terminology (platform v. manifesto) accompanies a major difference in how party principles are studied by academics and employed in politics

Empirical research on the content of party platforms and party manifestos exploded following publication of Pomper's 1967 article and his 1968 book. Many studies, if not most, focused on how well governmental parties fulfilled their platform or manifesto pledges. Research of this type proved to be especially popular in countries with competitive parties and parliamentary systems, which often have coalition governments. Party scholars in several countries eventually banded together to create a "Party Manifesto Database" of over 4,000 manifestos drawn from about 50 countries—including the United States—to support cross-national research.[28]

Studies soon focused on how well political parties kept pledges they made in party platforms and party manifestos. Petry and Collette identified and reviewed many such studies, asking whether "political parties keep their campaign promises once elected" and finding:

> [Our] review of 21 cases in 18 separate published studies reveals that parties fulfill 67 percent of their promises on average. Contrary to popular belief, political parties are reliable promise keepers. Why people underestimate the capacity of political parties to keep their election promises remains an open research question.[29]

One team of eleven scholars from multiple countries studied "fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries" and concluded:

> Parties that hold executive office after elections generally fulfill substantial percentages, sometimes very high percentages, of their election pledges, whereas parties that do not hold executive office generally find that lower percentages of their pledges are fulfilled.[30]

Scholars still monitor how well contemporary European parties fulfill pledges in election manifestos but devote less attention to how well today's American parties fulfill pledges in party platforms. The scholarly differences, in part, are due to historical differences in the parties..

Party Platforms v. Party Manifestos

American parties adopted platforms before European parties issued manifestos. The British Conservative Party was founded in 1832, only four years after the U.S. Democratic Party. However, researchers Thackeray and Toye said that British parties did not publish manifestos until 1900. They noted that the new Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel wrote and distributed an election manifesto in 1834, but that was his personal statement and not a true party document.[31] By the end of the century, the practice of party leaders issuing election addresses became established in Britain. Nevertheless, Thackeray and Toye said, "manifestos became mere 'shopping lists' made without reference to general principles" until 1900.[32]

British party manifestos also tend to be shorter than American party platforms. Thackeray and Toye counted words for 27 British manifestos from 1900 to 1997 for both the Conservative and Labour parties. Their counts can be compared with counts for 26 Democratic and Republican platforms from 1900 to 1996.[33] British manifestos are much shorter. British Labour manifestos averaged 5,482 words to 11,222 for Democratic platforms. The average Conservative manifesto was 7,611 words to 12,014 for the average Republican platform. Over time, both British manifestos and American platforms increased in length, which narrowed the differences between the two party systems. However, the 2015 Labour and Conservative manifestos of 18,178 and 30,146 words respectively were still shorter than the 26,058 and 35,467 words in the 2016 Democratic and Republican platforms.[34]

Are American party platforms longer than party manifestos in other countries because the U.S. is larger in size and population? While that factor may apply, the difference may be due more to the unique nature of American political parties. Both American political parties operate in a highly decentralized political system.[35] The United States has a federal form of government, with 50 state governments; three co-equal branches of national government; and a national legislature with two co-equal branches. These factors, and the larger size of the U.S., disperse political power across the country.

Unlike most other parties across the world, both American parties nominate their candidates for congressional offices in public elections and publicly elect delegates to party conventions that nominate presidential candidates. This combination of governmental and party structure results in highly decentralized national political parties. Different people and groups can influence the policies of their preferred party at various points while building the platform for adoption at the party's national convention.

Building Party Platforms

In comparing the processes of producing American party platforms and writing British election manifestos, two British scholars pointed to "The structural difference between the federal and unitary system," citing many of the points above about the decentralization of power in the United States, and they noted "the importance of state representation in the making of national party policy.[36] In sum, American party platforms differ from British party manifestos—and manifestos in other countries—

mainly because (1) the American governmental structure is decentralized, (2) the party organization is decentralized, and (3) the process of drafting the party document is itself decentralized.

In the United Kingdom, and especially in the Conservative Party, national party leaders figured prominently in starting and then influencing the drafting manifestos, and leaders' photographs are often featured in glossy manifestoes.[37] While U.S. presidents and presidential candidates have steered the content of their party's platform, they tended to exercise their influence at the end of the process rather than the beginning. State and local party activists typically launch and drive the platform-writing process.

Historically, partisans at the state and local levels were always involved in drafting party platforms. Richard Browne wrote a forty-page chapter to the process in 1936. Even at that time, it was too simple to say they "are adopted by the national party conventions after having been drafted by the Resolutions Committees of the conventions." Instead, Browne said, "The actual drafting takes place only after weeks and months of preliminary work, dating back several months before the convention meets."[38] He then outlined the work of various organizations, groups, and individuals who aided the drafting, devoting short sections to each of these participants:

> The National Committee . . . Advisory Committees . . . Dominant Candidates . . . Party leaders . . . State and Party Conventions . . . Non-party Organisations . . . Non-party Individuals . . . Public Hearings . . . Subcommittee on Drafting . . . The Resolutions Committee

Later accounts have confirmed the decentralized nature of the complex drafting process. Cooke's account of drafting the 1952 platforms stated:

> With hundreds of persons officially involved, and scores of others working behind the scenes, we may at best ascribe certain areas to the craftsmanship of one or more of the main agencies involved in the platform-making process. The genesis of the Republican platform may be traced to the subcommittees, the drafting committee, the special advisers, the full committee, and the party legacy.[39]
> . . . .
> The genesis of the Democratic platform goes back to the White House draft and the McCormack revision, the drafting committee, the special advisers, the full committee, and the legacy of past platforms.[40]

In 1968, Paul David studied how both parties created their platforms. Because "the platform has to be voted by the platform committee of the convention before it can reach the floor," David explained, "every platform committee in recent decades has involved a heterogeneous membership of more than 100, with two from every state delegation." Moreover, "Since 1960, it has been customary for the platform committees of both parties to come into session at the beginning of the preconvention week, first to hold public hearings and then to complete committee work on the final text of the platform."[41]

Concerning the 1976 Democratic Platform, Jeff Fishel wrote that its construction began four years earlier in 1972:

> When reform, anti-war, McGovern Democrats were bitterly opposed by major figures in the AFL-CIO and by many party regulars like the Daley organization from Chicago . . .
> Representatives of the Carter campaign came into the first national platform hearings, held in Washington, May 17-20, 1976 . . .
> The actual hearing produced the typically large (more than 140) parade of witnesses, from Michael Harrington speaking for "Democracy '76" . . . to Hubert Humphrey.[42]

Susan Fine's study of 1988 party platforms focused on the role that non-party actors played:

> The wheels of the platform writing process begin turning during the primary/caucus season. Each party holds regional hearings so that interested groups and individuals may express their views to the party executive committees which in turn draft the document. No restrictions are placed on who can testify.[43] A large portion of those outsiders testifying before the platform writing committees represent interest groups. An interest group whose perspective is reflected in a platform benefits in several ways because its view is endorsed by party leaders and delegates representing the party faithful.[44]

Sandy Maisel, however, found that the parties produced more "presidential-centered platforms" in 1992:[45]

> Each party's platform went through three public drafts. Staff produced one draft; that draft went respectively to the subcommittees of the Republican Committee on Resolutions and to the Drafting Committee of the Democratic Platform Committee. The second draft emerged from the Republican subcommittees and the Democratic Drafting Committee. The third draft emerged from the two full committees and in each case was adopted by the national convention without amendment.[46]

In truth, American party platforms have always been subject to presidential adjustment. Even in the 1930s, Browne wrote, "After the platform is adopted, it may be interpreted, perhaps altered, by the nominee himself."[47]

Because platforms are typically adopted before nominating a candidate, only aspirants who locked up the nomination in advance can exercise any real influence on the platform. Popular presidents running for re-election, of course, are positioned to influence the platform writing. Whether they do, depends on their commitment to specific legislative programs. President Roosevelt certainly steered the writing of Democratic platforms after his smashing election victory in 1936, as did President Lyndon Johnson following his landslide victory in 1964.

Finally, we should note that non-party groups also influence the content of party platforms. A comparative study of organized groups' testimony before platform committees found both parties' platforms in 1996, 2000, and 2004 "responsive to organized interests that are ideologically similar to the party status quo and to those who have demonstrated loyalty to the party."[48]

The process of drafting Democratic and Republican party platforms has remained a highly decentralized process involving thousands of party activists across the nation. There were 187 members on the 2016 Democratic Party Platform Committee, including 25 party leaders and elected officials selected by the Democratic National Committee. The website *Ballotpedia* said:

> In the months before the national convention, public hearings were arranged to allow Democrats the opportunity to comment on the direction of the party's future platform through video, written, and in-person testimony. Four 2-day forums were scheduled in June and July 2016 for this purpose:
>
> - Washington, D.C. (June 8-9, 2016)
> - Phoenix, Ariz. (June 17-18, 2016)
> - St. Louis, Mo. (June 24-25, 2016)
> - Orlando, Fla. (July 8-9, 2016)
>
> A separate, 15-person subcommittee, the Platform Drafting Committee, produced the initial draft of the document in late June.[49]

Because the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic interrupted both parties' platform drafting process, only the Democrats' 2016 platform will be considered. However, the unusual situation in 2020 demands discussing.

The 2020 Party Platforms

Evidence of party leaders' control, not just influence, emerged in 2020 before both parties' scheduled summer conventions. Due to the pandemic, the Democratic and Republican parties did not call together thousands of delegates to nominate their presidential candidates and adopt party platforms. While each party dealt with the situation in different ways, neither adopted a platform in a national convention.

For the first time in their history, Republicans in 2020 failed to adopt a new platform prior to the election. Directed by President Donald Trump, the National Committee simply published resolutions about the party platform prefaced by these remarks:

> WHEREAS, All platforms are snapshots of the historical contexts in which they are born, and parties abide by their policy priorities, rather than their political rhetoric;
> WHEREAS, The RNC, had the Platform Committee been able to convene in 2020, would have undoubtedly unanimously agreed to reassert the Party's strong support for President Donald Trump and his Administration;

The RNC then resolved to continue "to enthusiastically support the President's America-first agenda" and to adjourn the 2020 convention "without adopting a new platform until the 2024 Republican National Convention." This was its concluding resolution:

> *RESOLVED*, That any motion to amend the 2016 Platform or to adopt a new platform, including any motion to suspend the procedures that will allow doing so, will be ruled out of order.

In effect, the 2020 Republican Party decided to re-adopt its 2016 platform.

The Democratic Party also took unprecedented action during the 2020 pandemic. By April, Senator Bernie Sanders had withdrawn as a presidential candidate in the Democratic Party, conceding the nomination to former Vice President Joe Biden. While the Democrats' nomination was no longer in doubt, the party platform had not been drafted. Knowing that the Democrats would not hold their customary convention, the party's centrist candidate and presumptive nominee, Joe Biden, met with his left-of-center challenger, Bernie Sanders, to discuss the platform. They agreed to submit to the Platform Committee a 110-page document of policy recommendations from a "joint task force."[50] After some confusion about procedures, the Democratic Party managed to endorse an unusually long platform made outside the usual drafting procedures. One cannot know what to make of the 2020 Democratic Platform, which at 42,092 words, was by far the longest in its history.

Conclusion

Journalists and even scholars often downplay the importance of political party platforms. Platforms hold little interest to ordinary citizens and voters, but they are important, even critical, to Democratic and Republican party activists. Their contents reflect not only the politics *between* the parties but the politics *within* the party as well. That was clearly demonstrated within the Democratic Party before the Civil War, when divisions over slavery in new territories arose at the 1860 Democratic convention. As discussed later, the delegates in 1860 insisted on voting on the party's platform before

voting on the party's presidential nominee. The consequences of that vote led to a three-way split within the party and to Abraham Lincoln's election.

Almost a century later, the 1948 Democratic convention adopted a minority report that included a civil rights plank in their platform for the first time in the party's history. That action caused some delegates from southern states to walk out of the convention and ultimately led to converting most southern white Democrats into southern white Republicans. Although a party platform is more than the sum of its parts, some of its parts—its individual planks—carry great consequence for the party and overshadow the platform itself, as the civil rights plank did in 1948. Chapter 2 describes the selection and distribution of the planks culled from all past Democratic Party platforms.

CHAPTER 2

Finding Planks in Platforms

As "platform" is a metaphor for a collection of party principles, "plank" is a metaphor for a specific platform statement that supports those principles. Both terms—platforms and planks—are common in American politics but not in politics elsewhere. Coding Instructions for the worldwide Manifesto Database mentions neither term,"[51] and Robert Harmel's 2018 guide to cross-national research on party manifestos does not mention planks.[52] American scholars, in contrast, have analyzed party platforms and planks since the nineteenth century. In 1883, historian Walter Houghton wrote that principles in the 1868 Republican platform "consisted of fourteen planks."[53] In 1936, Richard Browne's dissertation on American party platforms identified four types of planks, resolutions, or pledges:

1. Specific endorsements or condemnations of specified laws. . . .
2. Proposals which call for action and specify what form the action will take without endorsing a particular law. . . .
3. Proposals which call for legislative or executive action, or both, without stating in any way the form of the action. . . .
4. Expressions of sentiment which do not call for any action, either legislative or executive.[54]

According to Gerald Pomper's 1967 classification of platform pledges, type #1 would be evaluative, types #2 and #3 would be pledges of different specificity, and type #4 just rhetorical.

To find and catalog Democratic Party planks, I read through all 45 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 2016 that the American Presidency Project posted on the Internet.[55] Admittedly, "reading through" these lengthy files meant looking for positions on issues while skipping over long passages of party rhetoric. The first Democratic platform in 1840 consisted of only 536 words, and its 1860 platform (when the party split just before the Civil War) was even shorter. As expected, the lengths of Democratic—and Republican—platforms have increased over time. (The average Republican platform exceeded the average Democratic one by nearly 2,000 words.) Using word counts posted by the American Presidency Project, Figure 2.1 plots the number of words in Democratic platforms since 1840.

FIGURE 2.1: Number of Words in Democratic Party Platforms, 1840-2016



Beginning in the 1960s, computers and word processing programs enabled parties to generate more verbiage, leading to longer platforms. Purple passages "pointed with pride" to great Democratic accomplishments and "viewed with alarm" to past and future Republican disasters. In addition, parties over time addressed new and more varied political issues. In 1840, however, the Democrats' platform, acknowledged as the world's first platform adopted at a national party convention,[56] made only nine resolutions. Here is the party's entire 1840 platform (key points in boldface):

1. Resolved, That the federal government is one of **limited powers**, derived solely from the constitution, and the grants of power shown therein, ought to be strictly construed by all the departments and agents of the government, and that it is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers.
2. Resolved, That the constitution **does not confer** upon the general government the power to commence and carry on, a general system of **internal improvements**.
3. Resolved, That the constitution **does not confe**r authority upon the federal government, directly or indirectly, to **assume the debts** of the several states, contracted for local internal improvements, or other state purposes; nor would such assumption be just or expedient.
4. Resolved, That justice and sound policy forbid the federal government to foster one branch of industry to the detriment of another, or to cherish the interests of one portion to the injury of another portion of our common country—that every citizen and **every section of the country, has a right to demand and insist upon an equality of rights** and privileges, and to complete and ample protection of person and property from domestic violence, or foreign aggression.
5. Resolved, That it is the duty of every branch of the government, to enforce and **practice the most rigid economy**, in conducting our public affairs, and that no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray the necessary expenses of the government.
6. Resolved, That **congress has no power to charter a national bank**; that we believe such an institution one of deadly hostility to the best interests of the country, dangerous to our republican institutions and the liberties of the people, and calculated to place the business of the country within the control of a concentrated money power, and above the laws and the will of the people.
7. Resolved, That **congress has no power**, under the constitution**,** to interfere with or control the **domestic institutions of the several states**, and that such states are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts by abolitionists or others, made to induce congress **to interfere with questions of slavery**, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, and endanger the stability and permanency of the union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend to our political institutions.
8. Resolved, That the **separation of the moneys of the government from banking** institutions, is indispensable for the safety of the funds of the government, and the rights of the people.
9. Resolved, That **the liberal principles** embodied by **Jefferson** in the Declaration of Independence, and sanctioned in the constitution, which makes ours the land of liberty, and the asylum of the oppressed of every nation, have ever been cardinal principles in the democratic faith; and every attempt to abridge the present privilege of becoming citizens, and the owners of soil among us, ought to be resisted with the same spirit which swept **the alien and sedition laws** from our statute-book. [Emphases added.]

The first eight of nine resolutions in 1840 asserted political positions and implied action to secure or obtain them. (Thus, they were also pledges.) The ninth resolution credited the party's liberal principles to its founder. Nevertheless, these 1840 resolutions still reflected the values of the party when it was founded in 1828. Moreover, these resolutions and party values were essentially repeated—often

verbatim—in the 1844, 1852, and 1856 platforms. Up to 1864, Democrats enumerated their platform resolutions. After that, numbered resolutions became less common and specific planks less clear, even if numbered. As platforms stopped numbering planks and platform verbiage increased, planks became increasingly difficult to spot, complicating the task of identifying and compiling all the planks in all the platforms.

Other historians and political scientists have systematically studied party platforms. Appendix B provides an extensive but incomplete chronology of that research. Most recently and notably, sociologist Scott Appelrouth employed a statistical technique called "topic modeling" to the texts of all 45 Democratic platforms since 1840 and all 41 Republican platforms since 1856. Topic modeling "clusters words from a collection of documents to topics whose meanings are to be unpacked by a close reading of those documents."[57] Using these "bags of word," Appelrouth's computer routine disclosed 14 topics dominating the Democratic platforms and 18 dominant topics for Republicans.[58] For Democrats, the top two topics were labeled "A New World Order" and "Farm Policies." For Republicans, they were "Agricultural and Industrial Policy" and "The Military."[59]

Appelrouth warned, "not only can the clusters of words be difficult to decipher, but they also may not include terms that are known to recur frequently," and later admitted, "On their own, the topic models do not expose how each party crafted its vision of the nation."[60] While he used topic modeling to frame his research, Appelrouth devoted most of his study to his own reading and analysis of the platform texts, not looking for pledges or planks but for expressions of political and governmental philosophy to describe both parties and illustrate their differences. His work will inform the chapters in Part 4 that analyze specific party planks.

John Gerring's research in *Party Ideologies in America,* most closely resembles mine.[61] Gerring read and categorized hundreds of candidates' speeches and all party platforms from 1828 to 1992.[62] He consulted more than 1,200 texts, "the vast majority speeches by the presidential candidates or their surrogate spokespersons."[63] Just from the parties' platforms, he classified over 10,000 sentences into 24 categories plus "unclassifiable".[64] Because Gerring mixed political speeches with party platforms and handled platforms differently, his research cannot be fully replicated—that is, repeated using exactly the same methods. Moreover, redoing his study using party platforms yields a different, and arguable truer, assessment of party principles.

Explaining the Procedure

Culling planks from party platforms involves selecting passages implying political actions that reflect political principles. The plank selection process is inherently subjective. I detected 3,392 specific planks, but other readers of the same texts may find fewer or more. Should another person choose to spend countless hours reading over 422,000 words in all Democratic platforms since 1840 and to independently cull an alternative set of planks, I would be delighted, for we could compare our two sets. They will surely not be identical in totals and specific planks, but I doubt that the two sets would be very different.

My confidence in saying that is bolstered by having compared my planks with those selected by Richard Browne nearly ninety years ago.[65] He compiled a list of planks taken from all parties (major and minor) from 1840 to 1936. I described Browne's compilation of Republican planks since 1856 in *The Republican Evolution*. Here, I can compare his list of 420 planks for 25 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 1936 with my set of 604 for the same period.

Browne worked without benefit of modern technology. Computer techniques allowed me to cut and paste text from party platforms online, to capture more planks, and to record more information about them. The first column of Table 2.1 displays the terse description of the eight planks that Browne culled from the 1840 Democratic platform.[66] The middle column notes the numbered resolutions from which they were drawn. The third column shows my longer plank descriptions, partially cut and pasted from the platform text.

TABLE 2.1: Two Plank Lists Drawn from the 1840 Democratic Platform

Browne's planks	No.	Janda's planks
Strict construction of the Constitution.	1	Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
Oppose internal improvements.	2	the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
Oppose assumption of state debts.	3	the federal government cannot assume state debts
Oppose sectionalism.	4	federal government cannot foster one industry or region over another
Rigid economy	5	no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
Oppose United States banks.	6	congress has no power to charter a national bank
State control of slavery.	7	congress has no power to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of states
Independent treasury system	8	government money must be separate from banking institutions
	9	favor liberal principles; oppose alien and sedition laws

Table 2.1 illustrates two points about culling planks from party platforms:

1. *Independent researchers usually produce similar lists of party planks*. Browne and I agreed on the content of eight of nine planks from the 1840 platform.

2. *Independent researchers may not always agree about what counts as a plank*. I considered Resolution #9 to be a plank; Browne did not.

The 1840 Democratic platform had few words, and its few resolutions were clearly numbered. The party's 1936 platform, representing the last year in Browne's study, provided a sterner comparison. That platform had over 2,300 words and did not enumerate resolutions. Nevertheless, Table 2.2 shows that we agreed on identifying most of its planks.

TABLE 2.2: Two Plank Lists Drawn from the 1936 Democratic Platform

Browne found 20 planks		**Janda found 17 planks**
	We agreed on 13 planks	
Strict neutrality	√	favor true neutrality in foreign policy
Anti-monopolies	√	end monopolistic practices and the concentration of economic power
Protect consumers against exploitation	√	enforce the criminal and civil provisions of the existing anti-trust laws
Farm relief through curtailing production	√	continue to improve the soil conservation and domestic allotment program for farmers
Provide cheap power	√	continue to promote plans for rural electrification
Encourage good housing	√	extend its housing program for the poor
Favor relief work	√	believe that unemployment is a national problem
Protect business from excessive competition	√	protect our farmers and manufacturers against unfair competition
Favor reciprocal trade program	√	seek lowering of those tariff barriers
Managed currency, economy	√	determined to reduce the expenses of government
Civil service	√	extend the merit system through the classified civil service
Generous treatment of veterans	√	provide for veterans
Constitutional amendment if necessary to increase federal power	√	amend constitution to enact necessary legislation
	We disagreed on finding other planks	
Browne found 7 others		**Janda found 5 others**
Protect savings		enable farmers to adjust and balance production with demand
Protect civil liberties		Extend the Good Neighbor policy
Favor old age pensions and unemployment		favor encouragement of sound, practical farm co-operatives
Aid to youth		favor judicious commodity loans on seasonal surpluses
Flood control		oppose war as an instrument of national policy
Labor legislation		
Protect citizens from kidnapping and banditry		

Using computer technology, I usually detected more planks in platform texts than Browne did, so I was surprised to learn that he listed 20 planks in the 1936 platform while I found only 17. Browne may have scrutinized that year's Democratic platform more closely for planks to include in his 1936 thesis.[67]

Describing at some length this discrepancy serves three purposes. First, it might explain the anomaly in how Browne and I counted planks in the same platform. Second, it shows how two researchers can differ on reading the same text. Third, it illustrates the nitty-gritty involved in counting platform planks.

Describing Democratic Planks

As most party platforms embedded their planks in sentences within the text, planks were often difficulty to spot. I identified sentences that (a) had contemporary political implications, and (b) implied the party's *position* on the issue. As for contemporary implications, I excluded endorsements of past accomplishments, such as praising passage of a legislative act. Concerning the party's position, the sentence had to indicate a policy stance: "fighting for the farmer" would not qualify. Identifying and cataloging party planks is an uncertain procedure, and other researchers would not have identified and cataloged exactly the same planks that I did.

My process for cataloguing Democratic planks followed that for cataloguing Republican planks in *The Republican Evolution*. It involved two steps: first laying out the main headings and then detailing the specific codes applied to the planks. The main headings and the specific codes followed the format used for Republican planks. The coding scheme had eight general categories organized into two equal groups. The primary group embraced the four core values of Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods. Those four values underlie most issues of domestic political conflict. A secondary group consists of three general categories—Government, Foreign Policy, and Symbolic—and a fourth category, Military. Technically, the Military is a Public Good, but military spending can be huge and grows with technology over time. These eight main headings are given in Table 2.3; each next to the first digit of a more detailed three-digit scheme. [All the Democratic planks are listed at www.partypolitics.org.]

TABLE 2.3: Distribution of 3,392 Democratic Planks over Major Code Headings

1st Digit	Heading Type	Coding Category Descriptions	N	%
	Primary Code			
1 – –	Freedom	Policies limiting government	304	9%
2 – –	Order	Policies restricting citizens' freedom	396	12%
3 – –	Equality	Policies benefitting disadvantaged people	339	10%
4 – –	Public Goods	Policies benefitting the public	1,120	33%
		Totals	**2,159**	**64%**
	Secondary Code			
5 – –	Government	Actions pertaining to the government	452	13%
6 – –	Military	Actions benefitting the military	130	4%
7 – –	Foreign Policy	Relations with foreign states	571	17%
8 – –	Symbolic	Expressions of support, regret	80	2%
		Totals	**1,233**	**36%**
		GRAND TOTALS	**3,392**	**100%**

Each of the eight major code headings embraced more detailed codes, producing 114 categories in all. There are far too many Democratic planks in too many categories to discuss them individually. The four primary codes reflect party principles better than the four secondary codes and account for almost two-thirds of all planks. Planks tagged under the four primary coding categories figure most prominently in tracing the Democrats' evolution, and they will be presented in detail in Part 4. Here, we detail the specific secondary code heading to illustrate the specificity of the coding.

Secondary Headings and Codes

Democratic planks coded under the four secondary headings—Government, Military, Foreign Policy, and Symbolic—did not differ substantially or consistently from Republican platform planks I had coded previously. Secondary Codes 5 – – Government, were used for planks that dealt with political structure and administration. Except for code 503 Expand Government, they had no consistent partisan nature. Table 2.4 lays out the Government codes and their frequencies.

TABLE 2.4: Government Plank Codes and Usage, 1840-2016

GOVERNMENT codes	N	%
500 Congress	29	6.4
501 Constitution	39	8.6
502 Civil/Postal Service	50	11.1
503 Expand government	42	9.3
504 Reorganize government	23	5.1
505 Elections	68	15.0
506 Interior, pro-public	47	10.4
507 Statehood	12	2.7
508 Territories	75	16.6
509 Native populations	31	6.9
510 Washington DC	16	3.5
511 Legal	16	3.5
512 Federal courts	4	0.9
Total	452	100.0

Just two Government codes—508 Territories and 505 Elections—accounted for almost one-third of the usage, and neither code consistently reflected partisanship. That was not true of code 503, Expand government, and it will be considered later in some detail.

The Secondary Codes under the heading 6 – – Military, flip-flopped over time—depending o which party owned the conflict at hand. Table 2.5 presents the codes and data.

TABLE 2.5: Military Plank Codes and Usage, 1840-2016

MILITARY codes	N	%
600 More spending	16	12.3
601 Less spending	19	14.6
602 Navy	7	5.4
603 Army	3	2.3
604 Air Force	4	3.1
605 National Guard	3	2.3
606 Nuclear	46	35.4
607 Missiles	4	3.1
608 Space	12	9.2
609 Intelligence	4	3.1
610 Command	3	2.3
611 Service	9	6.9
Total	130	100.0

Democrats adopted relatively few planks directed at the military, and more than one-third concerned nuclear weapons or energy.

Secondary Codes 7 – – Foreign Policy (like Military) also had showed little consistent partisanship, changing according to whether the policy at hand had Democratic or Republican ownership. Table 2.6 presents the codes and data.

TABLE 2.6 Foreign Policy Plank Codes and Usage, 1840-2016

FOREIGN POLICY codes	N	%
700 World Organizations	56	9.8
701 Europe	18	3.2
+702 NATO, etc., favorable	20	3.5
–702 NATO, etc., unfavorable	3	0.5
703 Asia	49	8.6
704 Americas	70	12.3
705 Africa	35	6.1
706 Soviet/Russia	31	5.4
707 China/Taiwan	22	3.9
708 Middle East	75	13.1
709 Wars post WW2	33	5.8
710 Foreign aid	29	5.1
711 Treaties	36	6.3
712 Monroe Doctrine	14	2.5
713 Protect Citizens	30	5.3
714 Avoid war	12	2.1
715 World Leader	38	6.7
Total	571	100.0

Most of the 708 Middle East codes were for planks expressing support for Israel.

Secondary Codes 8 -- Symbolic were used for the relatively few planks that praised people or countries. Such planks occurred more often in earlier platforms. Table 2.7 presents the codes and data.

TABLE 2.7: Symbolic Plank Codes and Usage, 1840-2016

SYMBOLIC codes	N	%
800 Presidents	7	8.8
802 Discrimination	9	11.3
803 Atrocities	4	5.0
804 Politicians	3	3.8
805 Treaties	2	2.5
806 Political Acts	20	25.0
807 Peace	31	38.8
808 War	3	3.8
809 Other	1	1.3
Total	80	100.0

Planks promising to achieve Peace (code 807) accounted for almost 40 percent of the Symbolic codes. Political Acts (e.g., code 806, which in 1888 expressed support for home rule for Ireland) took up another quarter. Such planks were idiosyncratic and did not significantly divide Democrats from Republicans. Secondary codes completed the coding categories. They are not involved in subsequent analyses of Democratic principles.

Describing Republican Planks

Extracting party planks from the political verbiage of party platforms is a subjective process, one that is open to charges of partisan bias in "selecting" the planks. Readers should understand that I compiled my database of thousands of Republican planks first, in 2020. A year passed before I began in 2022 to extract thousands of Democratic planks from a slightly larger set of platforms. After collecting the data, I was as surprised as anyone to find that the proportions of Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods planks were uncannily similar for both parties. Table 2.8 provides the same information for Republicans that Table 2.3 provides for Democrats. (Appendix C has tables reporting usage of all specific primary and secondary codes applied to Republican planks.)

Table 2.8: Distribution of 2,722 Republican Planks over Major Code Headings

1st Digit	Heading Type	Coding Category Descriptions	N	%
	Primary Code			
1 – –	Freedom	Policies limiting government	439	16%
2 – –	Order	Policies restricting citizens' freedom	374	14%
3 – –	Equality	Policies benefitting disadvantaged people	260	10%
4 – –	Public Goods	Policies benefitting the public	871	32%
		Totals	**1,944**	**72%**
	Secondary Code			
5 – –	Government	Actions pertaining to the government	244	9%
6 – –	Military	Actions benefitting the military	114	4%
7 – –	Foreign Policy	Relations with foreign states	402	15%
8 – –	Symbolic	Expressions of support, regret	18	1%
		Totals	**778**	**29%**
		GRAND TOTALS	**2,722**	**101%**

One noticeable but small difference between Tables 2.3 and 2.8 is in the percentage of total planks that drew primary versus secondary codes. Whereas primary codes were assigned to 72 percent of Republican planks, they accounted for only 64 percent of Democratic ones. Closer examination shows that more Democratic planks were coded under the secondary heading, 5 – – Government, which largely stems from significantly more Democratic than Republican planks being coded 506 Interior, pro-government.

Figure 2.1 plainly demonstrates strong similarities in the profiles of primary codes independently assigned to Republican and Democratic platform planks while coding in different years. Approximately one-third of all Republican and all Democratic planks were coded for providing Public Goods, fitting with political parties' role in government. Concerning political values, one-tenth of each party's planks drew Equality codes, and about thirteen percent were coded under the Order category. The only substantial difference occurred concerning planks coded for Freedom. Republican planks drew this code almost twice as often as Democratic planks. As explained in later chapters, Republicans—especially after the middle of the twentieth century—enacted many planks that reflected libertarian values.

Figure 2.2: Comparing Both Parties' Planks over Major Code Headings*



*Percentages were rounded to whole numbers.

Viewing Figure 2.2, some readers might think that little came from analyzing 6,000 Democratic and Republican platform planks. More than two years of laboriously collecting and coding party planks simply showed that Democrats and Republicans did not differ in any significant way in their political principles, in their key governmental values.

But Figure 2.2 lumps together the parties' planks without regard to historical periods. It does not take into account the divergent evolutions of the Democratic and Republican parties. Analyzing the parties' planks instead by political eras produces a very different picture, as will be demonstrated in Parts 3 and 4. The data will show that the two parties essentially swapped their positions concerning the role of the national and state governments and governmental pursuit of Freedom, Order, and Equality.

Conclusion

Reading through party platforms to identify specific planks that promise governmental action to fulfill a party principle is a tedious, subjective process. Different readers will come up with different lists of different length, but both lists are likely to overlap substantially. My research classified planks under eight headings divided into two sets—one "primary" and the other "secondary." The primary heading embraces planks coded for Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods. They account for almost two-thirds of all platform planks and reflect partisan differences far better than planks tagged with secondary codes.

Independent coding of Republican planks unexpectedly produced very similar profiles of major coding categories—both primary and secondary. Because data in this chapter apply to all planks adopted since the middle of the nineteenth century, the data do not disclose how the parties changed over time. During the many decades since the origins of the Democratic and Republican parties, their planks distributed very differently over the primary coding categories.

In *The Republican Evolution,* I contended that the Republican Party was a governing party during its Nationalism era from 1860 to 1924. By 1928, it entered a short Neoliberalism era, which ended in 1960. In 1964, Barry Goldwater ushered the party into its current Ethnocentrism era.

This book argues that the Democratic Party also experienced three different eras since its origin. Its States' Rights era lasted from 1828 to 1896. From 1900 to 1948, Democrats practiced Cooperative Federalism. In 1952, it entered its current National Authority era.

These eras need to be defined and explained, but that cannot be done without reviewing the Democratic Party's origin and its political fortunes, which are addressed in seven chapters of Part 2. Part 3 will draw on the party's political history to frame the three eras of the Democratic Party and study the Democrats' planks separately during the eras. Part 4 will compare the divergent evolutions of the Democratic and Republican parties.

PART 2: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND FORTUNES

The seven chapters in Part 2 focus on slavery and racial discrimination in tracing the party's evolution from slavery to equality.

The Democratic Party began in the early 1800s as a defender of human slavery. After the Civil War, former slaves became citizens and voters. For decades, the party's influential southern wing struggled over dealing with the new reality. By the end of the century, southern whites began implementing a rigid system of legal racial segregation.

Solid support for Democrats running for public office and segregation reigned across southern states from 1900 to the middle of the twentieth century. At the 1948 Democratic National Convention, however, the party abruptly and officially endorsed civil rights, causing some southern delegates to walk out of the hall. In the mid-1960s, a Democratic president and a Democratic Congress legislated to protect voting rights and to end segregation countrywide.

Beginning in the 1990s, Democrats passed national laws protecting equal rights for women, for people with disabilities, for immigrants who did not speak English, and for those who did not identify as male or female. The party of slavery had become the party of equality.

CHAPTER 3

1792-1828: The Democratic Party's Origin

Scholars generally acknowledge the U.S. Democratic Party to be the world's oldest surviving political party, but some disagree over its date of origin: 1792 versus 1828. It certainly is decades older than the Republican Party, which started in 1854,[68] and which was supposedly named to draw legitimacy from the "Republican" label used by Thomas Jefferson's followers.[69] Ironically, the Jeffersonian Republicans of the 1790s became the forbearers of today's Democrats.

Jefferson and his followers reportedly called themselves Republicans, because they believed they were defending the Republic (which is to say the Revolution) against subversion by what Jefferson called the 'Monarchist Federalists,'" led by Alexander Hamilton.[70] Later, Jeffersonians were deemed "Democratic Republicans" but not just "Democrats." Although most scholars credit President Washington's Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson (and Representative James Madison) for the origin of the Democratic Party, many distinguish between its inception (owed to Jefferson) and its creation (attributed to Andrew Jackson). Not until Jackson's successful presidential campaign of 1828 did partisans campaign as plain Democrats.

Regarding whether the Democratic Party began in 1792 as Republicans under Jefferson or in 1828 as Democrats under Jackson, the 1992 Democratic Party Platform officially declared: the party began under Jefferson, saying, "Two hundred summers ago, this Democratic Party was founded by the man whose burning pen fired the spirit of the American Revolution. . . . In 1992, the party Thomas Jefferson founded invokes his spirit of revolution anew."[71]

In 1992, Democratic partisans were eager to end the string of Republican election victories and presidencies—Ronald Reagan 1980 and 1984, George H.W. Bush 1988—so they may have jumped the gun in claiming their bicentennial celebration and by publishing *Of the People—The 200 Year History of the Democratic Party*.[72] Sized for cocktail tables, the handsomely-illustrated 200-page volume had essays by prominent scholar's and politicians. The lead essay, "The Party's Origins," was by eminent historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., editor of the 3,500-page, four-volume *History of U.S. Political Parties*.[73]

Playing along with the Democrats' bicentennial theme, Schlesinger wrote: "There is no precise moment when it can be said that the first American parties were founded. But 1792 can be plausibly claimed as the year when they began to emerge from the chrysalis."[74] Decades earlier, however, Schlesinger edited the first volume of *History of U.S. Political Parties* differently, devoting separate chapters to "The Jeffersonian Republican Party"[75] and to "The Democratic Party 1828-1860."[76] In effect, Schlesinger's magisterial work distinguished between the organizational nature of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian partisans. Jeffersonians simply bonded on governing principles; Jacksonians acted collectively to win elections. The two groups fit different views of a political party

Jeffersonians, Jacksonians, and Party Definitions

The Jeffersonians and Jacksonians reflected different definitions of a political party. The prevailing definition in the 1790s came from writings by Edmund Burke, the British philosopher and statesman. Commenting on parliamentary parties in 1770, Burke held that a political party consisted of politicians "united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principles in which they are all agreed."[77] At the time he wrote, parties were essentially parliamentary

factions; they did not compete widely for votes in popular elections in England until the 1830s.[78] Nevertheless, Burke's definition stands as the oldest, best known, and most revered for its noble objective—promoting the national interest.

Jeffersonian Republicans certainly met Burke's definition of a political party. They united over the principle that in a federal government, state rights outweighed national authority. Their views were opposed by a group of Federalists. Led by Alexander Hamilton, Federalists were united by the principle that the needs of the nation should take precedents over those of specific states. Historian Schlesinger said that both factions "had a rudimentary party confrontation" in the 1792 election.[79] While Jeffersonian Republicans and Hamiltonian Federalists backed candidates in congressional elections, neither group competed for popular votes in presidential elections.

A competing definition, a more modern one, was popularized in the mid-1950s by economist Anthony Downs. He described parties as teams "seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election."[80] Although Downs also believed that parties proposed policies based on political principles, he argued that they really adopted policies and principles to win elections. Downs' definition does not fit Jeffersonian Republicans, but it does apply to Jacksonian Democrats in 1828. In that year they campaigned vigorously for popular votes to elect Andrew Jackson in America's first mass election—involving over a million voters.

Democrats as a Political Party

The 1787 U.S. Constitution introduced popular election of candidates to the House of Representatives but allowed state legislatures to decide how to choose presidential electors. For decades, most states selected their presidential electors through their legislatures. As suffrage expanded, more states began to allow voters to choose presidential electors. In 1824, only eighteen of the twenty-four existing states cast popular votes to choose presidential electors. In 1828, suffrage included almost all adult white males, and all twenty-four states (except Delaware and South Carolina) chose presidential electors. In 1824, fewer than 366,000 citizens voted for president; in 1828, the popular vote total exceeded 1,149,000.[81]

In his 800+ page history of the Democratic Party, Jules Witcover illustrated how a political party, acting as an electoral team, operated differently from a set of political leaders united on a common principle. Witcover wrote that Jackson's supporters seized on his nickname:

> "Old Hickory," to construct a campaign built on that image, dubbing local political organizations Hickory Clubs, raising "Hickory poles" and planting hickory trees at rallies and barbecues. One anti-Jackson newspaper complained: "Planting hickory trees! Odds nuts and drumsticks! What have hickory trees to do with republicanism and the great contest?"
>
> But the Jacksonians were undeterred in pressing the theme. Soon drawings of hickory branches and leaves, and likenesses of Jackson himself, were adorning all manner of campaign souvenirs, from badges, plates, pitchers, even snuffboxes and ladies' hair combs.[82]

Although those actions by Jackson's partisans occurred nearly two centuries ago, readers can relate to them today. Campaigning then (touting hickory trees) seems similar to campaigning now (wearing MAGA caps). Thus, most scholars grant that the Democratic Party originated around 1792 under Thomas Jefferson but that it was not founded until the 1828 election of Andrew Jackson. That Jacksonians then no longer called themselves "Democrat-Republicans," only "Democrats," which helped fix the party's founding in that election year.

The party's founding fathers—both Jefferson and Jackson—defended slavery. During its nearly two centuries of existence, the United States Democratic Party has completely reversed its principles—from valuing human slavery to promoting social equality among humans. After the Civil War ended slavery, the party's influential southern wing struggled for decades over how to treat former slaves (now citizens and voters) before implementing the South's rigid system of racial segregation.

Segregation and solid support for the Democratic candidates continued across southern states into the middle of the 1900s. At the 1948 Democratic National Convention, the party officially endorsed civil rights, causing some southern delegates to walk out of the hall. In the mid-1960s, a Democratic president and a Democratic Congress enacted legislation to protect voting rights and to end segregation countrywide.

In the 2000s, Democrats passed national laws protecting equal rights for women, for people with disabilities, for immigrants who did not speak English, and for those who did not identify as male or female. The party of slavery had become the party of equality. As the party reversed its political principles, voters changed their political alignments. Before the 1960s, southern voters constituted the solid base of the Democratic Party. The phrase "Solid South" once referred to overwhelming support for Democratic candidates. Nowadays, Republican candidates count on solid support in southern states.

Conclusion

Today, the party founded by Andrew Jackson practices a governmental philosophy directly opposed to its original politics. Similarly, today's Republican Party is no longer the party of Abraham Lincoln. That both parties have reversed their original political orientations is not a new observation. Others have noted that both changed their policies and politics over time. I provide new and different empirical evidence from party platforms.

Before examining that evidence, we should review, in the next six chapters, the history of Democratic politics and electoral fortunes after its founding by Andrew Jackson in 1828. The chapters summarize the political dynamics in text and graphs.

CHAPTER 4

1828-1860: Embracing Slavery

To honor its founders the Democratic Party for decades held periodic Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners at the local, state, and national levels. At the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner on February 16, 1950 in Washington, D.C., (covered by all major radio networks and even televised), President Harry Truman remarked:

> These dinners carry forward a great tradition. The original Jefferson-Jackson dinner was held in this city in 1830, 120 years ago. It was given in memory of Thomas Jefferson, and its guest of honor was Andrew Jackson, President of the United States. At that first Jefferson-Jackson dinner, President Jackson gave his famous toast--"Our Federal Union, it must be preserved!"[83]

At that time, those historic names—Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson—represented political gods to the party faithful. Today, both slave owners are tarnished mortals. In 2015, the Iowa Democratic Party voted to stop designating its annual gatherings as Jefferson-Jackson dinners, joining three other states that had already done so.[84] By 2018, eleven states had done the same.[85]

At the 1830 Jefferson-Jackson dinner—when people in northern and southern states were already dividing politically over the slavery issue—Andrew Jackson toasted to "preserve the Union." Slaves constituted the basis of the South's economy, and the South was the basis of the Democratic Party. Slavery played little or no role in economics of northern states. Indeed, their workers feared losing their paid jobs to unpaid slaves. Despite these entrenched sectional differences, few people anticipated that the slavery issue would split the Democratic Party and produce a rival party whose elected president, Abraham Lincoln, would fulfill Jackson's 1830 toast: "Our Federal Union, it must be preserved!"

The Slavery Issue

Slavery's links to America, which still divides citizens nationwide today, strangely unified sections in the past. Southern Democrats united over slavery; northern whites tended to unite against slavery. Although very few northerners believed that black slaves were mentally and culturally their equals, many regarded the practice as morally wrong and favored abolishing it throughout the nation. Abolition, however, posed two serious problems.

Historian Joseph Ellis outlined both problems in his prize-winning book, *Founding Fathers*.[86] The first problem was the financial cost in reimbursing slave-owners for their loss. The Constitution's Fifth Amendment said that no "private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," and most northerners conceded that slaves were "private property." Ellis estimated that the cost of emancipating the 694,280 slaves counted in the 1790 Census at $170 million, when the federal budget was less than $7 million.[87]

Upon Congress' beginning in 1789, its thirteen states were roughly equally divided between North and South, which led to stalemate on the slavery issue. The twenty-two states in 1819 were evenly divided—eleven to eleven—between North and South. In 1820, Missouri sought entry as a slave state, upsetting the balance. The 1820 Missouri Compromise, which admitted Missouri as slave but also Maine as free, restored equilibrium. The Compromise also "outlawed slavery above the 36º 30' latitude line in the remainder of the Louisiana Territory."[88] It postponed an evitable showdown over slavery cloaked under the governmental philosophy of states' rights.

The Party's Fortunes to the Civil War

One party historian wrote, "The [Jeffersonian] Republicans in 1800 offered the voters a change; they outlined a clear program of policy alternatives to the prevailing Federalist policies. Although the term *platform* was not used and no official program was adopted by any party agency, the Republicans did provide what amounted to a platform."[89] Another historian said, that the Jeffersonian Republicans' key principle was strict construction of the Constitution and "as a check on the nationalization of the United States."[90] Given that scholars agree that Democrats in 1840 continued to embrace their 1828 principles, 1828 marks the beginning of the party's evolutionary process.

Tracing the history of Democratic principles over time requires linking platform planks to high and low points in the party's fortunes—to its election victories and defeats. My historical narrative will often refer to Democrats acting as a team in presidential election campaigns and to other parties' electoral teams. I briefly review presidential election results by parties over different political eras. Naming and describing the players becomes complex during the turbulent early history of the Democratic Party, before the Civil War—from 1828 to 1860.

Elected president in 1828, Andrew Jackson was a self-schooled, temperamental, army general from Tennessee. He was far different personally from the educated, multilingual, and much-admired Thomas Jefferson from Virginia, but their politics were similar. Although Jackson won a plurality of the popular and electoral vote in 1824, he lacked a majority of the electoral votes. The outcome was decided in the House of Representatives, where many disliked the rough frontiersman, and the House gave the presidency to John Quincy Adams. Adams was backed by "National" Republicans who split from "Democratic" Republicans for choosing a backwoods commoner as president. His rematch with Adams in 1828 occurred with a vastly expanded electorate, and Jackson won handily. He got 56 percent of the popular vote and 68 percent of the electoral vote, taking every state outside the northeast. Jackson also won re-election in 1832 against another National Republican, terminating that party's existence and perpetuating its followers' resentment of Jackson and Jacksonians.

Figure 4.1 below names all party candidates who received at least one percent of the popular vote in nine presidential elections from 1828 to 1860. Those who won the presidency are in boldface. Figure 4.1 depicts the Democrats' dominance after the party's founding. Democrats won six of nine elections to 1860. While masses of ordinary voters revered Andrew Jackson, some ambitious politicians reviled him. For example, the "National Republicans" opposed him unsuccessfully in 1828 and 1832. The short-lived Anti-Masonic Party also opposed Jackson, who was not only a Mason but the Grand Master of his Tennessee Masonic lodge.[91]

FIGURE 4.1: Popular Votes for President by Parties, 1828-1860*



*Percentages rounded to whole numbers.

In 1836, Anti-Masons joined with National Republicans to form the Whig Party, reviving a name from America's colonial era. Whigs in the British parliament opposed monarchical rule; Tories supported the crown. This Whig-Tory distinction in England influenced the colonists' views of King George III in America. By calling themselves Whigs, Jackson's opponents implied that they were opposing someone who acted as a king, not a president. Whigs and Democrats alternated in the presidency over four elections, 1840 to 1852.

Neither Whigs nor Democrats campaigned overtly on the issue of slavery. However, Democrats campaigned on states' rights, which silently included slavery. Whigs, who functioned more like an electoral team, seeking to win office than a party pursuing principles, also avoided slavery. One scholar said the Whigs' "most vital grievance" was Jackson's "executive usurpation."[92] Indeed, when Whigs convened in Albany, New York, in 1836 to nominate William Henry Harrison for president, they took no position on government policy. They simply resolved that the Democratic candidate, Martin Van Buren, had intrigued with president Jackson "to elect him to the Presidency" and thus "set an example dangerous to our freedom and corrupting to our free institutions."[93] Unfortunately for the new party, Whig conventions in other states nominated two other candidates and split the 1836 vote. In 1840, Whigs managed to nominate just one candidate, Harrison, who comfortably defeated Van Buren's attempt at re-election.

Over half a century after the Constitution was ratified, slavery emerged explicitly in party politics in 1840. Abolitionists formed the Liberty Party to oppose the spread of slavery. Its candidate, James G. Birney, gained only 0.31 percent of the popular vote and had no effect on the election's outcome. More importantly, the Democrats in 1840 formally embraced slavery in their first party platform, resolving:

> That congress has no power, under the constitution to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states, and that such states are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by the constitution; that all efforts by abolitionists or others, made to induce congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish the happiness of the people, and endanger the stability and permanency of the union, and ought not to be countenanced by any friend to our political institutions.

Although Liberty's candidate, Birney, increased his share to 2.3 percent in the next election, he probably again had no effect on the 1844 electoral vote, as Democrat James K. Polk recaptured the presidency for the Democratic Party. Once again, the Whig Party took no position on slavery. Two years later, both parties were forced to grapple with the issue.

While 1846 was an off-year for presidential elections, politics that year had consequences for later elections. President Polk had asked Congress for $2 million to negotiate peace after the Mexican War and to settle the national boundaries. Representative David Wimot of Pennsylvania, a Democrat, sought to amend the funding bill to prohibit slavery in the newly acquired territories in the southwest. The "Wilmot Proviso" failed to pass but provoked divisions among Democrats and Whigs.

In 1848, a group of "Conscience" Whigs concerned about slavery convened with an antislavery faction of New York Democrats and delegates from the Liberty Party to form the Free Soil Party.[94] The new party nominated Martin Van Buren, the former U.S. President and former Democrat. Although the Free Soil Party, headed by Van Buren, won more than ten percent of the popular vote, it took no electoral votes. Still, it divided the Democrats enough to elect Whig Zachary Taylor president on a platform that never mentioned slavery.

President Zachary Taylor died in 1850 and was succeeded by his Whig Vice president Millard Fillmore. Fillmore presided over and supported what became known as "The compromise of 1850," described as a package of legislation

> admitting California as a free state, creating Utah and New Mexico territories with the question of slavery in each to be determined by popular sovereignty, settling a Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute in the former's favor, ending the slave trade in Washington, D.C., and making it easier for southerners to recover fugitive slaves.[95]

Like most compromises, it satisfied neither side concerning slavery but papered-over the issue enough to continue politics as usual.

In 1852, the Whigs denied re-nominating its sitting president, Fillmore, and nominated Winfield Scott on a platform that again failed to mention slavery but did refer to "the recovery of fugitive slaves." Democrats, Whigs, and Free Soil competed for the presidency in 1852 as in 1848. This time, Democrats regained the presidency, electing Franklin Pierce. The Free Soil candidate drew under five percent of the popular vote.

In 1854, another off-year for presidential elections, Congress passed the fateful Kansas-Nebraska Act, introduced by Democratic Senator Stephen Douglas. It repealed the 1820 Missouri Compromise and reopened the Compromise of 1850. The National Archives said that the bill

> divided the land immediately west of Missouri into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska. He [Douglas] argued in favor of popular sovereignty, or the idea that the settlers of the new territories should decide if slavery would be legal there.
>
> Anti-slavery supporters were outraged because, under the terms of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 slavery would have been outlawed in both territories since they were both north of the 36º30' N dividing line between "slave" and "free" states.[96]

Within months after the Kansas-Nebraska Act was introduced, its opponents formed the Republican Party. Opposing the spread of slavery to the new territories, Republicans absorbed the former Free Soil Party.

Two years later, the infant Republican Party nominated John Frémont to compete in the 1856 presidential election against a candidate of the established Democratic Party. President Pierce expected to be re-nominated as the Democratic candidate, but northern Democrats objected to his support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and his enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law. For the first (and only) time in U.S. history "an elected president who was an active candidate for reelection was not nominated by his political party for a second term."[97]

As Pierce suffered from the slavery issue, so did the Whig Party, which had studiously avoided taking a stand. A rump group of Whigs held the party's last national convention in Baltimore and adopted its last platform in 1856. The party's extraordinary swan song formally resolved that the Whigs had "no new principles to announce—no new platform." However, they also formally resolved to back Millard Fillmore, who had already been nominated by the new American Party. Astonishingly, they endorsed him "without adopting or referring to the peculiar principles" of that party.[98]

The American Party emerged from a secretive patriotic society that instructed its members to say that they "knew nothing" about its activities. Hence, when organized in 1852, it was called the "Know-Nothing Party."[99] The American Party's "peculiar principles" included a resolution that "*native-born* citizens should be selected for all State, Federal and municipal offices." It also asserted that they should not have "any allegiance or obligation of any description to any foreign prince, potentate or power[100] The first part aimed at immigrants; the second aimed at Catholics, thought to owe allegiance to the Pope.

The 1856 election heralded the end of a decades-old two-party system. The Whig Party, whose presidential candidates opposed Democratic candidates from 1836 through 1856, had collapsed. Although Democrat James Buchanan was elected president in 1856, he drew only 45 percent of the popular vote. Republican John Frémont, the first candidate of a new party, attracted one-third of the vote, while the ethnocentric American Party & Whig candidate, Millard Fillmore, drew almost one-quarter.

Democrats Become a Regional Party

The 1860 election brought the collapse of the Democratic Party as a national party. After three tumultuous conventions—one began on April 23 in Charleston, South Carolina; a second on June 18 in Baltimore, Maryland; a third on June 23 also in Baltimore—Democrats fractured into sectional segments. Given the significance of those conventions' proceedings, each convention deserves discussion. Contemporary historian Walter R. Houghton provided a concise account of the events in his 1883 book, published just two decades later. Passages in quotation marks below are from that book[101].

The April 23 Charleston convention began with Democratic delegates from all thirty-three states

then in the Union. Before nominating a candidate, they voted unanimously to support the party's platform that the convention was to adopt. The main issue was not about slavery itself but on whether slavery should be permitted in new territories apt to become states. After six days, a divided committee delivered majority and minority reports that "agreed on all questions except the one regarding slavery in the territories." The majority report, backed by delegates from slave-holding states, argued that "the principle decided by the Supreme Court, referring to the Dred Scott decision" determined that a territory could enter the United States regardless of whether it "prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery."

Northern backers of the minority report refused to recognize the applicability of the Dred Scott decision and argued that "the question of slavery should be decided by the people in a territory. A vote to adopt the minority report passed 165 to 138, and a second vote on "adoption of the resolution referring to slavery in the territories" failed. Consequently, delegates from seven southern states withdrew from the convention on April 30. The Georgia delegation left the next day. Voting for the nomination began on May 1 but ended indecisively on May 3 after fifty-five-ballots. Illinois Stephen Douglas was ahead but short of the two-thirds then required by Democrats.

On June 18, Democrats reconvened in Baltimore, lacking some southern delegates who had left the previous convention, which had favored Douglas in the voting but failed to nominate him. Douglas' supporters (now in charge) ruled against seating delegates who had withdrawn from the first convention. After a vote against seating them eight delegations (most from southern states) left again. Balloting began the next day. The remaining delegates, mostly from northern states, nominated Senator Stephen Douglas as the Democratic Party's 1860 presidential candidate. It adopted a platform acknowledging that a "difference of opinion exists in the Democratic party" concerning "the institution of slavery within the Territories" and resolving to "abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon these questions of Constitutional law." In sum, Douglas' northern Democrats avoided taking a position on slavery.

The June 23 Baltimore convention consisted of "delegates who had withdrawn from the Douglas convention, and the original delegates from Louisiana and Alabama," Houghton wrote, "calling themselves the national democratic convention." They nominated John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky for president. Another group of delegates who had seceded from the Charleston convention also met in Baltimore later to nominate Breckinridge. They were later tagged as the Southern Democrats. Their platform said that a state "ought to be admitted into the Federal Union, whether its Constitution prohibits or recognizes the institution of slavery." Breckinridge's Southern Democrats would allow slavery.

Also in 1860, a third group of twenty states sent delegates (some from the former American Party) to meet in Baltimore. They formed the Constitutional Union Party whose platform did not mention slavery and recognized "no political principle other than THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRY, THE UNION OF THE STATES, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAWS [sic]," It nominated southerner John Bell of Tennessee for the presidency. Entering the presidential election, the once-dominant Democratic Party had divided into three parts.

Formed in 1854 and competing in its second presidential election in 1860, the Republican Party nominated Abraham Lincoln on the second ballot. Its platform mentioned slavery in five places and denied "the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States." Lincoln became the only president to win a majority of the electoral votes while winning only 40 percent of the popular votes. Southern Democrat Breckinridge won under 24 percent of the popular vote, but that was almost twice the vote won by Constitutional Union Bell and three times more than northern Democrat Douglas. Houghton concluded:

"Thus was the democratic party divided, and the election of a republican made possible." Democrats flourished only in the South for decades afterward.

Conclusion

When the Constitution was ratified in 1788, eight of the original thirteen states endorsed slavery, while five were so-called "free" states. By 1819, the Union had grown to twenty-two states evenly divided: eleven northern and free; eleven southern and slave. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 admitted Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free state to keep the balance at twelve to twelve. That postponed the political showdown for a few decades.

In 1828, the Democratic Party began as the dominant party in the nation, winning its first three presidential elections. Democratic presidents and Democrats in Congress steadfastly defended the principle of states' right within a federal system of government. Their defense of states' rights cloaked their defense of slavery.

In 1850, another legislative compromise kicked the can further down the road. It admitted California as a free state, allowed Utah and New Mexico to decide the issue by popular vote, and ended slavery in the District of Columbia. Many northern citizens wanted to insure that slavery would not extend beyond the southern states, and some worked actively to abolish slavery altogether. As new territories sought to enter the Union, whether they would permit or deny slavery became critical to both sides.

In 1852, Democrat Franklin Pierce won 51 percent of the popular vote and the presidency. His party seemed securely in control. In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, introduced by Democratic Senator Douglas, bill raised the possibility that slavery could be extended into territories where it had once been banned, which led to the formation of the Republican Party.

Although Democrat James Buchanan became president in 1856, he won only 45 percent of the popular vote. After Lincoln was elected in 1860, the Democratic Party was relegated to second place in presidential politics. The Civil War settled the slavery issue. Afterwards, racism replaced slavery as the defining political issue for Democrats in the southern states and a challenge for the Democratic Party nationwide. By 1860, the once proud party of Jefferson and Jackson, which had dominated politics for half a century, had become a regional party, out of national power.

CHAPTER 5

1864-1896: After Slavery and Before Segregation

After the Civil War, southerners—white and Black—had to adjust to the constitutional amendments that transformed former slaves into American citizens and voters. How would these freedmen live surrounded by many hostile whites? Former slave Houston Hartsfield Holloway, wrote, "For we colored people did not know how to be free and the white people did not know how to have a free colored person about them."[102]

Readers in the twenty-first century might think that southern whites, being economically and numerically dominant, replaced slavery with racial segregation soon after the war ended. However, eminent historian C. Vann Woodward's *The Strange Case of Jim Crow* explains that in the antebellum South slavery was incompatible with segregation, which "would have been an inconvenience and obstruction to the system."[103] Slavery was built on close, even intimate, contact between white supervisors and Black workers. Consequently, apartheid-style segregation did not spread across southern states until the start of the twentieth century. It took over three decades, from 1865 to the end of the century, for white southerners to replace slavery with segregation. The story has two parts: Reconstruction and Redemption.

Presidential and Congressional Reconstruction, 1865-1877

The Civil War officially ended on April 9, 1865. Republican President Abraham Lincoln was assassinated the next week. Lincoln had planned to reunite the North and South after the war by allowing "Confederate states to establish new state governments after 10 percent of their male population took loyalty oaths and the states recognized the permanent freedom of formerly enslaved people." Congressional Republicans in 1864 had already passed a more stringent plan:

> The Wade-Davis Reconstruction Bill would also have abolished slavery, but it required that 50 percent of a state's White males take a loyalty oath to the United States (and swear they had never assisted the Confederacy) to be readmitted to the Union. Only after taking this "Ironclad Oath" would they be able to participate in conventions to write new state constitutions.[104]

The Republican bill did not promote the "tolerance and speed" in reconstruction that Lincoln favored. He failed to sign the bill, and it died.

President Lincoln was succeeded by his Vice President, Andrew Johnson, a Democrat chosen to create a unity ticket for the 1864 election. Not only was Johnson a Democrat, but today's U.S. White House website describes him as "an old-fashioned southern Jacksonian Democrat of pronounced states' rights views."[105] Congress was not in session when Lincoln died and Johnson assumed office. As president, Johnson issued a series of proclamations in May that inaugurated what was called the period of Presidential Reconstruction (1865-1867).[106]

Johnson's policies offered freedmen no political role and allowed southern whites to return to power. State legislatures enacted Black Codes that "sought to limit the freedmen's economic options and reestablish plantation discipline."[107] When Congress reconvened in December 1865, Republicans differed in their reactions to Johnson's actions. Moderates agreed to modify some of his program but refused to seat some newly elected southern congressmen. Others, known as Radical Republicans,

sought to reverse Johnson's plans for reinstating the old southern way of life and to secure for freedmen their civil rights.

The Civil War brought "civil rights" to prominence. Today the term refers broadly to "rights guaranteed to a member of society"—to subjects "of a civil government."[108] The term had a narrower legal meaning then. The nation's first civil rights act was passed in 1862. It "freed slaves in the District of Columbia and compensated owners up to $300 for each freeperson."[109] After the war, Radical Republicans proposed, and Congress passed, the momentous 1866 Civil Rights Bill mandating that "all persons born in the United States," with the exception of American Indians, were "hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."

The legislation also granted all citizens the "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property."[110] That marked a profound change in government, as the nation, not the state, now claimed Americans as citizen and committed to protecting their rights.[111] Democratic President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Republicans' bill, but it became the first major piece of legislation to pass over a presidential veto.[112]

Radical Republicans then proceeded with a period of Congressional Reconstruction. Their 1867 Reconstruction Act divided the South into five military districts and directed that new governments be formed on the basis of manhood suffrage. After the Ku Klux Klan terrorized black citizens for exercising their right to vote, Congress passed Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871, allowing the use of military force, which halted Klan violence for a time. Freedmen were encouraged to vote, and most voted Republican. Many former slaves were elected to office: "some sixteen served in Congress during Reconstruction, over six hundred in state legislatures, and hundreds more in local offices."[113]

Northern Republicans' appetite for Radical Reconstruction of the South began to fade during the emerging industrialization era. The transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869. Typewriters, telephones, phonographs, and light bulbs came in the 1870s—along with a severe depression in 1873. As the Gilded Age began, the commercial and manufacturing North took less interest in the political fortunes of the poorer and agricultural South and more interest in financial opportunities elsewhere. Then in 1874, Democrats won control of the House for the first time since the Civil War. A historian wrote, "By 1876, only South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana remained under Republican control —the remaining southern states had been 'redeemed' by white Democrats."[114]

Reconstruction of the South ended after the disputed 1876 presidential election between Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and Democrat Samuel J. Tilden. Tilden led in the popular vote, but Hayes was only one short of an electoral vote majority. Conflicting electoral counts came from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana—the three southern states controlled by Democrats, who also held the House, which might decide the presidency. After lengthy meetings of a bipartisan committee, a political compromise was reached in March, 1877. Democrats would allow Hayes' election, and he would remove U.S. troops from the South, thus ending Reconstruction.

Southern Redemption, 1877-1896

Even before Reconstruction ended, southern whites sought "Redemption"—a term that suggested Biblical restoration of a just order, of whites' dominant station. One might think that southern whites reinstituted their just order in short order after U.S. troops no longer enforced Freedmen's civil rights. *The Strange Case of Jim Crow* explains that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution created roadblocks to redemption.[115] While "some historians have concluded that the full-

blown Jim Crow system sprang up immediately after the end of slavery to take the place of the Peculiar Institution," segregation statutes were slow in coming.[116] "More than a decade was to pass after Redemption before the first Jim Crow law was to appear upon the law books of a Southern state, and more than two decades before the older states of the seaboard were to adopt such laws."[117]

Reconstruction had made voters of Freedmen, and southern Democratic politicians sought their votes, just as northern politicians lusted after the Irish vote about the same time. Reconstruction had broken the strict-color line, and Woodward wrote: "once broken they are just as ready to conciliate the negro as the Northern politician to flatter the Irishman."[118] Woodward gave evidence for the "strange case" of gradual redemption: "Southern states elected ten Negroes to the U. S. House of Representatives after Reconstruction, the same number elected during Reconstruction. Every Congress but one between 1869 and 1901 had at least one Negro member from the South."[119]

While virtually all the former slaves in Congress were Republicans, some were elected to state and local offices as Democrats. Although "Negroes were often coerced, defrauded, or intimidated, they continued to vote in large numbers in most parts of the South for more than two decades after Reconstruction." They were courted for their votes: "conservative leaders of the Southern Democrats [led] a concerted drive to attract them away from their traditional party"—Lincoln's party. The courtship was not productive for the freedmen: "Caught between the 'Lily-White' policy of the Republican party and the blandishments of the Southern Democrats, the Negro became confused and politically apathetic."[120]

Southern whites slowly—more slowly than we might imagine today—devised ostensibly legal means to disenfranchise Blacks. State governments, controlled by Democrats, established property or literacy qualifications for voting, but these often failed to disqualify enough blacks. Poll taxes further discouraged them, as well as lower class white voters. Woodward wrote: "But if the Negroes did learn to read, or acquire sufficient property, and remember to pay the poll tax and to keep the receipt on file, they could even then be tripped by the final hurdle devised for them—the white primary."[121]

Although the South had evolved into Democratic one-party government by the end of the redemption period, that was almost two decades after the end of Reconstruction in 1877. Not until 1896 did a southern state (South Carolina) make the nomination of Democratic candidates for government office a white "private" non-governmental function. Wholesale adoption of the white primary in the South came later—as did widespread, rigid racial segregation. Rigid segregation did not follow soon after the Civil War; it appeared only in the twentieth century.

The Party's Fortunes, 1864-1896

Democrats had dominated national politics over the 32 years from 1828 to 1860, winning six of nine presidential elections. Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 had displayed the popular votes for president by parties for the earlier period. Figure 5.1 depicts popular votes for president over the end of the century. Over 32 years from 1864 to 1896, Republicans won seven of nine presidential elections. Figure 5.1 illustrates three key points about American party politics after the Civil War:

- Republicans replaced Democrats in dominating presidential elections throughout the entire period;
- after Reconstruction, Democratic presidential candidates competed closely with Republicans for popular votes; and

- in contrast with presidential elections before the war, the two major parties regularly won over ninety percent of the popular votes.

In nine presidential elections from 1864 to 1896, no third party received more than three percent of the vote until 1892, when the Populist Party won nine.

FIGURE 5.1: Popular Votes for President by Parties, 1864-1896*



*Party candidates winning at least 1 percent of the vote

The four minor parties that gained at least one percent of the presidential votes arose over different issues. The Greenback Party responded to the decade-long economic depression that started with a market crash in 1873. It favored returning to paper money, commonly known as "greenbacks," issued during the Civil War as an easier way to pay debts. The Union Labor Party absorbed many Greenbacks following Chicago's 1886 Haymarket Riot, pitting industrial workers against their employers. The Prohibition Party, which still exists, opposed consumption of alcoholic beverages. The Populist Party defended agrarian interests, also squeezed by industrialization, and favored the unlimited coinage of silver as an easier way to pay debts.

In 1896, William Jennings Bryan, the Democrats' presidential candidate, adopted the Populists' "free silver" program, thought to increase the money supply and help debtors. The Populists endorsed Bryan, and his election loss ultimately ended the Populist Party—but not Bryan's political career as a Democratic presidential candidate. He was nominated two more times, and lost both elections. The Democrats, with a regional base, struggled to win a presidential election as a national party.

Prior to the Civil War, Democrats were truly a national party, campaigning across North and South and often winning popular majorities. In 1852, Democrat Franklin Pierce won electoral votes in 27 of 31 states, losing only in Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Vermont.[122] In 1856—even after the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 sparked the creation of the Republican Party—Democrat James Buchanan won all but the eleven most northern states. After the war, however, Democrats became more of a regional party, a southern party with some northern presence.

Democrats' electoral performance during 1864-1876 cannot be compared with the earlier period because of the war and Reconstruction. After the disputed 1876 election that ushered in the 1877 Compromise and Republican Hayes' election, Democrats competed fully again in presidential elections and did surprisingly well at winning popular votes. Both parties were virtually tied at 48 percent in 1880, and the Democratic candidate Grover Cleveland, actually outpolled Republican candidates in 1884, 1888, and 1892. In 1884, Cleveland ran for president while governor of New York, which had voted Republican the previous election. Winning its 36 electoral votes put Cleveland in office. Seeking re-election in 1888, he lost New York and lost re-election. In 1892, Cleveland won New York and re-election, becoming the only president to regain office after an electoral defeat.

After Reconstruction, Democrats managed to win narrow popular vote pluralities but lose electoral vote majorities largely because they became a southern party. When Republican Lincoln won the presidency in 1860, 303 electoral votes in the U.S. were spread across 33 states. Although Lincoln won only 40 percent of the popular vote, he got won 180 electoral votes (59 percent), because three Democratic candidates fought the election under different factions of their party. By 1880, the number of states had increased to 38 with 369 electoral votes. Moreover, that growth came outside the 11 southern states of the old Confederacy. Figure 5.2 portrays the rise in presidential electoral votes from 1880 to 1896 for the rest of the nation versus the Confederate South.

FIGURE 5.2: Presidential Electoral Votes by Region, 1880-1896



Thanks to population growth, the South received a slight gain in electoral votes following the 1890 Census. Nevertheless, the region declined from having 29 percent of the electoral votes needed to elect a president in 1880 to 25 percent in 1896. Although the Democrats' fate as a regional party was constrained concerning its contribution to the electoral vote, its role for delivering popular votes to the party was enhanced. As shown in Figure 5.3, the Democratic Party regularly voted nearly 60 percent for Democratic candidates during these elections.[123]

FIGURE 5.3: Percent Democrat Presidential Vote, Inside and Outside the South, 1880-1896*



* Vote percentages computed from *Wikipedia's* tables of presidential elections by states.

Data in Figure 5.3 suggests how Democratic presidential candidates, winning big in one region, could compete so closely in the popular vote with Republican candidates, who won by smaller margins in more states. Although the Democratic Party had not yet completely dominated the South in 1880-1896 (a one-party South was yet to come), white southerners voted overwhelmingly for Democrats (who eulogized the "old South") and against Republicans (who southerners blamed for destroying it).

Conclusion

From 1828 to 1856, the Democratic Party won six of eight presidential elections. In 1860, Democrats split into three parts over the slavery issue. That enabled the new Republican Party, which opposed the spread of slavery, to elect Abraham Lincoln president. From 1860 to 1896, Republicans captured the presidency in eight of ten elections. Democrats won only in 1884 and 1892, electing and later re-electing Grover Cleveland.

Although a northerner, Cleveland sympathized with white southerners. He regarded Reconstruction as a "failed experiment," and refused to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment that guaranteed voting rights to freedmen.[124] A Cleveland biographer cited a 1903 speech in which he admitted "a willingness to trust the southern whites with the blacks and a remarkable tolerance of southern racial folkways."[125] Some northerners feared "that the return of the Democrats would mean the end of freedmen's rights, if not their liberty."[126] In the next century southern Democrats worked hard to do exactly that.

CHAPTER 6

1900-1928: Legislating Segregation

Racial segregation was not lawful, yet not unlawful, throughout the South as of the 1890s. State governments in the former Confederacy, controlled by Democrats, did not enact legislation to segregate the races until the 1900s. Northern Democrats in Congress allowed southern Democrats to do that without much fuss. This chapter provides a brief history of segregation and of the role of Democrats—North and South—in creating and allowing racial segregation.

The Politics of Segregation

The Republican Party had been formed in 1854 to oppose the spread of slavery to new territories. The 1860 Republican Party platform denied "the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States." It also promised to preserve "our Republican institutions; and that the Federal Constitution, the Rights of the States and the Union of the States." Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States on March 4, 1861. On April 12, southern forces fired on Ft. Sumter. Three days later, Lincoln mobilized northern state militias to suppress the rebellion and "to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union."[127]

If northern whites had been polled then, most would shown negatives opinions about slavery but also about Negroes, the slaves. According to historian C. Vann Woodward:

> By the eve of the Civil War the North had sharply defined its position on white supremacy, Negro subordination, and racial segregation. The political party that took control of the federal government at that time was in accord with this position, and Abraham Lincoln as its foremost spokesman was on record with repeated endorsements. He knew the feelings of "the great mass of white people" on Negroes.[128]

While the "great mass of white people" in the north opposed slavery and its spread, they were unsure about how to treat the people they had freed. Most would not accept them readily into their societies.

Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal published his monumental study of "the American dilemma" in 1944, when racial segregation was fully developed across all eleven states of the confederacy. He wrote, "conditions were rather different in different Northern states," but "wherever Negroes lived in significant numbers they met considerable social segregation and discrimination."[129] Segregation was partially developed in the five border states (Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia). Myrdal said, "Institutional segregation and discrimination [in those states] is roughly between that of the North and that of the South."[130]

Merriam-Webster defines racial segregation as "the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social intercourse, by separate educational facilities, or by other discriminatory means"[131] Segregation as a social practice had long been accepted in many contexts. Separation by gender in bathroom facilities was common across the world, as was gender segregation in religious venues—practiced even today by some faiths in the United States.

Long before the Civil War, school children in the North were effectively separated by race through residence and economics. Slaves' children in the South simply did not attend public schools

before the war, and racial segregation in education appeared soon afterward in southern states. Lawfully enforced racial segregation across virtually all other social, commercial, civic, and political venues, however, arose only decades after Reconstruction. Myrdal wrote that it came despite the fact that "Congress intended to give the Negroes 'social equality' in public life to a substantial degree" after the Civil War.

> The Civil Rights Bill of 1875, which, in many ways, represented the culmination of the federal Reconstruction legislation, was explicit in declaring that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of previous condition of servitude.[132]

During the South's Redemption period from 1877 through the end of the nineteenth century, southern whites devised various methods—formal and informal—to defy the law and subjugate black citizens.

Not until the twentieth century did southern states enshrine segregation through so-called Jim Crow Laws.[133] C. Vann Woodward found: "Up to 1900 the only law of this type adopted by the majority of Southern states was that applying to passengers aboard trains . . . . but in the next decade nearly all of the other Southern states fell in line."[134]

Establishing Segregation

In 1883, the Supreme Court issued a set of decisions on what came to be known as the "Civil Rights Cases." The Court ruled that the 1875 Civil Rights Act "forbid discrimination in hotels, trains, and other public spaces, was unconstitutional and not authorized by the 13th or 14th Amendments of the Constitution."[135] Although the law was only held to be "unconstitutional in so far as it referred to acts of social discrimination by individuals," the Court's decision opened the way "for the Jim Crow legislation of the Southern states and municipalities."[136]

The Court's admission that the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed all citizens "equal protection of the laws" did prove troublesome to southern whites seeking to subjugate the Blacks. So to pass "their various segregation laws to legalize social discrimination," Myrdal wrote, they "had to manufacture a legal fiction," which led to the notion of "separate but equal" facilities and treatment.[137] In its 1896 decision, *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana state law that allowed for "equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races."

The Democratic critic and conservative writer D'Souza in 2018 correctly noted:

> While state sponsored segregation was a Southern phenomenon giving some support to the progressive campaign to blame racial evils on the South—it should also be noted that every Southern segregation law was passed by a Democratic legislature, signed by a Democratic governor and enforced by Democratic officials. There are no exceptions to this rule. So segregation was the work of the Democratic Party in that region.[138]

When the northern Democrat Grover Cleveland did capture the presidency for two terms toward the end of the 1800s, he did nothing about racial segregation. Nor did Woodrow Wilson when elected early in the 1900s.

Democrats' Presidential Fortunes, 1900-1928

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the Republican Party not only continued its domination of presidential elections, it gained popularity among voters. Ascendant in populous states outside the South, Republicans handily defeated Democratic presidential candidates from 1896 to 1908. As shown in Figure 6.1, Republican presidential candidates won absolute majorities of the popular vote in six of the eight elections to 1928 as well as majorities of the electoral vote.

FIGURE 6.1: Popular Votes for President by Parties, 1900-1928*



*Percentages are rounded to whole numbers.

In 1912, former Republican president Teddy Roosevelt sought to deny Republican President Taft's re-election by running for re-election himself as the Progressive Party nominee. GOP voters split between the two candidates and their parties, and Democrat Woodrow Wilson won a majority of the electoral votes with only a plurality of the popular votes. Wilson managed to be re-elected in 1916, but narrowly.

Figure 6.1 also shows that, during these decades, minor parties drew relatively few votes, except for the two candidates running under the Progressive Party label. In 1912, the Progressive Party (also called the Bull Moose Party) consisted of Roosevelt supporters who bolted from the Republican Party. In 1924, Wisconsin Senator Robert LaFollette's supporters formed a Progressive Party supporting

regulation of the railroad, corporate taxes, sport for workers and farmers, and other policies closer to Democrats than Republicans.

Although Democrats commanded the electoral votes from all eleven states of the former Confederacy, winning all those southern states fell far short of the electoral vote majority needed to win office. 0portrays the party's problem in presidential elections.

FIGURE 6.2: Distribution of Electoral Votes, South v. Non-South, 1900-1928



[a] In 1920, Tennessee voted for Harding.
[b] In 1928, Florida, Nort Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia voted for Hoover.

Typically, Democrats racked up huge margins in the popular vote in the South, but more and bigger other states regularly voted Republican by sufficient margins to win their electoral votes. Figure 6.3 plots the popular vote by region.[139]

FIGURE 6.3: Percent of Popular Vote for President, South v. Non-South, 1900-1928*



* Vote percentages computed from *Wikipedia's* tables of presidential elections by states.

As shown in both Figures 6.2 and 6.3, the southern vote was not invariably monolithic. In 1920, Tennessee voters chose Republican Warren Harding over Democrat James Cox. More significantly, in 1928 voters in almost half the Confederate states rebelled against the Democratic candidate, Al Smith, a Catholic New Yorker who favored the end of Prohibition.

In 1912, the Democrats nominated Woodrow Wilson—a southerner, son of a Protestant pastor, a political scientist, and past president of Princeton. Wilson was also regarded as a "progressive," a term often applied to those opposed to Republican policies that served corporate wealth and business interests. "Like romanticism or Victorianism, progressivism" was often used but rarely well defined.[140] William Jennings Bryan, a three time Democratic presidential candidate and still a force in the party, considered himself a progressive. He believed that Wilson was one too, and backed him for the 1912 Democratic nomination. Because Democrats—in deference to the South—required a two-thirds vote of delegates to nominate, the convention took 46 ballots before nominating Wilson.

Wilson was indeed an intellectual progressive who believed "that the corporate world required monitoring by government in the public interest," the focus of his "New Freedom" program.[141] But Wilson was also a southerner and a racist. In 1913, he authorized plans for segregation of government employees in Washington, DC.[142] In 1915, Wilson's White House screened *The Birth of a Nation,* a film that praised the Ku Klux Klan "as a heroic force, necessary to preserve American values, protect white women, and maintain white supremacy."[143] Just as Thomas Jefferson's claim that "all men are created equal" applied only to whites, Wilson's "New Freedom," was intended for the common man, but not the Black man. Blacks were not going to be free politically or socially under Democrats in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Democrats' Congressional Fortunes, 1900-1928

The Constitution allowed states to determine how to choose their senators and representatives. Most state legislatures chose to name U.S Senators themselves. During Reconstruction in the 1870s Mississippi's legislature, responding to northern influence, sent two African-Americans to the Senate as Republicans. After the Constitution was amended in 1913 to require popular election of U.S. Senators, southern legislatures picked white Democrats, with few exceptions thereafter.[144] As a result, the eleven former Confederacy states continuously held over twenty percent of the Senate's seats from 1900 to 1928. The twenty-two southern Senators, regularly re-elected, acquired seniority and gained power within the chamber. They fiercely defended racial segregation.

From the beginning, the Constitution prescribed that House members were to be elected by the people. Southern voters made less predictable choices than southern legislatures. From 1877 to 1901, voters from eight different southern states sent twenty different black Republicans to the House.[145] The last was George Henry White, who represented North Carolina for two terms (1897-1901). Despite holding extensive control over congressional elections, Democrats took steps to prevent other African-Americans from serving in Congress, and none did for nearly three decades.[146]

While the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed freedmen the right to vote in state-run public *general* elections, Democrats contrived to nominate candidates through private, whites-only *primary* elections, called "direct primaries." Many northerners regarded the direct primary as a progressive reform. Instead of nominating candidates by party committees or conventions, primary elections allowed party voters to directly choose their party's candidates. Nevertheless, the direct primary originated in the South as a means to exclude Blacks from participating in the Democratic Party. After

1900, the Democratic Party extended segregation to the electoral process, which effectively converted the South to one-party government.

The origin of the direct primary is murky. In 1892, the *Chicago Tribune* reported on a primary election in South Carolina that "virtually settles the election of the State officers and Congressmen."[147] According to Woodward, the segregated "state-wide Democratic primary was adopted in South Carolina in 1896, Arkansas in 1897, Georgia in 1898, Florida and Tennessee in 1901, Alabama and Mississippi in 1902, Kentucky and Texas in 1903, Louisiana in 1906, Oklahoma in 1907, Virginia in 1913, and North Carolina in 1915."[148] Soon, virtually everyone elected to Congress from the South was a Democrat. Figure 6.4 shows the party distribution in the House of Representatives after elections from 1900 to 1928. The jump in House seats in 1912 reflected additional seats for Arizona and New Mexico after admission as states. In 1929, Congress fixed the House size at 435.

FIGURE 6.4: Distribution of House Seats by Party and Region, 1900-1928



As southern whites took control of congressional candidates' nomination, they also took control over their election to Congress. Once elected, southern congressmen were routinely re-elected, building seniority and thus influence in the House. Consequently, "Southern Members of Congress who opposed race reforms in the 1910s and 1920s soon became influential enough to thwart civil rights reforms in later decades."[149]

Conclusion

Legal racial segregation throughout the South did not follow soon after the formal end of Reconstruction in 1877. Creating a far-reaching, government-backed system of segregation took more than two decades. By 1900, southern Democrats had consolidated their control of state and local

government in the eleven states of the old Confederacy sufficiently to re-establish white supremacy over their former slaves.

Outside of the south, many white citizens shared white southerners' racial prejudices and many more—Democrats and Republicans alike—accepted the doctrine of states' rights, and chose not to interfere. From 1900 to 1928, southern Democrats maintained political control of their region and racial practices, with little opposition from northern Democrats.

CHAPTER 7

1932-1948: Tolerating Segregation

Party politics changed dramatically in 1932. Whereas Republicans held the presidency (and usually Congressional majorities) for six of eight presidential terms from 1900 to 1928, Democrats held the presidency (and usually majorities in Congress) for all five terms from 1932 to 1948. Whereas President Wilson endorsed racial segregation, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman morally opposed segregation, although they differed on dealing with it politically. Fearful of losing support of southern Democrats in Congress, Roosevelt tolerated segregation, seeking refuge in states' rights. Truman fought segregation by exercising national authority. Eventually, during Truman's administration, the Democratic Party itself took a stand against segregation and for civil rights.

Segregation's Extent during the Period

In 1950, Pauli Murray, a multi-racial scholar and descendent of former slaves, published a 700-page compendium of existing state laws on social discrimination and racial segregation.[150] (Her book came out before the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. *Board of Education* ruling that "separate but equal" educational facilities were inherently unequal.) Murray briefly summarized her comprehensive survey:

> Thus, [in 1950] states may outlaw segregation by statute if they choose, or they may permit or require segregation so long as equal facilities are maintained. Eighteen states have taken steps to eliminate segregation in public facilities. Twenty-two jurisdictions by law require or permit segregation in one form or another. Some states have pursued a *lessez-faire* [sic] policy and left the regulation of racial practices to private individuals.[151]

While a few other states then did not have statutes that addressed segregation or equal access to public accommodations, twenty-two did "require or permit segregation in one form or another." It was mostly required in the eleven states of the former Confederacy and in the five border states: Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia.

A 1997 Foreword to a reprinting of Murray's book noted that in 1950 thirty states still had statutes that banned interracial marriage.[152] Many Americans today may not realize how intensely southern whites backed racial segregation and how fervently they opposed interracial marriage. Both sentiments were vociferously promoted by, among others, Theodore G. Bilbo, elected in Mississippi as a Democratic State Senator, as Lt. Governor, as Governor (twice), and for three terms as United States Senator, beginning in 1934.

Senator Bilbo introduced his "Greater Liberia Bill" to the U.S. Senate in 1939. It proposed purchasing "not to exceed 400,000 square miles of territory of either or both such countries adjoining the Republic of Liberia" to be used "for the voluntary resettlement of American Negroes in their fatherland, West Africa." The bill's complete text became Appendix A of his 330-page diatribe, *Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization*, published in 1947.[153] He ended his book this way:

> We are today standing at the crossroads, and there are but two roads ahead. Separation leads to the preservation of both the white and Negro races, to a future which belongs to God. Mongrelization leads to the destruction of both races, to the destruction of our Nation itself.

> Take your choice—separation or mongrelization. The America of tomorrow—white or mongrel? Let us pray that Almighty God will guide our feet upon the road to a white America which will continue to lead the world in civilization and culture.[154]

Bilbo's extreme views were too much, even for the Senate, which shelved his bill. However, Bilbo spoke for many white southerners. Moreover, Democratic Senators' views had to be taken into account in Washington. Roosevelt depended on Bilbo's support for his liberal legislation and catered to him. Author Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote, "the Roosevelt administration congratulated Bilbo on his win in 1940 pronouncing him 'a real friend of liberal government.'"[155] Coates noted that this did not indicate that Roosevelt was "an anti-black bigot"; he considered it part of 'the Democratic Party's "evolution.'" Dependent on political support from southern Democrats, Roosevelt chose to tolerate segregation and racial discrimination.

Democrats' Fortunes, 1932-1948

The 1929 stock market crash and ensuring Great Depression caused many millions of voters to turn away from the Republicans and toward the Democrats. They elected Franklin Delano Roosevelt in a landslide in 1932 and by an even bigger margin of votes in 1936. Economic hard times in 1932 had enabled two leftist parties—the Socialists and the Communists—to each draw about two percent of the popular votes for president. In 1948, two other parties—left and right—also garnered about two percent. One party resurrected the Progressive label (for a second time) and campaigned against segregation and for welfare legislation and conciliation with the Soviet Union. A States' Rights Party campaigned for segregation. Otherwise, the two major parties accounted for the presidential votes, with the Democrats clearly dominant during this period. Figure 7.1 displays the data.

FIGURE 7.1: Popular Vote for President, 1932-1948*



Democrats also won commanding control of both chambers in Congress, which backed President Roosevelt's "New Deal" of government programs and projects intended to employ people and end the economic depression. The 1932 Democratic platform called for "an immediate and drastic reduction of governmental expenditures" and advocated reducing the cost of the Federal Government "not less than twenty-five per cent." Instead, FDR vastly increased government expenditures.

Although FDR ignored his party's platform admonition on spending, congressional Democrats—North and South—supported his actions. The eleven southern states provided an unbroken block of Democratic Senators and a nearly unbroken block of Democratic Representatives.[156] Figure 7.2 shows the Democrats' dominance of the House of Representatives during Roosevelt's first two terms and prior to World War II.[157]

FIGURE 7.2: Distribution of House Seats by Party and Region, 1932-1948



Moreover, these southern Democrats solidly supported their new Democratic president. In his study of the Democratic Party at the time, Otis Graham said, "In 1933, there was no roll call vote on which a majority of southern Democrats deserted the national ticket to defeat a measure [backed by] a majority of Republicans."[158]

But Graham found that "the southerners began to bolt very early as the president responded to the northern urban constituency, and Roosevelt found himself at odds with the southern Democratic leadership in Congress." After 1935, "the president could not count upon the southern Democrats . . . who joined forces with those who would restrain the liberal impulses of the New Deal."[159] Graham noted that the Roosevelt administration gave benefits to "virtually every major group." The South got cotton and tobacco programs, electricity and flood control from the Tennessee Valley Authority, and

jobs for the unemployed. Midwestern farmers got wheat and corn price supports and loan and mortgage programs. Workers got social security, and cities got public works and public housing.

Blacks, who still suffered discrimination outside the South, got less, but they did receive some jobs and welfare relief. Perhaps they were surprised to get anything at all from government, for Graham reported that "northern blacks left the party of Lincoln and voted seventy six percent Democratic in 1936."[160] His figure is suspect, given the nascent stage of survey research in the 1930s. However, it is largely corroborated by data that Myrdal reported in the vote for Roosevelt in wards with more than fifty percent Negro [sic] in nine selected northern cities. Figure 7.3 plots Myrdal's data for the wards in his four largest cities. In all four major cities (and in most of the smaller ones in Myrdal's book), Blacks voted for Roosevelt in higher percentages with each election.[161]

FIGURE 7.3: Vote for Roosevelt in Black Wards in Four Major Cities, 1936-1940



Historian Graham reported that southern Democrats were unhappy with northern Democrats catering to the Negro vote. He wrote: "the southerners had been restless since 1935, disturbed by the few small signs that blacks were looking to Washington for aid, unhappy with the administration's attention to northern labor, unhappy with continuing budgetary deficits."[162] While Roosevelt was sympathetic to "civil rights in principle for black Americans, he was not going to go out or his way for them when to do so would jeopardize other of his objectives."[163]

Roosevelt's New Deal programs were superseded by World War II, which spurred economic activity and tested segregation outside the South. National media also challenged racial discrimination. In 1943, two major Hollywood film studies released musicals (*Cabin in the Sky* and *Stormy Weather*) starring popular Black performers (e.g., Ethel Waters and Lena Horne) with all-Black casts. While both films contained racial stereotypes, their actors spoke standard English, were employed productively, and thus contributed to the emerging discourse about race.[164] So did Black soldiers who served in racially segregated units and returned making new claims on their rights as American citizens.

Elected during the Great Depression, FDR's main concern was the economy. Although Roosevelt was from desegregated New York and Truman from segregated Missouri, Truman took bolder stances on civil rights. In 1946, a year after succeeding to the presidency, he sent Congress a special message on civil rights based on a presidential commission, and in a speech to the NAACP broadcast on radio, he declared "We cannot be content with a civil liberties program which emphasizes only the need of protection against the possibility of tyranny by the government."[165]

Facing a "bitter intraparty fight between Northern liberals and Southern conservatives over the convention's civil rights platform plank" at the 1948 Democratic National Convention,[166] however, Truman accepted recycling this mild language on civil rights from the party's 1944 platform:

> We believe that racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally with all citizens and share the rights that are guaranteed by our Constitution. Congress should exert its full constitutional powers to protect those rights.

Nevertheless, party historian Witcover wrote that delegates from the "Deep South" rejected Truman's "conciliatory gesture" and demanded "a clear reaffirmation of states' rights, a thinly veiled cover for continued discriminatory practices toward blacks."[167] The Dixie delegates put forth a stronger statement of states' rights. One version included a section titled "The Rights of the States," that cited Jefferson's belief in "the support of the State governments in all their rights as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns." Northern liberals threatened a fight on the convention floor.[168]

Floor fights are futile, warned party leaders. They advised Minneapolis Mayor Hubert Humphrey not to risk his political career over challenging southern forces in the party. Yet Humphrey did in a soaring speech on the convention floor:

> There are those who say to you: "We are rushing this issue of civil rights." 1 say we are a hundred and seventy-two years late. There are those who say: "This issue of civil rights is an infringement on states' rights." The time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights.[169]

To general surprise, the Democratic National Convention rejected the South's states' rights plank and adopted the liberals' civil rights planks. Judged by today's standards, the 1948 plank—controversial then—was unexceptional. Here is the full paragraph that contains the plank, expressed in boldface:

> The Democratic Party is responsible for the great civil rights gains made in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on race, creed or color,
>
> The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination.
>
> We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution.
>
> We highly commend President Harry S. Truman for his courageous stand on the issue of civil rights.
>
> **We call upon the Congress to support our President in guaranteeing these basic and fundamental American Principles: (1) the right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4) and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our nation.**

Southern delegates were furious about the adopted plank. *The New York Times* reported that all Mississippi delegates and half the Alabama delegates walked out of the hall in Philadelphia and into a rainstorm.[170] Two weeks later, President Truman on July 6, 1948, issued Executive Order 9981 banning segregation in the armed forces and full integration in all branches. Against considerable resistance, almost all of the military was integrated when the Korean War ended in July 1953.[171] (That took five years after President Truman had ordered the end of segregation in the military.)

Party Organization

Nationally, Democrats had operated under a formal party structure since the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was formed in 1848.[172] Its main function was to arrange for the quadrennial Democratic National Convention, which adopted the party's platform and nominated its presidential candidate. After Reconstruction, southern states regularly voted Democratic in presidential elections and were well represented on the DNC. Nevertheless, the Democratic convention had never nominated a southern politician for president.[173] True, Woodrow Wilson was born in Virginia, raised in Georgia, and began college in North Carolina; but he got his degree from Princeton in New Jersey, became Princeton's president, and New Jersey's governor before gaining his party's presidential nomination.

Democratic one-party government was ensconced in the South early in the 1900s. Democrats were regularly elected to the U.S. Senate and House and banded together in congressional voting. One might think that southerners had also created a strong regional party organization to further their philosophical belief in states' rights and their practical defense of segregation. They did not, according to *Southern Politics,* a landmark 650+ page study by V. O. Key, published in 1949.[174]

According to Key's chapter on Party Organization, "in most of the South most of the time party machinery is an impotent mechanism," for it has "nothing to do with the election of public officials. . . . Within the South the Democratic Party becomes a framework . . . for the settlement of factional contests."[175] Typically, these factions were headed in different states and times by self-serving demagogues with colorful names: "Ma" Ferguson (Texas), "Kingfish" Huey Long (Louisiana), "Big Jim" Folsom (Alabama); "Cotton Ed" Smith (South Carolina); and others.[176] Instead of being tied together organizationally, southern Democrats were united over a common value: "In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro."[177] Key wrote:

> In their relations to the national party, southern state Democratic organizations are subjected to internal strains because of their anomalous position as spokesmen in national party councils for states that have contradictory political yearnings: they want to be united and they also want to divide.[178]

In 1832, the Democratic convention had established the rule requiring a two-thirds vote of delegates to nominate a presidential candidate, giving southern delegates a virtual veto over who was nominated. In 1932, a century later, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's supporters tried but failed to enable nomination by a simple majority of convention delegates. They succeeded in 1936, when Roosevelt—now President and dominant force in the party—could not be denied. Losing the two-thirds rule caused southerners to ponder their future influence in the party.

Conclusion

The 1932 Democratic platform, noting "this time of unprecedented economic and social distress," proposed reducing government expenditures to deal with the depression. Instead, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt moved in the opposite direction and won praise for policies concerning working conditions, social security, public housing, welfare support, women's employment, and acceptance of Blacks in urban economies. But he fell far short of his wife, Eleanor, in accepting Blacks in urban societies and did almost nothing to promote their participation in southern life. FDR may not have liked segregation, but he tolerated it, first in order to implement his domestic policies, and later to fight a war and win a peace.

President Harry Truman expanded his predecessor's governmental policies. One historian said, "His Fair Deal agenda actually went beyond that of the New Deal in proposing at least three major new initiatives in the fields of civil rights, national health insurance and federal aid to public education. Part of giving working Americans a fair deal, Truman determined to give working Americans a "fair deal" by repealing organized labor's pet hate, the 1947 Taft-Hartley law, which was passed over his veto.[179]

CHAPTER 8

1948: The Year Democrats Crossed the Rubicon

Most histories of the Democratic Party treat the 1948 Democratic National Convention in passing, simply mentioning Hubert Humphrey's impassioned speech backing a civil rights plank formally proposed by Wisconsin congressman Andrew Biemiller, a member of the platform committee.[180] Humphrey's action and speech deserve more attention. The policy decision taken at the 1948 convention marked it as the party's most significant convention since 1860, when Democrats split into three parties. As discussed in Chapter 4, that convention led to Abraham Lincoln's election. The 1948 convention also split the party, but the electoral consequences took longer to unfold after northern Democrats crossed the Rubicon.

History buffs will recall that "crossing the Rubicon," refers to General Julius Caesar's decision in 49 BCE to cross the narrow Rubicon River with his army. The river separated Rome from its northern provinces, and Rome forbade crossing it with military force. Caesar expected his action would cause a civil war, and it did. Since then, "crossing the Rubicon" has meant taking a fateful and irrevocable decision.

Historians writing about the Truman era in the Democratic Party have slighted the historical importance of the 1948 Democratic National Convention in the party's evolution. They focus more on Truman's fight against the Taft-Hartley Act, which restricted the activities and power of labor unions, than on his support of civil rights. Arthur Schlesinger's authoritative four-volume *History of U.S. Political Parties* assigned the chapter, "The Democratic Party, 1945-1960," to historian David Ross. Ross devoted more than a full page to Truman and the Taft-Hartley Act and never mentioned the party's pivot away from Roosevelt's aversion of the civil rights issue and towards Truman's support of it. Nor did Ross acknowledge the party's moment of epiphany, when a national convention of Democratic delegates switched from tolerating segregation to pursuing equality.

True, party historians routinely praise Hubert Humphrey's stirring convention speech—as mentioned above in Chapter 7. Many writers quote from Humphrey's speech: "The time has arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of states' rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human rights." However, they cite that passage more to festoon their account of the tumultuous convention that re-nominated President Truman than to note the critical importance of the civil rights plank.

Perhaps it will help to go back in time, to read what contemporary newspapers reported about the Democrats' July 12-14, 1948 convention in Philadelphia. Like other major papers, the *Chicago Tribune* sent multiple reporters to cover the event. Their accounts (typically lacking bylines) are preserved in electronic form.[181] The stories confirm that southerners regarded the civil rights plank as an existential issue, one that would determine their future within the Democratic Party. All quotations below the bulleted heading were drawn from pages 2 and 3 of the July 15, 1948 edition of the *Chicago Tribune*. Article headlines are in boldface.

- *A long article laid out the situation confronting southern delegates*:

THEY'RE WORSE OFF

The mutineering southerners thus came out of the floor battle worse off than if they had not precipitated the struggle, for Truman was acclaimed for

the things on which the south attacked him. It was a victory for Truman and the radical wing of the New Deal.

The Southerners' defeat came on two ballots. The first was a minority declaration from Dan Moody, former Texas governor, and Chauncey Sparks, former Alabama governor. This declaration upheld the ancient Jeffersonian doctrine of state rights and non-interference by the federal government on state and local questions.

FUNDAMENTA1 PRINCIPLE

Signed by 15 southern members of the resolutions committee, this resolution called for the following declaration in the party creed:

"The Democratic party reaffirms its adherence to the fundamental principle of state rights as reserved in the federal Constitution and pledges that it will not oppose any attempt, legislation or otherwise, to invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the states in their domestic affairs."

This resolution was tossed out of the window by a vote of 929 to 309, most of the favoring votes coming from 11 southern states.

Then came the Truman civil rights minority plank. It was presented by Andrew J. Biemiller, a former Milwaukee congressman of leftist tendencies.

- *A long struggle occurred states' rights:*

BATTLE RAGES 3 HOURS

In a battle on the floor which raged for 3 hours, the southern state righters were defeated by a 3 to 1 margin in an effort to get thru a plank declaring against federal infringement on the ancient doctrine of the right of the states to control their domestic affairs.

Truman's idea, avowed Feb, l, was for a civil rights program embracing federal action against the poll tax and lynching, establishment of a fair employment practices commission, and the banishment of Jim Crowism on transportation facilities,

To make the defeat more crushing, the convention adopted another minority report from the resolutions committee, which included the basic tenets of the Truman Policy,

- *The vote on the civil rights plank was quicker but much closer:*

THEY CLIMB ABOARD

Because of the radicals behind it, some northern leaders, both white and Negro, were shying away from it before the meeting. But when they learned it was against racial segregation in the military forces, they climbed aboard, aware of the vote in their constituencies.

The big industrial states got behind it and put it thru. Reduced to political figures, an estimated 5 million Negro voters in the north outweighed the Democratic leaders of the deep south, traditionally a Democratic stronghold. The Humphrey-Biemiller plank was adopted. 651 1/2 to 582 l/2.

- *Another story revealed the depth of the southerners' despair:*

OFFERS SEN. RUSSELL

Charles J. Bloch, a hoarse voiced orator from Georgia, offered Sen. Russell of Georgia as a leader who will preside over the government of the United States under provisions of the Constitution of the United States."

Terming President Truman's civil rights program a violation of constitutional guarantees of states rights, Bloch said, "you shall not crucify the south on the cross of civil rights"—a paraphrase of William Jennings Bryan's famous "Cross of Gold" speech.

> "The south is no longer going to be the whipping boy of the Democratic party," he roared, "and you know that without the south you cannot elect a President of the United States."
>
> Bloch said the south had no intention of returning to "bayonet rule and the tragic era of re-construction" imposed by the civil rights program.
>
> "We do not propose to return to that era," he said. "I do not intend to suggest southern secession from the Democratic party but the Georgia delegation will sit until adjournment of the convention fighting any infringement of states rights.
>
> "I give you Sen. Russell who has fought valiantly and thus far successfully against having any such language crammed down the throat of the south at the behest of well organized minority groups."

The quotations above from the *Chicago Tribune* came on the final day of the convention. In a July 14 story on activities the previous day, the *Tribune* reported another setback to the South's attempt to recover its position in the Democratic Party:

> **URGES TWO-THIRDS RULE**
>
> A minority report on the rules committee recommendations, advocating restoration of the rule requiring a two-thirds vote for selection of a Presidential candidate, was presented by Gov. J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. This rule, abandoned by the party in 1936, had given the south what virtually amounted to a veto over the nomination.

It was soundly defeated.

Conclusion

Thousands of Democrats had gathered in Philadelphia to nominate their presidential ticket in 1948. But they first had to adopt a party platform and address the thorny issue of civil rights. Since the party's first platform in 1840, no Democratic platform had mentioned the phrase, "civil rights." A century later, southern Democrats prior to the convention had drafted a platform stressing states' rights. Despite their historic success in the past, southerners expected their version to be threatened on the convention floor by a stronger civil rights plank. In *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, V.O. Key wrote, "As the Democratic national convention approached, southerners opposed both Mr. Truman's nomination and his civil rights program, but they differed among themselves about what they would do if they lost at Philadelphia, as they were sure to do."[182]

In place of the southern-friendly plank in the draft platform, young newcomer Hubert Humphrey, Mayor of Minneapolis, declared

> that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution

In a close vote and over vociferous objections from southerners, a majority of convention delegates chose his modest but unprecedented support for civil rights. Many southern delegates walked out of the convention afterward.[183]

By passing a civil rights plank that committed their party "to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination," Northern Democrats at the convention stopped tolerating segregation in the South and promised to end it through national government, thus ending their acceptance of states' rights when it came to racial discrimination.

Southern delegates at the convention clearly understood what was at stake. When delegate Charles Bloch from Georgia vowed, "The south is no longer going to be the whipping boy of the Democratic party," and roared, “and you know that without the south you cannot elect a President of the United States," he indicated that southern voters could no longer be counted on to reliably vote Democratic. Some southern delegates had already walked out of the convention hall. Others began planning to organize a new party.

Southern Democrats needed time to devise a new political strategy. Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina quickly formed the States' Rights Party, ran on its ticket, won just shy of 2.5 percent of the popular vote, and carried four southern states. Contrary to Bloch's boasting roar, Democrats managed to elect a president without the southern bloc of electoral votes. In 1952 and again in 1956, the South—still rebelling against the Democrats but seeing no future in a southern party—began voting Republican. Eisenhower carried four states in the former Confederacy in 1952 and five in 1956. However, Richard Nixon carried only three in 1960 and lost to John Kennedy.

Republicans needed time to decide how to exploit the new electoral situation. According to Republican strategist Kevin Phillips, the time came in 1964, when the GOP crossed its own Rubicon: “The 1964 election constituted a Rubicon for the Republican Party; and its crossing marked off an era.”[184] As I argued in *The Republican Evolution*, Republicans entered their present era of Ethnocentrism in 1964, leaving behind their era of Neoliberalism, which lasted from 1928 to 1960.

CHAPTER 9

Pursuing Equality, 1952-2020

Thus in 1948 the Democratic Party officially began to reverse its stance on segregation. It moved toward making equality—both political and social—its prime principle of social policy. That was almost eighty years ago. Since then, Democrats have struggled to implement the "self-evident truths" that Thomas Jefferson declared in the Declaration of Independence:

> that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .

Democrats today interpret "all men" to mean "all human beings," which includes far more people—and different people—than Jefferson envisioned. Nevertheless, Jefferson's statement of government's purpose remains valid, that to secure citizens' unalienable rights, "Governments are instituted among Men." Personal freedom is not enough to produce political and social equality; government order is required to impose equality. To many readers, order and equality may seem contradictory values. They are, but order is usually needed to impose equality.

Freedom, Order, and Equality

The familiar cry of the French Revolution—*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*—led people to think that all three terms refer to compatible concepts. In some contexts—e.g., in the late 1700s when downtrodden French peasants and urban workers revolted against their oppressive rich nobles and royals—the terms *Liberté* and *Égalité* were mutually reinforcing. More generally, the concepts often clash. *Fraternité*, which essentially meant that French peasants and workers were united in their revolution, is not pertinent nowadays.[185] While freedom, equality, and order remain very relevant concepts, they need disentangling.

In common political discourse, "freedom" implies absence of government restrictions. That is the view of the Freedom Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives, which favors limited government and opposes government spending. In contrast, "Freedom Now!"—a cry during the 1960s civil rights movement— reflected an idealistic demand for equality. Today, that idealism appears in the Committee for Freedom Now, a non-profit Washington DC organization that protects human rights.[186] The Freedom Caucus and the Committee for Freedom Now have nothing in common, which demonstrates that "freedom" can mean different things to different people. Some scholars attempt to explain the difference by distinguishing between positive and negative freedom, which I find confusing so do not employ that distinction.[187]

I accept the Freedom Caucus definition of political freedom as the absence of government restrictions. Ironically, government may have to order freedom. President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863 "declared 'that all persons held as slaves' within the rebellious states 'are, and henceforward shall be free.'"[188] He *ordered* freeing the slaves from state-imposed legal servitude. Not until 1865 was slavery and involuntary servitude outlawed by the Constitution's Thirteenth Amendment, which of course was *ordered* under the amended Constitution.

Before national government ordered the freeing of slaves, white southerners claimed their freedom to treat blacks as they wished. After former slaves were freed, they suffered racial

discrimination from a dominant white society. Later, state governments claimed political freedom—under states' rights—to segregate the races and generally promote white supremacy. Not until the national government ordered states to stop segregation was the practice ended. Equality was dependent on government orders. Freedom did not end segregation; order did.

Personal freedom involves three actors: citizenry, government, and society. Legally, a citizen is free to do whatever government does not prohibit. Practically, a citizen is not free to do what society does not allow.[189] Although legally freedmen, Blacks did not gain a measure of social equality until government ordered their equal treatment in voting, schooling, employment, and public accommodations—until government legislated against racial discrimination in society.

This chapter reviews the Democratic Party's pursuit of equality through national government over seven decades. From 1952 to 1990, the party focused on eliminating racial and gender discrimination. From 1992 to 2020, Democrats expanded their pursuit of equality, opposing discrimination against disabled and homosexuals citizens. The nature of American party politics also changed between the periods. The ideological distance increased between the two parties' principles concerning social equality, as their partisan bases became more ideologically polarized. Ironically, during these years, the general public became more accepting of social equality.

Democratic Fortunes, 1952-1990

Democrat Adlai Stevenson lost the 1952 presidential election to Republican Dwight Eisenhower. That ended two decades of Democratic control of the presidency. Republicans also gained control of both chambers of Congress for the first time since the Great Depression. Still, few scholars mark 1952 as a critical election in American politics.[190] Eisenhower won some southern states, but the South still looked solidly Democratic.

FIGURE 9.1: Percentages of Popular Votes for President, 1952-1988



As shown in Figure 9.1, Democrats held the presidency only three of ten terms (Kennedy, Johnson, Carter) from 1952 to 1988. True, after the 1963 assassination of President John Kennedy, Democrats won a huge victory in 1964, when his vice president, Lyndon Johnson, won election on his own. Otherwise, Republican presidential candidates regularly outpolled Democrats in most years. The two major parties largely dominated presidential voting from 1952 to 1988—except for the 14 percent of votes won by a former Alabama governor running for president in 1968 and the 7 percent cast for former House Republican John Anderson in 1980. Moreover, voters during this period showed willingness to swing between Democratic and Republican candidates.

Also during these years, Democrats did much better in Congress. The South still regularly returned Democrats to the Senate, and Democrats won the House in every election from 1954 to 1990. Figure 9.2 displays the distribution of House members by party and region.

FIGURE 9.2: Distribution of House Seats by Party and Region, 1952-1990



Figure 9.2 also shows the steady erosion of seats in southern states from Democrat to Republican that began in 1952 and continued to 1990. While Republicans held the presidency through most of this period, Democrats controlled Congress and had more Democrats than Republicans from southern states.

Pursuing Equality, 1952-1990

Elected in 1960 with a Democratic Congress, President Kennedy's "New Frontier" program proposed two major pieces of legislation to further social equality, despite opposition from southern Democrats. One was the 1963 Equal Pay Act (EPA) that reduced wage disparity based on the worker's sex. It passed 362 to 9 in the House (all nine "nays" coming from Democrats) and by voice vote in the Senate. Kennedy signed it on June 10. Also in June 1963, President Kennedy was embroiled in the second and far more controversial legislative proposal, a Civil Rights Bill that would outlaw discrimination based on race, color, or religion.

A Senate filibuster blocked the president's Civil Rights Bill in the summer of 1963. After Kennedy's assassination that November, President Johnson made passing the Civil Rights Bill his central legislative focus in 1964. The bill originally prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Virginia Democrat (and chair of the House Rules Committee), Howard

Smith, attempted to kill it through ridicule by added sexual discrimination to the list. His attempt backfired, and the enacted legislation banned discrimination by sex in federally funded education programs. Title IX in the 1964 Civil Rights Bill not only benefited women by increasing their educational opportunities; it enabled them to participate in traditionally male sports to an extent never before imagined.

President Johnson was more egalitarian than many in his own party. The Civil Rights Bill passed the House by a vote of 290 to 130, with support from 82 percent of Republicans but only 66 percent of Democrats. Almost all southern House members (Democrats) voted against it. After enduring 72 days of Senate filibustering, it passed 73-27 in June, 1964, supported by only one southerner (Ralph Yarborough of Texas).[191] Arizona Republican Senator Barry Goldwater—a lifetime member of the NAACP—also voted against passage, saying he was defending states' rights, not discrimination. In July, Goldwater attended his party's national convention to claim its 1964 presidential nomination.

Johnson's historic legislative victory was followed by the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which outlawed the discriminatory voting practices adopted in many southern states after the Civil War, including literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. It passed the Senate 77-19, opposed by Democratic senators from southern states, but all House Democrats voted for the bill, which passed 222-174.

The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) came before Congress in 1972. (That was during President Nixon's administration, but the president had no role in the amendment process.) Two-thirds of the House and two-thirds of the Senate passed the ERA and submitted it for ratification by the states. Both political parties supported the ERA in their 1972 platforms, but its approval by the required three-quarters of states was uncertain. Although Democrats backed the ERA again in 1980, Republicans did not. The Constitutional Amendment failed to obtain approval of the necessary 38 states by June 30, 1982.

Democratic Fortunes, 1990-2020

Republican George H. W. Bush was elected president in 1988. He and some other prominent Republicans shared Democrats' interest in promoting some forms of social equality, especially prohibiting discrimination against disabled citizens. In 1990, Democrats led passage of the 1990 Americas with Disability Act (ADA). While many Republicans—including disabled war veteran Senator Robert Dole—strongly supported the bill, some opposed it, as did some business and religious organizations. The bill passed the House 377 to 28, and the Senate 76 to 8, with Republicans casting nearly all House Nays and every Senate Nay. Although President Bush and many other Republicans backed the ADA, it was mainly Democratic legislation.

President Bush lost re-election to Democrat Bill Clinton, and Democrats held the presidency for five of the eight terms from 1992 to 2020, as shown in Figure 9.3. Although Ross Perot won nearly twenty percent of the presidential votes in 1992 as an independent, the two major parties continued to dominate presidential voting. Running as a candidate of the Reform Party in 1996, Perot's vote was cut in half. The Libertarian and Green party candidates in the last three elections barely registered in single digits.

FIGURE 9.3: Percentages of Popular Votes for President, 1992-2020



If one compares electoral data for the 1952-1988 period (Figures 9.1 and 9.2) with data for 1992-2020 (Figures 9.3 and 9.4), four things stand out:

- Democratic presidential candidates out-polled Republican candidates in seven of eight elections;
- Democrats won absolute majorities of the popular vote three times, Republicans only once;
- The parties' percentages became closer, indicating a more divided electorate; and
- Republicans gained House seats in the South over the period.

FIGURE 9.4: Distribution of House Seats by Party and Region, 1990-2020



Comparing Figure 9.4 with Figure 9.2 for 1952-1988 reveals that House Republicans held virtually no seats in the South in 1952 but gradually added seats over the biannual elections. By 2020, southern Republicans outnumbered southern Democrats nearly two to one. For decades, the "Solid South" had been solidly Democratic, but it was becoming a Republican bastion. Writing in 2002, two southern political scientists described the earlier South:

> It is easy to forget just how thoroughly the Democratic party once dominated southern congressional elections. In 1950 there were no Republican senators from the South and only 2 Republican representatives out of 105 in the southern House delegation. . . . A half-century later Republicans constituted *majorities* of the South's congressional delegations—13 of 22 southern senators and 71 of 125 representatives.[192]

As Republicans replaced Democrats in southern congressional districts, Republican presidents became subjected to ethnocentric pressures. In 1996, Republican congressmen introduced the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that banned national recognition of same-sex marriage by limiting marriage's definition to the union of one man and one woman. DOMA also allowed states to refuse recognizing same-sex marriages granted under other states' laws. The bill passed the House and Senate overwhelmingly, but was opposed by 65 Democrats in the House and 14 in the Senate.[193] Democratic President Bill Clinton reluctantly signed DOMA into law.

Democratic presidents became increasingly dependent on egalitarian members of Congress from northern states and more urban districts. Having passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 intending to protect women from sex discrimination, Democrats under President Obama passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which supported equal pay for women. The bill passed the Senate 61 to 36, with Republicans casting all opposing votes. The House voted 250 to 177, with 5 Nay votes from Democrats and 172 from Republicans.

Democrat Bill Clinton had signed the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act that limited marriage to a man and a woman. Serving then as a Democratic Senator from Delaware, Joe Biden also voted for DOMA and against gay marriages; he also wavered on letting gay men and lesbians serve in the military. He—and many in his party—were not ready to recognize same-sex marriage then. Chicago's Democratic Alderman Paddy Bauler had once reportedly proclaimed, "Chicago ain't ready for reform yet."[194] By 2022, the party was ready. As president in 2022, Biden backed and signed the Democrats' Respect for Marriage Act that required all states to recognize same-sex and interracial marriages performed in any other state. *The New York Times* reported that signing the bill capped "his own personal evolution embracing gay rights over the course of a four-decade political career."

> Mr. Biden, 80, was raised in a time when much of the country was less tolerant of people's sexual orientations. His policy choices in the Senate reflected those times, often siding with those who proposed restrictions, or limits, on gay men and lesbians.[195]

All House Democrats and 39 Republicans supported the Respect for Marriage bill, as did all Democrats and 12 Republicans in the Senate. From 1996 to 2022, news media reported on "a tectonic shift in public opinion on the issue of same sex marriage."[196] In fact, some gay Republican members of Congress lobbied for the bill's passage.[197]

We should also note that over the years Democrats battled discrimination in ways that did not require legislation. In 1928, New Yorker Al Smith became the first Catholic presidential nominee on a major party ticket. In 1933, President Roosevelt appointed Frances Perkins Secretary of Labor, the first women to serve in a president's cabinet. In 1949, President Truman appointed William Hastie as the

first African-American federal appellate judge. In 1952, Democrats nominated the first divorced presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson, and re-nominated him in 1956. Despite Al Smith's dismal electoral performance in 1928, Democrats in 1960 nominated another Catholic, John Kennedy, who became the first non-protestant president. In 1984, the party chose Geraldine Ferraro as its vice presidential nominee, the first woman on a major party presidential ticket. In 2000, Al Gore ran for president with Senator Joe Lieberman as his running mate, making him the first Jewish candidate in a presidential election. In 2007, Nancy Pelosi became the first woman to serve as Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Then in 2008, Democrats nominated and elected (twice), Barack Obama, the first Black president in the party founded by Andrew Jackson, a former slaveholder. In 2016, Democrats nominated, but failed to elect, Hillary Clinton, the first woman to run for president as a major party candidate. In 2020, Democrats nominated Kamala Harris, of mixed racial heritage, as Joe Biden's running-mate and elected her as the first female Vice president of the United States. In 2021, President Biden then appointed openly gay Pete Buttigieg at Secretary of Transportation.

It bears noting that in 1980 Republicans nominated a divorced person, Ronald Reagan, for president and elected him twice. Then in 2008 Republicans nominated a woman, Sarah Palin, for vice president. Following Democrats and the general public, Republicans were also moving toward social equality. In 2024, several Republicans of various ethnicities campaigned for their party's nomination. They included Tim Scott (Black), Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy (Indian), and Francis X. Suarez (Cuban).

Conclusion

From 1932 to 1948, the Democratic Party tolerated racial segregation in southern states, whose support in Congress was needed to pass New Deal and Fair Deal legislation. After the national party broke from its southern wing on civil rights in its 1948 National Convention, Democrats began to fight racial segregation and discrimination as well as discrimination against other social groups, especially women and non-heterosexuals.

Beginning in the 1960s, Democratic presidents and Democrats in Congress began passing legislation that prohibited social discrimination and promoted social equality. These laws include the 1963 Equal Pay Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the 1972 Equal Rights Amendment, the 1990 Americans with Disability Act, and the 2009 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. However, what Democrats managed to enact into law was far less than what they aimed for in terms of social equality. The party's egalitarian principles and its policy aspirations were better reflected in its quadrennial platforms.

PART 3: DEMOCRATIC PLAFORM PLANKS

The first chapter explains the reason for analyzing Democratic platform planks in three eras:

1828-1896	The States' Rights Era
1900-1948	The Cooperative Federalism Era
1952-2020	The National Authority Era

The next three chapters report on Democratic planks tagged with the primary codes for Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods in each era.

The last chapter compares the Democrats' planks with 2,722 Republican planks, as reported in *The Republican Evolution.*

CHAPTER 10

Eras and Epochs in American Party Politics

Framers of the Constitution, like the citizens they represented, were more invested in their own state governments than in the national government they were creating. Thomas Jefferson's "states' rights" philosophy had broader appeal than Alexander Hamilton's preference for strong central powers, and Jacksonian Democrats inherited Jefferson's philosophy.

Scholars agree that Democrats favored states' rights over national authority from the party's inception to the end of the nineteenth century. Like other party historians, I hold that the party turned to a different philosophy by the beginning of the twentieth century. Differing from some writers, I contend that Democrats adopted a third—and radically different—philosophy of federalism in 1952. My assertions about the party's changing view of federalism are not entirely new, but they do provide an alternative account of the party's evolution from slavery to equality.

I define three different philosophies of federal government and label them as different governing "eras" delineated by years holding presidential elections:

1828-1896	The States' Rights Era
1900-1948	The Cooperative Federalism Era
1952-2020	The National Authority Era

Each of these philosophies of federalism figured prominently in the evolution of the Democratic Party, and each warrants discussion.

States' rights*:*

A sovereign nation's legitimate use of governmental power over its inhabitants is called its "police power," defined as "the fundamental ability of a government to enact laws to coerce its citizenry for the public good." A 1954 U.S. Supreme Court case, *Berman v. Parker*, stated, "Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order. . . are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power"; while recognizing that any "attempt to define [police power's] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless."[198]

The British colonies that formed the United States "shared the belief that each of them was sovereign and should have jurisdiction over its most important affairs"[199] The Constitution's Tenth Amendment specified: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Because the Constitution did not empower the U.S. government to provide for citizens' safety, health, morality, and welfare, the Tenth Amendment by default entrusted police powers to the states. Authorized "to enact laws to coerce its citizenry for the public good," southern states claimed a Constitutional right to enslave people for the good of its economy.

Cooperative Federalism

The adjective "cooperative" before federalism "recognizes the overlapping functions of the national and state governments."[200] Under Cooperative Federalism, the national government conceded

to states' rights on fiercely defended topics, but expanded its own powers through favorable readings of two Constitutional clauses. The Supremacy Clause in Article VI stated that laws made "under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." The Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I granted Congress powers "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its legislation.

The Center for the Study of Federalism wrote, "During the nineteenth century, the national government used land grants to support a variety of state governmental programs such as higher education, veterans' benefits, and transportation infrastructure." Moreover, "The model of cooperative federalism was expanded during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. The influence of the national government over social welfare policies continued after World War II."[201]

In effect, cooperative federalism was Democrats' "live and let live" philosophy of government in the twentieth century prior to World War II. The national government was allowed to direct the economy and provide for social welfare at the cost of tolerating racial segregation in the South.

National Authority

This term (and era) elevated the authority of national authority over states' rights in our federal system of government. Under President Lyndon Johnson, Democrats stopped tolerating racial segregation in the South and began enforcing equal rights for minorities, women, and disabled people across the country. Johnson said about the battle for civil rights: "We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result."[202] However implausible Johnson's commitment to improving citizens' welfare, he essentially claimed a police function for national government.

In contrast, according to the Center for the Study of Cooperative Federalism, Republicans—led by President Reagan—swung back "toward the model of dual federalism"—a still different model that preserved distinct realms for national and state sovereignty.[203] Reagan's "New Federalism" was

> rooted in the knowledge that our political liberties are best assured by limiting the size and scope of the national government. . . . In most areas of governmental concern, the States uniquely possess the constitutional authority, the resources, and the competence to discern the sentiments of the people and to govern accordingly.[204]

Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 campaigned on states' rights, but he lost the election and thus failed to deliver on his promise. As president in 1981, Ronald Reagan returned to Goldwater's theme. A contemporary analysis stated, "If there is an underlying philosophy behind Reagan's 'new federalism,' it can be summed up in two words — states' rights."[205]

These three eras not only subsume the Democratic Party's policies on racial discrimination, but they also relate to the party's positions on a wide range of other governmental issues as stated in its convention platforms.

Gerring's Epochs and Janda's Eras

Scholars often analyze American politics using election data to identify different party "systems"[206] that structured our national politics.[207] Typically, these classifications refer to voting behavior and electoral campaigns. Although I use election years to date my eras, they are defined by the

principles advocated by the nation's two major parties. My approach owes much to John Gerring's 1998 study, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996,*[208]

Despite including "ideologies" in its title, Gerring's book is not about the liberal-conservative continuum so prominent in today's discussions of party politics. Gerring noted "the shortcomings of standard terminology (liberalism, conservatism)" and proposed "a modest reconceptualization of American party ideology along historical lines."[209] He studied "official party platforms as well as an extensive collection of campaign speeches [especially by presidential candidates], letters, and other publications issued by the Whig [the Whigs were the Republicans' predecessors], Republican, and Democratic parties."[210] He sorted sentences in these documents into content categories [e.g., civil rights, small business] and then counted their occurrences.

Gerring subsumed these content categories under broader concepts, such as social order, liberty, equality, tyranny, patriotism, and economic growth. He searched for changes in the "central dichotomy" confronting the parties at each presidential election year and for changes in the parties' political "themes." Gerring failed to define "central dichotomy," but it appears to represent a basic clash between political interests or states of affairs. He also left "theme" undefined, but it seems to mean "principle." He summarized his major findings in two tables—one for the Democratic Party from 1828 to 1992, and the other for the Whig/Republican Party from 1828 to 1992. I presented Gerring's delineation of Whig/Republican epochs in *The Republican Evolution*. Only the Democratic Party's evolution will be discussed here.

According to Gerring, the Democratic Party's ideology, and therefore, its principles, changed substantially over time. For Gerring, the party experienced ideological change over three "epochs" from 1828 to 1992. He called the period from 1828 to 1892, the Democrats' *Jeffersonianism* epoch, during which the party defended "liberty" against "tyranny." During Gerring's *Populism* epoch from 1896-1948, the party defended "the people" against "the interests." In his *Universalism* epoch, from 1952 to 1992, Democrats championed "inclusion" over "exclusion." Table 10.1 outlines Gerring's classification.[211]

TABLE 10.1: Gerring's Ideological Epochs of the Democratic Party

	JEFFERSONIANISM (1828-1892)
Central dichotomy:	liberty versus tyranny
Themes:	white supremacy, antistatism, civic republicanism
	POPULISM (1896-1948)
Central dichotomy:	the people versus the interests
Themes:	egalitarianism, majoritarianism, Christian humanism
	UNIVERSALISM (1952-1992)
Central dichotomy:	inclusion versus exclusion
Themes:	civil rights, social welfare, redistribution, inclusion

Although not indicated in the table above, Gerring also claimed that "equality" was a "Persisting Theme" of the Democratic Party. However, he noted, "Equal rights were to be extended to all white men, but not to inferior races."[212] While he did identify "white supremacy " as a party "theme," that applied only to his first epoch, 1828-1892. Crediting the party with "egalitarianism" from 1896 to 1948

is problematic, but Gerring seems to refer "primarily to economic matters" and to a classless society—not to racial matters.[213] After southerners bolted from the party in 1948 and the national Democratic Party became committed to civil rights, the party fully embraced the equality principle, without qualifications. On that we agree.

Gerring defined his epochs to capture changes in Democrats' ideology. I seek to trace the party's evolution in exercising authority under federal government as well so we title them differently. While his political focus on policy output overlaps almost completely with mine on party principles, I regard Gerring's ideological "epochs" as "eras" in federalism. I accept his delineation of the time period into three parts and also label my eras using election years, but I cite different years to end my first era and to begin the second. I also extend my last era to 2020, whereas his study ended in 1992. Table 10.2 labels Gerring's epochs and my eras by the politics that the party pursued within our federal form of government.

TABLE 10.2: Gerring's Epochs v. Janda's Eras

Gerring's Epochs		Janda's Eras	
Jeffersonianism	1828-1892	States' Rights	1828-1896
Populism	1896-1948	Cooperative Federalism	1900-1948
Universalism	1952-1992*	National Authority	1952-2020

*Gerring's research ended in 1992.

I modified the dates and renamed the eras in keeping with this book's purpose of documenting the Democratic evolution over time in the exercise of governmental authority—state, federal, or nation—as well as its policy transformation from slavery to equality. I divide the Democratic Party's evolution into three eras.

1828-1896: Gerring chose 1892 to end his Democratic Party's first epoch, but I end its first era in 1896. That was the last full year of the presidency of Democrat Grover Cleveland, the only Democrat elected in the nineteenth century after the Civil War. Cleveland harkened back to the party's Jeffersonian beginning, espousing original states' rights and limited government principles of Democrats before the Civil War. A biographer said that he sang "a libertarian melody," namely "public-sector frugality, a respect for the limits imposed by the Constitution, a light hand from the government."[214] In the 1992 book celebrating the Democrats' bicentennial, William Leuchtenburg wrote:

> Jefferson's nineteenth century successors—from James Madison through Grover Cleveland—adhered to these Jeffersonian precepts: states' rights, free trade, hard money and, at least in theory, strict construction of the Constitution. Both Andrew Jackson and Grover Cleveland vetoed internal improvements bills as pork barrel legislation that would benefit avaricious special interests. In his second inaugural address in 1893, Cleveland insisted, "The lessons of paternalism ought to be unlearned and the better lesson taught that while the people should patriotically and cheerfully support their government, its functions do not include the support of the people."[215]

Gerring's "Jeffersonianism" label for his epoch applied better to Democrats when Jefferson (and Jackson) still lived, and his followers were still alive. Nevertheless, from Jefferson through Cleveland the Democratic party claimed "states' rights" to constrain the scope of national legislation,

1900-1948: Most writers (like Gerring) cite 1896 as the start of a new party system, coinciding with the Democrats nominating William Jennings Bryan for president after his stirring "Cross of Gold"

speech. Despite his famous speech, Bryan lost the 1896 election, and free coinage of silver became a lost issue. Notwithstanding that election defeat and subsequent losses in 1900 and 1908, Bryan continued as a prominent force in the party after the turn of the century. Leuthtenberg said:

> under the leadership of "the Boy Orator of the Platte," the young Nebraska congressman, William Jennings Bryan, the Democrats began to turn in a different direction. They continued to embrace the Jeffersonian ideals of liberty, equality and justice, but experience had taught that industrial age of industrialization and mass communication, of crowded cities and mighty trusts, these ideals were best fulfilled not by decentralized government but by strengthened authority in Washington.

Gerring's used "populism" to characterize his second epoch. The term has several meanings, some quite diverse. One corresponds to "the people versus the interests," his central dichotomy during this period. In terms of federalism, Democrats in the first half of the twentieth century sought to mobilize "the people" (i.e., the national government) to fight "the interests"—corporations that put profits ahead of the public good—while allowing southern states to maintain racial segregation.

Democrats managed to advance the national public good—as they saw it—through judicious and selective interpretation of the "supremacy clause" in Article VI of the Constitution. That clause "effectively means that when the laws of the federal government are in conflict with the laws of a state's government, the federal law will supersede the state law."[216] Under the concept of cooperative federalism, states have sovereign rights to make laws that apply within their boundaries, but if they conflict with national laws, the national laws will prevail. During cooperative federalism, Democrats chose not to propose national laws that would challenge the comfortable nation-state relationship. Whereas Republicans during the Lincoln administration outlawed state-sanctioned slavery, made former slaves citizens, and gave them the right to vote, the Democratic Party took no noteworthy stand against racial segregation in southern states from 1900 to 1948.

When Democrats were in power during two terms under President Woodrow Wilson, four terms under Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry Truman, they enacted national laws to regulate interstate commerce, stabilize the economy, protect labor unions, provide for social welfare, and otherwise—in their view—fight "the interests" on behalf of "the people." Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, however, they did so without confronting "the elephant in the room," that racial desegregation in the south was protected by state laws. Not until 1948, when the Democratic Party adopted a platform plank that addressed civil rights of all Americans, did the Democratic Party shed its deference to states' rights. Thus ended the party's "cooperative federalism" era.

1952-2020: Gerring fixed 1952 as the beginning of the Democrats' "Universalism" epoch, with its central dichotomy being "inclusion versus exclusion." His book did not explain universalism at any length, but his dissertation stated: "Themes of economic exploitation, labor, monopoly, and inequality [which characterized his populism] gave way to those of minority rights, inclusion, and pragmatism" in the party's universalism epoch.[217].

Southern states were still practicing segregation after World War II. National action was needed to commit all of the United States to "inclusion versus exclusion." The Supreme Court took the first major step when it decided in *Brown* v. *Board of Education* to desegregate schools across the nation. In 1957, Congress passed the first Civil Rights legislation since 1875. It provided African-Americans only limited protection for voting in elections yet its passage was strongly opposed by southern Democrats in both chambers of Congress.

In the 1960s, the Democratic Party championed inclusion over exclusion in political participation. Passing national laws, such as the 1964 Voting Rights Act, it exemplified the Democratic Party's era of "national authority." I extend the era's duration through 2020, using information available after Gerring's book was published.

Democratic Platform Planks by Eras

As Democratic platforms grew longer over time, they also contained more planks. Figure 10.1 plots the number of planks by federalism eras.

FIGURE 10.1: Democratic Platform Planks by Federalism Eras



During the Democrats' States' Rights era, their short platforms contained few planks and they varied little across presidential election years. Democrats adopted somewhat longer platforms in their Cooperative Federalism era and created proportionately more planks. Because platform lengths increased dramatically over time, comparisons between eras become complicated.

Table 10.3 presents comparative information about platform lengths, words, and planks.

TABLE 10.3: Platform Words over Three Democratic Federalism Eras

Federalism Eras	Number of platforms	Total Words in platforms	Average words per platform	Percent of words per era	Total planks in era	Percent of planks in era
1840-1896	15	21,144	1,410	5%	209	6%
1900-1948	13	52,097	4,007	12%	534	16%
1952-2016	17	349,044	20,532	83%	2,649	78%
All	45	422,285	9,384	100%	3,392	100%

A noticeable drop in party planks occurred in 1936, when FDR and Democrats were riding high in Washington, were expected to win big in the 1936 election, and did not need to promise much in the party's platform. During the Democrats' National Authority era, the increase in adopted planks matched

the increase in platform length. However, Democratic planks also dropped sharply in 1964 and again in 1988. The drop in 1964 accompanied a political situation resembling that in 1936. Lyndon Johnson seemed sure to defeat Barry Goldwater in 1964, activists were happy with the party's direction, and they proposed few planks. In 1988, the party made a tactical decision to issue a "brief, bland, and bullet-proof" platform."[218] Short platforms were favored for a couple of elections afterward.

Conclusion

The Democratic Party's evolution divides into three eras based on Democrats' changing views of federalism. From the party's founding in 1828 to 1896, it extolled states' rights against strong national government. From 1900 to 1948, the party accommodated states' rights within national government during a period of cooperative federalism. Beginning in 1952, Democrats entered an era of national authority, which favored national authority over states' rights.

The history of Democratic principles inheres in platforms adopted at the party's national conventions. A party platform formally and typically represents the majority view of party activists—the many thousands of citizens who strongly identify with the party, defend the party in politics, follow the party in government, and influence the policies that the party advocates. Planks extracted from party platforms provide the most authoritative record of party principles.

My process for cataloguing party planks repeated the one I used for cataloguing Republican planks in *The Republican Evolution*. As explained in Chapter 2, it involved two steps: first laying out the main headings and then devising specific codes for the planks. The main headings and the specific codes followed the format used for Republican planks. There were eight general coding categories organized into two equal groups.

The major group embraced the four core values of Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods. Those four values underlie most issues of domestic political conflict. A secondary group consists of three general categories—Government, Foreign Policy, and Symbolic—and a fourth category, Military.[219] The next three chapters report planks coded under the four primary coding categories, which better distinguish between Democratic and Republican party principles. A fourth chapter compares Democratic platform planks with Republican planks.

CHAPTER 11

Freedom and Order Planks

This is the first of three chapters to examine specific planks taken from all 45 Democratic platforms since 1840. Most planks will come from the 1,717 tagged with codes in the four major primary categories of Freedom, Order, Equality, and Public Goods, but a few planks are tagged with a secondary code. Thus, these chapters will draw from the full range of 3,392 planks in all Democratic platforms, but only a few of the 114 coding categories will be examined in detail. This chapter focuses on planks that addressed federalism through four specific codes under the primary headings of Freedom and Order.

Planks drew Freedom codes if they proposed policies that limited government. For example, Freedom code 103 was applied to planks that favored admitting immigrants. Planks got Order codes if they restricted citizens' freedom. Thus, Order code 203 went to planks that restricted or opposed immigration. These examples conform to a contemporary "liberal/conservative" interpretation, but that is not always true. For instance, Freedom code 114 (dealing with firearms) opposes restrictions on owning or using guns, while Order code 214 favors restrictions.

I shaped the coding framework before reading the planks. Consequently, not all codes created were used, as shown in Table 11.1. For example, no Democratic planks received Order codes 200, 201, and 210. Almost 20 percent of the Democrats' Freedom codes limited Taxation (Code 106). Almost 40 percent of its Order codes prescribed regulating or funding the Economy (code 205).

TABLE 11.1: Freedom and Order Plank Codes and Usage, 1840-2016

FREEDOM codes	N	%	**ORDER** codes	N	%
100 Expression/Privacy	10	3.3	200 Expression/Privacy		
101 Religion	4	1.3	201 Religion		
102 Ethnicity	20	6.6	202 Ethnicity	3	0.8
103 Immigration	36	11.8	203 Immigration	20	5.1
104 Education	9	3.0	204 Education	4	1.0
105 Economy	21	6.9	205 Economy	152	38.4
106 Taxation	59	19.4	206 Taxation	52	13.1
107 Trade/Tariff	37	12.2	207 Trade/Tariff	16	4.0
108 Labor	29	9.5	208 Labor	38	9.6
109 Agriculture	2	0.7	210 Agriculture		
110 States' rights	28	9.2	210 National rights'	39	9.8
111 Transgressions	29	9.5	211 Transgressions	35	8.8
112 Alcohol/Drugs	6	2.0	212 Alcohol/Drugs	18	4.5
113 Life/Death	4	1.3	213 Life/Death	1	0.3
114 Firearms	2	.7	214 Firearms	17	4.3
115 Lifestyle	8	2.6	215 Lifestyle	1	0.3
Total	304	100.0	Total	396	100.0

Freedom code 110 was applied to planks that defended States' Rights, while Order code 210 was used for planks favoring National Rights. Freedom code 105 and Order code 205 (Economy) indicate whether they limited (105) or expanded (205) government control.

Changing Views of Federalism

From its beginning, the Democratic Party looked askance at federalism. The party's 1844 platform condemned:

> the creed and practice of Federalism, under whatever name or form, which seeks to palsy the will of the constituent, and which conceives no imposture too monstrous for the popular credulity.

The party's 1848, 1852, and 1856 platforms repeated—word-for-word—1844's condemnations. While the meaning of the platforms' phrases—"to palsy [cripple?] the will of the constituent" and "too monstrous for the popular credulity"—are unclear, they clearly indicate that Democrats wanted nothing to do with federalism during their States' Rights era. "Federalism" never appeared again in a Democratic platform for the rest of the nineteenth century.

In fact, "federalism" also never resurfaced in any Democratic platforms during the Cooperative Federalism era for the first half of the twentieth century. Not until the party's National Authority era from 1952 to 2016, did the term reappear, when the 1968 platform stated:

> Under our constitutional system of federalism, the primary responsibility for law enforcement rests with selected local officials and with governors, but the federal government can and should play a constructive role in support of state and local authorities.

Although their party granted that states had "the primary responsibility for law enforcement," Democrats carved out "a constructive role" for the government in Washington to help out the locals. That was the last time that federalism was invoked as a governmental concept in Democratic platforms.

While the party played down federalism as a concept, it used the term "Federal Government" (incorrectly) as a substitute for national government. The phrase "national government" occurred only once in party platforms during the States' Rights era; five times in the Cooperative Federalism era; and (ironically) only eight times in the National Authority era. Conversely, "federal government" was mentioned 29 times in the first era, 36 in the second, and 176 in the third. That computes to 14 times per 10,000 words, versus 7 times (per 10,000) in the second era and 5 times in the third. This computational example makes the small point that Democratic platforms from 1840 to 1896 referred to the "Federal Government" twice as often as party platforms from 1900 to 1948 and nearly three times more often than from 1952 to 2016.

Plank Codes for States' Rights and National Rights

More revealing is a comparison by era of platform planks that were assigned the two codes, Freedom 110 States' Rights and Order 210 National Rights. Figure 11.1 plots the data for 58 planks tagged with those codes. Note that Democratic platforms in 1840-1896 adopted almost as many planks on States' Rights and National Rights (26 out of 209) as Democrats did in 1952-2016 (33 out of 2,649), despite the overwhelming discrepancy in total planks in the two eras. The usage differential reflects the many frequent references to Federal Government in the early era.

The data in Figure 11.1 confirm characteristics of the party's federalism eras. Nearly all of the 26 Democratic planks during 1840 to 1896 advocated States' Rights. The few planks (8) adopted from 1900 to 1948, during the Cooperative Federalism era, divided equally between the two coding

categories. Notably, ALL of the 33 planks during 1952 to 2016 (its National Authority era) backed National Rights.

FIGURE 11.1: States' Rights and National Rights Planks by Eras



Plank counts by eras are instructive, but what the planks actually stated is more important. From this point, I will report their substance for each of the three eras, ordering the planks by years in which they occurred. Sometimes the planks will be quoted verbatim; sometimes they will be in the form of extracts or short restatements.

1840-1896:

Here are (verbatim) the 24 Democratic planks that favored States' Rights during the party's States' Rights era.

1840 Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
1844 Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
proceeds from public land sales cannot be distributed among the states
1848 Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
proceeds from public land sales cannot be distributed among the states
1852 Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
proceeds from public land sales cannot be distributed among the states
1856 resist the agitation of the slavery question
Resolved, That the federal government is one of limited powers
the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements
proceeds from public land sales cannot be distributed among the states
1864 oppose the subversion of the civil by military law in States not in insurrection
oppose interference of the military in elections in Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Delaware
preserve the Federal Union and the rights of the States unimpaired
1868 establish a federal union of co-equal States
Immediate restoration of all the States to their rights in the Union
repeal enrolling State militias into national forces in time of peace
1872 demand removal of all disabilities imposed after the rebellion

1892 defeat the Force Bill to safeguard Blacks voting in the south
1896 denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in local affairs

The 24 planks above from 1840 to 1896 clearly promoted or defended states' rights. Among other restrictions on national powers, five specifically declared that the central government had limited powers, four stated that it could not carry out internal improvements (e.g., build roads), and four prevented it from distributing monies to individual states.

However, two planks did recognize national rights later in this era. In 1860, the "northern" segment of the Democratic Party that nominated Stephen Douglas agreed to respect the Supreme Court's decision about the powers of territorial legislatures concerning slavery. After the Civil War, Democrats did specifically pledge to preserve the union.

1860 respect federal restrictions on domestic relations
1872 pledge ourselves to maintain the union of these States

1900-1948:

The party said little about either states' or national rights during its Cooperative Federalism era. I found and coded only eight planks, four on each side of the issue. Here are the four that defended states' rights, coded under Freedom 110—

1908 let states determine rules for grazing on public lands
1912 favor full exercise by the States of their reserved sovereign powers
1924 condemn efforts to nationalize the functions and duties of the states
1928 demand that the constitutional rights and powers of the states shall be preserved

-—and here are the four favoring national rights coded Order 210:

1908 favor giving the Interstate Commerce Commission power to inspect railroad tariff rates
1936 enforce the criminal and civil provisions of the existing anti-trust laws
1940 opposed to giving states and local authorities control of Federally-financed work relief
1944 favor Federal aid to education administered by the states

1952-2016:

After 1952, no Democratic platforms had planks coded Freedom 110 for States' Rights, but 33 planks were coded Order 210 for National Rights. Here is the full set:

1956 favor federal financing of school construction
1960 Federal aid for comprehensive metropolitan transportation program
Federal aid for metropolitan area planning
Federal aid in combating air and water pollution
1972 enforce anti-trust laws in corporation-agriculture-agribusiness interlocks
support increases in the federal share of education costs
support federal initiatives and federal standards to reform automobile insurance
support general revenue sharing and using tax revenue for local use
1976 enforce all equal opportunities laws and affirmative action
enforce the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
provide federal aid to end spending differences on education within state borders

	support general revenue sharing for the fiscal health of all levels of government
	there should be a phased reduction in the states' share of welfare costs
	support general revenue sharing and using tax revenue for local use
1980	enact five-year extension of the local government revenue sharing program
	enforce all civil rights laws and regulations
	enforce all U.S. trade laws and unfair trade practices that cost American jobs
	enforce and strengthen antitrust laws
	enforce existing anti-discrimination laws with respect to hiring, pay and promotions
	enforce minimum wage and Davis-Bacon protections
	enforce The Equal Pay and the Age Discrimination Acts
	favor a steady increase in federal support to reduce inter- and intra-state disparities
	provide greater assistance to state and local governments for their welfare costs
	require the FBI and CIA to observe civil rights
1988	equalize financing among local school districts within each state
1992	restore government as the upholder of basic law and order for crime-ravaged communities
1996	enforce labor standards to protect workers in vulnerable industries
2000	enforce protections against on-the-job discrimination
	redirect money from state bureaucrats and transfer it directly to schools that need it
2004	support Federal fiscal relief to states as an effective tool to jumpstart growth
2008	provide significant and immediate temporary funding to state and local governments
	reward successful community colleges with grants
2016	enforce the Dodd-Frank financial reform law

Close study of individual planks in all 45 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 2016 shows that the Democratic Party's position concerning the distribution of governmental power in a federal system evolved over the party's history. Democrats fiercely defended states' rights throughout the nineteenth century. During the first half of the twentieth century, the party practiced Cooperative Federalism, which allowed for the exercise of national power in some areas and respect for states' rights in others. In effect, the party exercised national power in economic matters but allowed states to regulate their social affairs.

For a period after 1964, Democrats provided national financial assistance to state and local governments in the novel form of "revenue sharing," mentioned in several planks above. The Center for the Study of Federalism described revenue sharing as,

> a type of fiscal federalism whereby the federal government allocates revenue to state and local governments with little or no strings attached. Unlike categorical grants that are program specific, revenue sharing provides flexibility to subnational political jurisdictions in using federal funds tailored to their special needs.[220]

The Center said that Lyndon Johnson began the program originated in 1964; Richard Nixon adopted it with modifications in 1971; Jimmy Carter continued revenue sharing later in the 1970s; but Ronald Reagan ended the funding during the 1980s. Through revenue sharing and other forms of national financing, Democrats backed many policies designed to induce state compliance rather than coerce it. Often their economic policies carried centralizing consequences for federalism.

Plank Codes for Economic Freedom and Order

Politics revolve around the economy. Consequently, party platforms addressed it in many ways, resulting in planks that posed problems in classification. In the context of federalism, this section

classifies planks according to whether they limit central government (Freedom code 105 Economy) or empower central government (Order code 205 Economy). Figure 11.2 displays the results for 173 Democratic planks over all three eras.

FIGURE 11.2: Economic Freedom and Order Planks by Eras



As Democratic platforms grew in length, they devoted more attention to managing the economy. However, Democrats were far more likely to limit national control in the first era than in the second or the third.

1840-1896:

Here are the eight Democratic planks assigned the Freedom code 105 that limited national authority or otherwise preserved rights:

1840 federal government cannot foster one industry or region over another
1844 federal government cannot foster one branch of industry over another
1848 advance "liberty, equality, and fraternity," by resisting laws for the few
federal government cannot foster one branch of industry over another
1852 federal government cannot foster one branch of industry over another
1856 federal government cannot foster one branch of industry over another
1884 enforce individual rights against corporate abuses
1892 denounce the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890

Six of these eight planks clearly limit the central government, but the one in1884 might be constructed as strengthening the central government against corporations.

However, the five planks coded as imposing Order on economic matters in the States' Rights era are non-problematic. Each entrusts some authority to the national government.

1852 resist all monopolies and exclusive legislation for the benefit of the few
1856 resist all monopolies and exclusive legislation for the benefit of the few
1872 oppose all further grants of lands to railroads or other corporations
1992 abolish contract convict labor
1892 abolish notorious sweating system

1900-1948:

During Cooperative Federalism from 1900 to 1948, only two planks were coded 105 Freedom concerning the economy:

1912 oppose establishment of a central bank
1932 remove government from private enterprise, except public works and natural resources

Order code 205 Economy was applied to 37 planks, which are too many to list. Here is a sample:

1900 oppose private monopolies
1908 prohibit the railroads from competing with their shippers
1908 protect resources in timber, coal, iron and oil against monopolistic control
1912 oppose injunctions in industrial disputes
1912 prevent gambling in agricultural products by organized exchanges
1924 pledge vigorous enforcement of existing laws against monopoly
1924 readjust and lower rail and water rates
1924 regulate by governmental agencies the anthracite coal industry
1928 opposed to a monopoly in American shipping
1928 protect products of convict labor
1932 oppose monopoly and unfair trade practices
1932 regulate Exchanges in securities and commodities
1932 regulate Holding companies which sell securities in interstate commerce
1936 protect our farmers and manufacturers against unfair competition
1948 pledge an intensive enforcement of the antitrust law

Democrats during their Cooperative Federalism era adopted many platform planks that backed national government.

1952-2016:

In their National Authority era, Democrats occasionally did adopt some planks coded Freedom 105 Economy, cutting back on national authority, for example:

1968 dismantle the restrictions placed on foreign investment and finance,
1972 eliminate the unfair, bureaucratic Nixon wage and price controls
1980 conduct an agency-by-agency review to make regulation less intrusive
1980 deregulate the trucking industry
1980 simplify the tax code and ease the burden on taxpayers in the preparation
1984 reduce regulation of the railroad industry

However, more than one hundred other Democratic planks during this era were coded Order 205 Economy. Nearly all proposed more national government regulation, which fit the Order classification. (Planks that simply proposed more spending for the Public Good will be covered in a later chapter.) Here again is a sample of the planks coded Order 205:

1956 protect fish and game habitats against encroachment for commercial purposes.
1972 protect the rights of tenants to organize tenant organizations
1976 prohibit corporate ownership of competing types of energy, such as oil and coal

1976 prohibit the practice of red-lining by private financial institutions
1980 protect businesses against takeover by giant conglomerates
1980 protect consumers against dangerous products
1988 oppose all offshore oil drilling in environmentally sensitive areas
1992 oppose new offshore oil drilling and mineral exploration
1996 oppose new offshore oil drilling and mineral exploration
2000 protect our environment from oil and gas drilling
2016 oppose drilling in the Arctic and off the Atlantic coast,
2016 oppose drilling in the Arctic Ocean or the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
2016 oppose efforts to undermine the effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act
2016 oppose mountaintop removal mining operations
2016 prohibit anti-competitive "pay for delay" deals that keep generic drugs off the market
2016 protect Safe Drinking Water Act provisions

By the middle of the twentieth century, the party's position evolved to embrace national authority over states' rights concerning social equality, which will be documented in Chapter 12. First, we should review another bit of evidence concerning evolution in Democratic platforms.

Plank Codes for Expanding Government

Although the secondary group of coding categories seldom displayed consistent differences between the Democratic and Republican parties, one code—503 Expand Government—revealed that they behaved very differently on expanding the government. The code was applied to 40 planks that specifically addressed the distribution of government authority in a federal system. Only one such plank appeared in the Democrats' first era.

1840-1896

1896 demand the enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission

The only plank that favored expanding the national government came at the very end of the States' Rights era, when Democrats were beginning to address problems of industrialization.

1900-1948

A total of 15 planks were coded 503 Expanding Government in the Cooperative Federalism era. All but one favored expansion of national government.

1900 favor enlargement of the scope of the inter-State commerce law
1900 recommend that Congress create a Department of Labor
1904 demand an enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission
1908 demand such enlargement of the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission
1908 enactment of a law creating a Department of Labor
1908 oppose extending central government by judicial construction
1912 extend work of the bureau of mines
1916 favor the creation of a Federal Bureau of Safety in the Department of Labor
1916 favor the extension of the powers and functions of the Federal Bureau of Mines
1928 pledges itself to enlarge the existing Bureau of Public Health
1940 favor enactment of legislation creating an Indian Claims Commission
1948 advocate federal aid for education administered by and under the control of the states

1948 Labor Education Extension Service be established in the Department of Labor
1948 urge that the Department of Labor be rebuilt and strengthened
1948 advocate federal aid for education be administered by and under control of the states

Although the 1908 plank opposed having the judiciary extend the central government, that plank occurred in a paragraph that stated: "we insist that Federal remedies for the regulation of interstate commerce and for the prevention of private monopoly shall be added to, not substituted for, State remedies." So that plank also favored "Federal remedies" to regulate interstate commerce. The exception to expansion of national government is listed at the end in italics. Although that plank received the 503 code, it was coded negatively, indicating opposition to government expansion.

1952-2016

One would expect many planks coded for expansion of government in the National Authority era, and here are all 25:

1960 create a council of advisers on resources and conservation
1960 propose a consumer council, backed by a suitable staff
1960 propose a Federal advisory agency for expansion of cultural resources
1960 propose a Federal bureau of intergroup relations for discrimination in housing, etc
1960 recommend establishment of a Youth conservation Corps
1972 study federal chartering of large multi-national and international corporations,
1972 support the development of an independent consumer agency
1972 oppose all efforts to abolish or dismantle the U.S. Department of Agriculture
1976 more forceful role for the General Accounting Office
1980 Establish a Minority Business Development Agency in the Department of Commerce
1980 expand economic development initiative programs of the Department of Commerce
1980 strengthen Office of Civil Rights in the Departments of Education and HHS
1996 improve speed, efficiency, authority, and efficacy of the FAA and the FRA
2008 start a National Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank for infrastructure improvements
2008 reinvigorate the Environmental Protection Agency
2008 establish a Chief Technology Officer for the nation
2008 expand AmeriCorps, double the size of the Peace Corps
2008 staff the Federal Emergency Management Agency with professionals
2008 stop the abuse of privatization of government jobs
2008 we will create a White House advisor on Indian Affairs
2012 provide states two years of funding to build needed roads, bridges, and transit systems.
2016 establish Build America Bonds for infrastructure investment by state and local governments.
2016 enhance the antitrust enforcement arms of the DOJ and FTC
2016 providing Justice, SEC, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission more resources
2016 strengthen AmeriCorps

Democratic platform planks during the National Authority era repeatedly called for expansion of the national government.

Conclusion

The Democratic Party was founded in 1828 during the successful election of Andrew Jackson as President of the United States. Jackson and his Democratic followers defended states' independence and their own power in the relatively new federal system of government. The party formally declared its principles in its first platform adopted at its national convention in 1840. That platform and its next three in 1844, 1848, and 1852 reiterated the Jacksonian position on states' rights. All four documents contained the same resolution: "That the federal government is one of limited powers." Furthermore, in identical language, all four platforms resolved that "the general government lacks power to carry on internal improvements" within states, such as building roads or dams. The Democratic Party remained committed to this view of federalism throughout the rest of the nineteenth century. Democratic platforms from 1840 to 1896 reflected a States' Rights interpretation of federalism.

By 1900, progressive views within the party responded to negative consequences of industrialization. They backed national economic policies against corporate greed while still recognizing states' rights concerning social policies, including segregation. During the party's Cooperative Federalism era from 1900 to 1948, Democratic platforms had very few planks dealing with national or states' rights but many that asserted national economic policies. The Democratic Party left its Cooperative Federalism era in 1948, when it adopted its first civil rights planks.

Becoming more independent of its southern wing, the national Democratic Party in 1952 entered its current era of National Authority concerning federalism. Since then, the party has passed scores of planks asserting national over states' rights and favoring national control of the economy. Today's Democratic Party has completely reversed its original position on the distribution of powers in a federal system of government.

CHAPTER 12

Equality Planks

Democratic platform planks from 1840 to 2016 document the party's evolution from slavery to equality. The planks were assigned one of eleven Equality codes if they positively affected the life chances of citizens in selected social groups—except for code 301, which negatively affected life chances for Non-whites. Approximately ten percent of the 3,392 Democratic planks dealt in some way with equality. Table 12.1 reports the frequency distribution of the eleven Equality codes.

TABLE 12.1: Distribution of Equality Codes over Federalism Eras

	1840-1896 States' Rights	1900-1948 Cooperative Federalism	1952-2016 National Authority	Total
300 Non-whites+		2	20	22
301 Non-whites-	8		0	8
302 Women		14	82	96
303 Disadvantaged			10	10
304 Handicapped		1	27	28
305 Low income			4	4
306 Elderly			38	38
307 Children	1	5	42	48
308 Veterans	4	15	39	58
309 LGBTQ			12	12
310 Indigenous		1	14	15
Totals	13	38	288	339

Code 308 Veterans, which pledged support for veterans in returning to society, consistently drew many planks in all three eras, but such proposals did not distinguish Democrats from Republicans and will not be discussed further. Two facts stand out in Table 12.1:

- During their States' Rights era, Democrats rarely addressed issues of equality, except negatively for Non-whites.
- During their National Authority era, Democrats addressed equality issues for all groups.

We will begin with how the party dealt with Non-whites.

Equality Planks for Non-whites

Figure 12.1 shows the distribution of Equality codes 300 and 301 for Non-Whites over all three federalism eras.

FIGURE 12.1: Equality Codes by Federalism Eras



During the party's States' Rights era, all eight Democratic planks negatively affected Blacks:

1844 congress has no power to "interfere with questions of slavery"
1848 congress has no power to "interfere with questions of slavery"
1852 congress has no power to "interfere with questions of slavery"
1856 Congress cannot interfere with questions of slavery
1856 noninterference by Congress with slavery in every state and territory
1856 support "the act for reclaiming fugitives from service or labor"
1860 abide by the decision of the Supreme Court on slavery in the territories
1868 abolition of all instrumentalities for securing negro supremacy

During their Cooperative Federalism era, Democrats generally avoided addressing Equality issues, but they did adopt these two weak positive planks:

1940 strive for legislative safeguards against Negro discrimination in government service
1944 believe racial and religious minorities have the right to live, develop and vote equally

During the party's National Authority era, all 20 Democratic planks were positive. They are too numerous to list, but these four are illustrative

1964 enforce the civil rights Act of 1964
1984 upgrade and replenish housing in minority communities
2004 support enabling more minority students to enter the sciences
2016 fight to end institutional and systemic racism in our society

Equality Planks for Women

Democrats adopted no planks favoring women's equality during their States' Rights era but passed fourteen planks during the Cooperative Federalism era. They are:

1916 provide for decency, comfort and health in the employment of women
1916 recommend the extension of the franchise to the women
1920 favor employment services with women's departments

1920 favor women on all commissions dealing with women's work or women's interests
1920 increased appropriation for vocational training in home economics
1924 oppose exhaustive debilitating employment conditions for women
1924 welcome women in control of government
1928 declare for equality of women with men in all political matters
1928 favor an equal wage for equal service
1928 oppose exploitation of women in industry
1940 safeguard the health, safety and economic welfare of women workers
1944 favor legislation assuring equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex
1948 constitutional amendment on equal rights for women
1948 favor workers of our nation receive equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex

Democrats during the National Authority era adopted 82 planks concerning women's equality, far too numerous to list. Here is a sample:

1952 We believe in equal pay for equal work, regardless of sex
1964 promote full equality of opportunity for women
1968 create voluntary family planning information centers
1972 end discrimination against women in access to education, tenure, promotion and salary
1972 appoint women to all branches of the federal government
1980 restore compensatory education for disadvantaged children
1980 promote equal pay for work of comparable value
1992 Democrats stand behind the right of every woman to choose
2000 support contraceptive research, family planning
2008 pass the Fair Pay Act
2016 support the Violence Against Women Act

Equality Planks for the Disadvantaged

During their National Authority era, Democrats adopted these ten planks to help "disadvantaged" groups that had no distinguishing social characteristics.

1968 have federal home subsidies favor disadvantaged people
1968 set Income payments and eligibility standards for the aged, the blind, the disabled
1972 disadvantaged peoples, should be represented in any group making decisions
1972 develop affirmative action programs in universities and colleges for minorities and women
1980 oppose cuts in social programs, aiding the aged, women, children and minorities
1980 enroll more minorities and women in medical schools, health education programs
1980 improve federal programs to maximize their benefit to those most in need
1980 support federal scholarships to meet the needs of all the underprivileged
1984 restore compensatory education for disadvantaged children
2016 provide targeted funding for small business growth in underserved communities

Equality Planks for the Handicapped

Democrats during Cooperative Federalism did adopt one plank concerning the handicapped:

1948 aid the blind and other handicapped persons

Democrats during National Authority became deeply concerned about the handicapped, adopting 27 planks similar to these:

1952 favor further improvements in public assistance programs for the handicapped
1960 permit workers who are totally and permanently disabled to retire at any age
1972 mentally retarded must be given employment and educational opportunities
1980 support increasing the federal share of the costs of education for the handicapped
1996 enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act
2000 ensure that people with disabilities can meet their full potential
2008 support full funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
2016 realize the full promise of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Equality Planks for Low Income Residents

Prior to 1952-2016, no Democratic plank addressed poor people with low income. Even during their National Authority era, they adopted only four planks specifically favoring that group

1976 support community-based social services to low- and middle-income families
1976 support for full funding of neighborhood legal services for the poor
1984 support participation in federal programs of all low and moderate income pupils
1992 strengthen legal services for the poor

Instead, Democrats addressed the needs of poor people through welfare programs, to be discussed in the next chapter under Public Goods.

Equality Planks for the Elderly

Also prior to 1952-2016, no Democratic plank addressed the elderly. However, the party adopted 38 planks concerning elderly and retired people during its National Authority era. Here are ten examples:

1952 favor further strengthening of old age and survivors insurance
1960 eliminate discrimination in employment due to age
1968 include prescription drugs in Medical care for the aged
1972 Establish federal standards and inspection of nursing homes
1980 expand funding provided for the Section 202 housing program for the elderly
1992 support the needs of our senior citizens for productive and healthy lives
2004 Help seniors by protecting medicare and cutting prescription costs
2008 provide assistance to those who need long-term care
2008 seniors and disabled should have access to quality affordable long-term care services
2016 support the Older Americans Act

Equality Planks Concerning Children

In 1892, at the tail end of the States' Rights era, Democrats' became concerned enough about hazards in manufacturing that they went on record to favor national legislation favorable to children:

1892 prohibit employment in factories of children under 15 years of age

During Cooperative Federalism, Democrats supported five more planks concerning children's employment and well being:

1916 apply the Uniform Child Labor Law
1916 favor the speedy enactment of an effective Federal Child Labor Law
1920 prohibit child labor
1928 protect infancy and childhood against exploitation
1948 expand maternal care, improve the health of the nation's children

Exploitation of child labor in American manufacturing was no longer a national problem by 1952, but Democrats continued to focus on children's welfare in their National Authority era, adopting 42 planks such as these:

1952 support services for the children of agricultural migratory workers
1968 expand the Neighborhood Youth Corps,
1972 Full funding of legislation designed to meet the needs of children with special needs
1980 enact an adequately funded, comprehensive quality child-care program
1984 enforce use of automobile child restraints
1988 expand availability of pre-school education for children at risk
1992 enforce child support by parents
1992 support a family preservation program to reduce child and spousal abuse
1996 cut off children's access to cigarettes
2000 guarantee access to affordable health care for every child
2004 increasing child support enforcement and promoting responsible fatherhood
2016 increase investments to make quality childcare more affordable

No longer content to let states alone determine how children are raised and cared for, the Democratic Party sought to set national goals and standards.

Equality Planks for LGBTQ Citizens

Few Americans before World War II knew that there were many lesbian women and gay men in the United States. Very few people advocated for their rights, and lesbians and gays themselves were certainly not politically prominent. Democrats adopted the first plank to end discrimination against them in 1996 and adopted eleven others by 2018. Here is the full set of twelve planks:

1996 end discrimination against gay men and lesbians
2000 end workplace discrimination against gay men and lesbians
2000 support AIDS-fighting initiatives
2008 allow qualified men and women to serve openly regardless of sexual orientation
2008 support providing Medicaid coverage to more low-income HIV-positive Americans
2008 support the repeal of "Don't Ask Don't Tell"
2012 actively combat efforts by other nations that criminalize homosexual conduct or ignore abuse
2012 request $4 billion over three years for the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS
2012 support marriage equality and equal treatment under law for same-sex couples
2016 commit ourselves to insuring fair treatment for LGBT
2016 Democrats believe that LGBT rights are human rights
2016 fight for comprehensive federal non-discrimination protections for all LGBT Americans

Beginning as a political party founded on slavery and white supremacy, the Democratic Party had evolved nearly two hundred years later as a champion of social equality in virtually all aspects of life.

Equality Planks for Indigenous People

No Democratic planks addressed indigenous people during the party's States' Rights era, but one plank was adopted near the end of its Cooperative Federalism era:

1940 favor payment of any just claims by Indian and Eskimo citizens of Alaska

Then in the party's National Authority era, these fourteen planks were adopted:

1952 advance the health, education and economic well-being of our American Indian citizens
1956 assist Indian tribes in the full development of their human and natural resources
1956 Elimination of all impediments to full citizenship for American Indians
1960 assist Indian tribes in the full development of their human and natural resources
1964 Assist our Indian people to improve their standard of living
1972 American Indians should be given the right to receive bilingual medical services
1980 advocate quality education in the Bureau of Indian Affairs
1980 ensure that tribal resources develop at a pace that preserves the existing life-style
2008 assist American Indian communities
2012 American Indian and Alaska Native tribes are sovereign self-governing communities
2016 enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act
2016 strengthen Indian voting rights, including improved access to polling locations
2016 empower Indian nations
2016 expand health care provided by the Indian Health Service

Equality Planks Concerning Segregation

No mention of "segregate" in any form occurred in over 20,000 words in 15 Democratic platforms from 1840 to 1896. Nor did it appear in over 50,000 words in 13 platforms from 1900 to 1948, during which segregation was established throughout the South. The term was taboo in the party.

After the Democratic Party adopted its first civil rights plank at its 1948 national convention, the party freely discussed segregation and desegregation in its 17 platforms during the National Authority era. Some form of the term appeared 26 times. The party's 1956 platform stated, ambiguously:

> Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States relating to segregation in publicly supported schools and elsewhere have brought consequences of vast importance to our Nation as a whole and especially to communities directly affected. We reject all proposals for the use of force to interfere with the orderly determination of these matters by the courts.

The 1972 Democratic platform did support the goal of school desegregation, and almost half a century later, the party's 2016 platform rued:

> Our schools are more segregated today than they were when Brown v. Board of Education was decided, and we see wide disparities in educational outcomes across racial and socioeconomic lines.

The 1954 Supreme Court decision that led to school desegregation across the South and eventually across the country was fought feverishly in places and has taken years to implement. School

desegregation would not have occurred as early as it did without the Supreme Court's unanimous decision, which established National Authority over States' Rights. In the wake of the Court's decision outlawing racial segregation in school, the Democratic Party—acting through the presidency and Congress—asserted National Authority concerning racial segregation in other aspects of American life.

Equality Planks Concerning Civil Rights

"Civil rights" has acquired a different meaning today from that prior to the Civil War. As discussed briefly in Chapter 5, the term then did not includes social rights. A recent book by reconstruction historian Eric Foner described four types of rights in the antebellum period.[221]

> Most basic were *natural rights*, such as the "unalienable" rights enumerated by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. Every person, by virtue of his or her human status, was entitled to life, liberty (even though this principle was flagrantly violated by the existence of slavery), and the pursuit of happiness (often understood as the right to enjoy the fruits of one's own labor and rise in the social scale). [Emphasis added]

According to Foner, *civil rights* were of a second type and

> included legal entitlements essential to pursuing a livelihood and protecting one's personal security-- the right to own property, go to court, sue and be sued, sign contracts, and move about freely. These were fundamental rights of all free persons, but they could be regulated by the state. Married women, for example, could not engage in most economic activities without the consent of their husbands, and many states limited the right of blacks to testify in court in cases involving whites.

Civil rights were separate from *political rights* and did not including voting:

> Legally, despite Webster's dictionary, access to the ballot box was a privilege of "franchise," not a right. It was everywhere confined to men, and almost everywhere to white men.

Finally, Foner wrote, there were *social rights*:

> an amorphous category that included personal and business relationships of many kinds. These lay outside the realm of governmental supervision. Every effort to expand the rights of blacks was attacked by opponents as sure to lead to "social equality," a phrase that conjured up images of black-white sexual intimacy and interracial marriage.[222]

From 1840 to 1986, the term "rights" appeared 52 times in Democratic platforms, almost always referring to general states' or citizens' rights. Once, in 1892, the Democrats referred to "electoral rights," but that occurred while objecting to federal oversight of elections:

> We warn the people of our common country, jealous for the preservation of their free institutions, that the policy of **Federal control of elections**, to which the Republican party has committed itself, is fraught with the gravest dangers, scarcely less momentous than would result from a revolution practically establishing monarchy on the ruins of the Republic. It strikes at the North as well as at the South, and injures the colored citizen even more than the white; it means a horde of deputy marshals at every polling place, armed with Federal power; returning boards appointed and controlled by Federal authority, **the outrage of the electoral rights of the people** in the several States, [Emphasis added)

From 1900 to 1948, "rights" occurred in 65 instances but never as part of the phrase "civil rights" until 1948. The term appeared on the lead sentence of an important passage:

> The Democratic Party is responsible for the great **civil rights** gains made in recent years in eliminating unfair and illegal discrimination based on race, creed or color,
>
> The Democratic Party commits itself to continuing its efforts to eradicate all racial, religious and economic discrimination.
>
> We again state our belief that racial and religious minorities must have the right to live, the right to work, the right to vote, the full and equal protection of the laws, on a basis of equality with all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Although Democrats won the presidency and controlled Congress in the 1948 election, southern Democrats stood in the way of fulfilling the party platform pledges. That required another fifteen years of political change.

In June 1963 President John Kennedy announced that he would be sending to Congress a civil rights bill that would outlaw racial segregation in public accommodations—restaurants, hotels theaters, stores, and so on. After his assassination in November, his successor, President Lyndon Johnson, vowed to pass Kennedy's bill and did so in July 1964.

My coding scheme did not include a separate category for "civil rights" planks, but searching the texts of all 3,392 planks can identify them. Here are all fourteen that mentioned the term ordered by year followed by the assigned code numbers.

1952	502	favor legislation to perfect existing Federal civil rights statutes
1964	300	enforce the civil rights Act of 1964
1968	505	pledge effective and impartial enforcement of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts
1972	111	restore civil rights to ex-convicts after completion of their sentences
1972	302	include denial of civil rights on the basis of sex
1980	210	enforce all civil rights laws and regulations
1980	210	require the FBI and CIA observe civil rights
1980	405	amend The Fair Housing Act and Title VI of the civil rights Act to include handicapped
1980	503	strengthen Office of civil rights in the Departments of Education and HHS
1980	511	establish civil rights units at appropriate U.S. Attorneys' offices
1984	511	reaffirm the principle that government must protecting the civil rights of all citizens
1992	115	provide civil rights protection for gay men and lesbians
2004	300	restore vigorous federal enforcement of our civil rights laws
2016	205	support the CFPB in enforcing civil rights laws against discrimination in consumer lending

The Kennedy-Johnson Civil Rights Act of 1964 transformed "civil rights" into an umbrella term covering a wide range of social rights and promoting equal treatment for all.

Conclusion

The Democratic Party was founded in 1828 on two interlaced principles: (1) to defend states' rights within a federal system of government and (2) to preserve slavery as a social institution necessary to the economy of southern states. With legitimate roots in federalist theory, states' rights served as a righteous cloak for perpetuating social inequality. Although the national government fought a war to re-establish national government, curtail states' rights, and end slavery; the Democratic Party, cowed by its strong southern wing, continued to defend states' rights and avoided exercising national authority even when holding the presidency twice prior to 1896. In 1892, Democrats did adopt a plank against

employing children under 15 in factories, but passed no other plank urging national action benefitting disadvantaged groups in society during its States' Rights era, 1828-1896.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Democrats realized that more national action was needed to confront nationwide problems caused by industrialization. As they did in 1892 by opposing child labor in factories, Democrats abandoned their States' Rights philosophy of federalism and from 1900 to 1948 accepted Cooperative Federalism, which allowed for national policies in economic affairs and some national rules in social affairs. Party platforms adopted a handful of planks protecting non-whites, women, the disabled, children, and indigenous people. Nevertheless, the party tolerated racial segregation in southern states until 1948, when the Democratic National Convention adopted a meaningful civil rights platform that ended the party's tolerance of segregation.

By 1952, Democrats had entered their National Authority era and adopted scores of planks that imposed national goals and standards on individual states. Scott Appelrouth's independent study of all 45 Democratic platforms concluded:

> Democrats championed a seemingly endless list of groups: children, women, youth, "poor people," tenants, American Indians, the physically disabled, the "mentally retarded," the elderly, veterans, prisoners, consumers, workers, farmers, and, most controversially, black Americans.

In the process, he wrote, Democratic platforms cited panoply of new rights:

> "the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation" (1960); "the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sick employment" (ibid.); the right "to another job" if "any man or woman workers displaced by a machine or by technological change" (1964); a "right to as much education and training as he desires and can master . . . even if his family cannot pay for this education" (1968); . . ."the right to quality, safety, and the lowest possible cost on goods and services " (1972).[223]

The Democratic Party was intent on pursuing social equality.

CHAPTER 13

Public Goods Planks

After governments have established basic order and granted certain freedoms, they usually, in different measures, provide Public Goods—benefits and services theoretically available to everyone, such as education, postal service, sanitation, and parks.[224] While public goods benefit all citizens, they are unlikely to be produced by the voluntary acts of individuals. Government actions provide public goods by taxing citizens to pay for them. Understandably, some citizens object to the expenditures. Consequently, spending for Public Goods might be viewed as coercive and coded as Order. Given that the marginal costs to individual taxpayers are not confiscatory, Public Goods planks are not coded as Order planks.

Democratic planks concerning Public Goods were coded as reported in Table 13.1, which orders the coding categories by frequencies of usage for each era.

TABLE 13.1: Public Goods Planks by Federalism Eras, Ordered by Total Usage

	1840-1896 States' Rights	1900-1948 Cooperative Federalism	1952-2016 National Authority	Totals
400 Education	1	10	136	147
407 Labor	3	30	107	140
406 Health		7	117	124
410 Energy		12	85	97
409 Agriculture		26	64	90
401 Transportation	6	21	56	83
405 Housing	1	6	64	71
403 Conservation		19	48	67
414 Economy		9	56	65
404 Welfare		5	56	61
402 Environment			57	57
408 Communication		5	30	35
416 Banking & Currency	16	7	7	30
415 Spending/Deficit	9	3	10	22
412 Merchant Marine		8	8	16
413 Indebtedness	7	1		8
411 Shipping	1	3	2	6
419 Immigration			1	1
Totals	44	172	904	1,120

Today, when a party adopts a plank concerning the public good it typically *favors* providing that good. But in the Democrats' States' Rights era, the party usually *opposed* such government spending. During the States' Rights era, only 44 of 209 total planks (21 percent) were coded for Public Goods. During the Cooperative Federalism era, the party began to provide more Public Goods in more diverse segments of economic life. The percentages of planks coded for Public Goods jumped to 32 percent (172 of 534) during Cooperative Federalism and to 34 percent during National Authority (904 of 2,649).

Public Goods Planks in Democrats' First Two Eras

States' Rights: 1840-1896

At first, Democrats did not envision a positive role for government in economic life. Most Democrats' planks concerning the Public Good fell under code 415 Banking & Currency. Of the sixteen planks, eight imposed restrictions on national control of the economy:

1840 government money must be separate from banking institutions
1844 government money must be separate from banking institutions
1848 government money must be separate from banking institutions
1848 praise defeat of national bank in 1844 election
1852 government money must be separate from banking institutions
1856 government money must be separate from banking institutions
1892 repeal the prohibitory 10 per cent tax on State bank issues
1896 opposed to the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of the United States in time of peace

The other eight pertained almost entirely to whether paper money was backed by gold or silver. Democrats generally favored adding silver, thinking that cheaper money would increase crop prices and make it easier for the "working man" to pay off debts.

Another nine Public Goods planks focused on Spending/Deficit code 415, and all of them discouraged public spending:

1840 no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
1844 no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
1848 no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
1852 no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
1856 no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray necessary expense
1868 economy in the administration of the government
1876 demand a rigorous frugality in every department
1888 enforce frugality in public expense and abolish needless taxation
1896 demand a return to that simplicity and economy

Of the seven planks tagged 413 Indebtedness, five argued against it, while the other two conceded that debts had to be paid:

1840 the federal government cannot assume state debts or do internal improvements
1844 the federal government cannot assume state debts or do internal improvements
1848 the federal government cannot assume state debts or do internal improvements
1852 the federal government cannot assume state debts or do internal improvements
1856 the federal government cannot assume state debts or do internal improvements
1868 Payment of the public debt of the United States
1872 pay public debts

Although early States' Rights Democrats opposed national spending for "internal improvements," they came to accept and even encourage it. By 1856 Democrats endorsed the idea of a cross-continental railroad and they favored improvement of waterways.

1856 favor an overland transit from the Pacific to the Mississippi River

1860 insure the construction of a Railroad to the Pacific coast
1884 improve the Mississippi River and other great waterways
1892 improve the Mississippi River and other great waterways of the Republic
1896 improve the Mississippi River and other great waterways of the Republic
1896 oppose the Pacific Railroad Funding bill

Democrats did oppose a funding plan for a railroad in 1896, but that involved politics more than principle. They also adopted a scattered handful of planks favoring labor, education, housing, and shipping, but during their States' Rights era, Democrats were not enthusiastic about having the national government provide Public Goods.

Cooperative Federalism: 1900-1948

In their Cooperative Federalism era, Democrats proposed more and different planks concerning Public Goods. Of the 172 planks in the database, over 100 fell in just five categories: Labor (30), Agriculture (26), Transportation (21), Conservation (19), and Energy (12).

Labor planks favored the eight-hour day, workers' rights to organize, compensation, labor standards and so on. Democrats did adopt three labor planks in the previous era, but those in the Cooperative Federalism proposed or implied national legislation/

Whereas there were no Democratic planks on agriculture in the previous era, the Cooperative Federalism era produced 26. Suddenly, Democrats favored providing credits to farmers, studying farming costs, encouraging farm cooperatives, providing crop insurance, and price guarantees.

As for the 21 Transportation planks, most (16) still concerned waterways, but four addressed roadways, as automobiles became more prevalent. Although a system of U.S. highways was designated in 1926, the roads themselves were built and maintained by state or local authorities. Moreover, World War II interrupted the spread of private automobiles. Not until the Interstate Highway System was launched in 1956 did the national government become deeply involved in road construction.

The 19 Conservation planks reflected concerns with reclaiming arid lands, flood control, and reforestation. Most of the 12 Energy planks dealt with electrification and oil production.

During the Cooperative Federalism era, Democrats managed to propose national responses to problems concerning labor, agriculture transportation, conservation, and energy, but they did so recognizing states' rights concerning their citizens' conduct.

Public Goods Planks during National Authority, 1952-2016

Democrats adopted more than 900 Public Goods planks in the current era, involving the national government in many aspects of modern life. Accordingly, this section needs to be structured differently. The planks adopted are far too many to list any individually. The extensive use of Public Goods coding categories for platform planks showed how modern life had demanded national attention to new problems confronting American citizens and the international community. Below are brief summaries of the ten most frequent coding categories that contained fifty or more planks. They are discussed in decreasing frequency of usage.

Education:

Most Democratic planks catalogued for the Public Good during this era dealt with education. At least 17 of the 136 planks promoted teacher education; 14 stressed the importance of bilingual education; 15 on the importance of the arts as well as the sciences; another 10 focused on school lunches; and others advanced medical science.

Health:

In addition to spending for medical science, the health category drew 118 planks—a huge increase from the 7 planks in the previous era. Democrats involved the national government in hospital construction, medical research, health care delivery, nursing homes, and medical insurance. Medicare, Medicaid, and Affordable Care were Democratic programs.

Labor:

Only 3 planks were coded for Labor in the first Democratic era, versus 30 from 1900-1948 and 111 after 1952. Those planks ranged across labor standards, collective bargaining, fair pay, workers' safety, unemployment, and other topics—nearly all of which aimed at greater social equality.

Energy:

No planks were coded for Energy in the first era. The 12 Democratic planks in 1900-1948 focused on producing oil and electricity. These energy sources also arose in the 85 planks after 1952, but the production and regulation of nuclear power soon joined the list. The first plank mentioning solar power appeared in 1972, and wind in 1976. Modernization of the nation's power grid was raised in 2008. Yet in 1980 numerous planks stressed our reliance on coal.

Agriculture:

Although 64 planks dealt with agriculture after 1952, that number was relatively fewer (7 percent) of all planks than in the Cooperative Federalism era (15 percent), when more people were engaged in farming and the depression hurt farmers so badly. Democrats backed farm price supports, encouraged farm cooperatives, expanding exports, and preserving the family farm.

Housing:

Although 64 planks also addressed housing after 1952, that was far more than the 6 in the previous era and the single plank in the first era. Democrats proposed "fair housing" planks in response to racially segregated housing patterns in urban areas. They provided funds for public housing and laws to protect tenants. Democrats expected that more and improved desegregated housing would promote equality. They produced more housing but it was rarely desegregated.

Economy:

No Democratic planks were coded for dealing with the economy in the first era, but that code was applied to about 5 percent of the planks in the other two eras. The 56 planks during National Authority aimed mainly at helping small businesses but also overseeing banks and credit card companies.

Welfare:

The 58 planks coded for Welfare in this era were proportionately more than the five planks in the second era and no planks in the first one. Of these 56, 15 specifically supported the Democrats' signature social security program. (Funding for social security was addressed under taxation codes.) Other welfare planks favored unemployment relief, food programs, public assistance, and aid for the poor.

The Environment:

Concern with "the environment" arose after World War II. No plank in either of the two earlier eras drew this code; 57 planks drew it after 1952. Democrats sought to combat air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, solid waste, acid rain, and ozone depletion.

Transportation:

Transportation was the tenth and last welfare code applied to more than fifty planks in the National Authority era. However, the 56 planks in this coding category represented less percentage usage than the 6 and 21 planks that addressed waterways in the two other eras. Democrats did adopt plans on waterways in the National Authority era, but far more attention was given to mass transit systems, passenger trains, and airports.

Regulating for the Public Good

While spending public money is usually associated with providing Public Goods, government regulation can also qualify as a Public Good.[225] Laws that specify which side of the road to drive constitute a Public Good. Government regulations, and other Democratic legislation, did not always issue from Democratic platforms. The 1934 legislation that created the Federal Communications Commission is a good example. In 1928, both the Democratic and Republican platforms mentioned radio, as proliferating stations used overlapping airwaves. Republicans, who controlled the presidency and Congress called for "expert government supervision" to

> Assign the radio communication channels, regional, continental, and transoceanic,—in the best interest of the American businessman, the American farmer, and the American public generally.

Democrats said something much weaker:

> Government supervision must secure to all the people the advantage of radio communication and likewise guarantee the right of free speech. Official control in contravention of this guarantee should not be tolerated. Governmental control must prevent monopolistic use of radio communication and guarantee equitable distribution and enjoyment thereof.

Nevertheless, the newly elected Democratic president and Congress in 1934 imposed order on radio transmissions by assigning communications channels as the Republicans proposed eight years earlier but did not implement.

Establishing the FCC required some government funding, but regulating broadcast waves cost far less than aiding farmers and putting people to work during the depression. Technically, government

regulation is a Public Good, but providing visible Public Goods—financial aid, dams, highways, airports—typically involve much larger expenditures. Today, the U.S. government raises money for its expenditures mainly through taxation. That was not always true.

Tax Planks

Tariffs on imported goods were the major source of government receipts under the old Articles of Confederation, and tariffs also provided funds for government under the new constitution. Tariffs generated 80 to 90 percent of U.S. funds until the Civil War, when an income tax was enacted to bolster finances. The income tax expired in 1872, as spending returned to normal after the war. From 1875 to 1890 tariffs provided more than half the government's cost, with taxes on alcohol and luxuries providing most of the remainder.[226]

In 1894, a Democratic Congress and president (Cleveland) revived the Republican income tax, but the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1895. In 1909 a Republican Congress, supported by a Republican president (Taft), proposed a 16th Amendment to the Constitution allowing an income tax. Democrats controlled Congress and the White House (Wilson) when the 16th Amendment was ratified in 1913. This history underpins Democratic planks on taxation over the three federalism eras, which fall into two categories, and displayed in Table 13.2.

TABLE 13.2: Taxation Plank Codes, Freedom 106 and Order 206, by Federalism Eras

Plank Codes	1840-1896 States' Rights	1900-1948 Cooperative Federalism	1952-2016 National Authority	Total
Freedom 106	6	5	48	59
Order 206	1	5	46	52

1840-1896

Democrats did not address taxation at all until 1868, after an income tax was imposed to finance the Civil War. Their six "Freedom" planks sought to limit the amount of taxes or the burden of compliance.

1868	106	simplifying the internal revenue system
1876	106	demand that all custom-house taxation shall be only for revenue
1884	106	demand that Federal taxation shall be exclusively for public purposes
1884	106	limit taxation to requirements of economical government
1884	106	oppose collecting taxes to be distributed among the States
1892	106	oppose sumputary laws [against luxury purchases]

The party's single "Order" plank had no significance:

1868	206	Equal taxation of every species of property, according to its real value

Taxation was not a party issue in Democrats' States' Rights era.

1900-1948

In 1900, Democrats still objected to an income tax as a war tax and later adopted five other planks that favored lower taxes.

1900	106	favor the reduction and speedy repeal of the war taxes
1924	106	oppose the so-called nuisance taxes, sales taxes
1928	106	favor a further reduction of the internal taxes of the people
1948	106	favor the reduction of taxes, whenever it is possible to do so
1948	106	favor the repeal of the discriminatory taxes on oleomargarine

However, Democrats soon indicated that they favored a graduated income tax—one that increased by income levels, known as progressive taxation—and taxes that were otherwise not notably regressive.

1908	206	favor an income tax as part of our revenue system
1912	206	support the income tax
1924	206	favor a graduated tax upon incomes
1924	206	favor a tax on commodities that will promote competition
1948	206	opposed to the imposition of a general federal sales tax

During their Cooperative Federalism era, Democrats reinforced their preference for progressive taxation over a flat tax rate or a sales tax. Prescribing increased national tax rates for higher incomes and monitoring payments resulted in more intervention into economic affairs nationwide, but Democrats still avoided intervening into states' social affairs.

1952-2016

Democrats' concern about taxation spiked in their National Authority era, with 46 planks coded Freedom and 46 coded Order. Over half of the Freedom planks (25) promised tax credits, which benefit only those who owe taxes and claim the credits. Democrats often used tax credits to benefit disadvantaged groups. Here are two examples:

1972	provide tax credit not deductions for blindness, old age, poverty
2000	extend the benefit of the Earned Income Tax Credit to working families

Most of the 46 Order taxation planks targeted those with higher incomes, such as these:

1972	make Social Security tax progressive, raise the ceiling on earned income
1980	promote the principle of progressive taxation
1984	limiting benefits of the third year of the Reagan tax cuts to incomes of less than $60,000
2000	end manipulative corporate tax shelters that undercut our tax system
2008	ask those making over $250,000 to pay a bit more in social Security
2012	close loopholes for the largest corporations and the highest-earning taxpayers
2016	support a financial transactions tax on Wall Street to curb excessive speculation

From 1840 to 1896, Democrats had sought to limit revenue flows to the national government, keeping it from overpowering states' rights. Although levying a personal income tax was approved by constitutional amendment in 1913, relatively little was raised by that tax for two decades. In 1934, just 14.2 percent of government receipts came from personal income taxes—slightly more than the 12.3 percent from corporate income taxes. By far the largest share (45.8 percent) came from excise taxes. By 1948, expenses of World War II pushed up the personal income tax share to 46.5 percent, around which it fluctuated to 2016, when it was 47.7 percent, versus the corporate share of 11.3.

"Tax and Spend" *v.* "Don't Tax and Spend"

Between 1934 and 2016, Social Insurance and Retirement receipts grew from 1 percent to 32.6 percent of the total U.S. government revenue.[227] In 1935, employee and employer each paid 1 percent of the employee's earning up to $3,000. The percentages increased periodically to 6.2 percent for employee and employer by 1990, and a formula increased the earnings base annually after 1950, amounting to $118,500 in 2016.[228] In 2016, Social Security outlays amounted to almost one-quarter of national expenditures.

A newspaper story in the mid-1930s labeled Democrats as the "tax and spend" party.[229] After the end of World War II, Republicans used the phrase to castigate their opposition's fiscal policies along two lines: (1) their tax rates for both personal incomes and corporate incomes were too high, and (2) they spent so much on Public Goods that even their high taxes could not cover the costs. Consequently—Republicans charged—Democrats repeatedly ran huge budget annual deficits, which, over time, accumulated to create our huge national debt. Republicans, in contrast, proposed to whittle away at the national debt by cutting both taxes and spending.

As confirmed in the above section, Tax Planks, Democrats did indeed repeatedly support progressive taxation, setting higher rates on higher personal and corporate incomes. Republicans after 1900 favored lowering tax rates, especially for those with higher incomes. Republicans did indeed deliver on their promises to lower tax rates. While Republican tax policies produced less government revenue, Republicans did not consistently spend less, so they did not regularly reduce the budget deficit. In fact, they usually increased the deficits, as demonstrated by the Obama and Trump administrations, in Table 13.3 and 3.1.

TABLE 13.3: Total Budget Deficits during Obama and Trump Administrations*

Obama Years	**Receipts – Outlays = Budget Deficits**
FY2010	– $1,294,373
FY2011	– $1,299,599
FY2012	– $1,076,573
FY2013	– $679,775
FY2014	– $484,793
FY2015	– $441,960
FY2016	– $584,651
FY2017	– $665,446
FY2010 – FY2017 =	– $628,927 **decrease**
Trump Years	
FY2018	– $779,137
FY2019	– $984,155
FY2020	– $1,083,419
FY2021	– $966,066
FY2018 – FY2021 =	+ $186,929 **increase**

*Amounts are in Millions of Constant 2012 Dollars

By law, all Fiscal Years (FY) end in October and are named for the year in which they end. The budget that Democrat Barack Obama's presented to the Congress in 2009 was for FY2010, which ended in October 2010. Elected in 2016, Trump became responsible for the FY2018 budget. President

Obama managed to decrease the annual budget deficit by over $600 million from FY2010 to FY2017. In contrast, President Trump's increased the deficit by almost $200 million from FY2018 to FY2021.

The Obama-Trump comparison is extreme but typical of the differences between Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. The method used in Table 13.3 of computing changes in annual budget deficits is used in Figure 13.1 to compare annual budget deficits for party/presidential administrations since 1952.

Figure 13.1: Budget Deficits in Millions Since 1952*



*Amounts are in Millions of Constant 2012 Dollars

Figure 13.1 shows that out of nine presidential administrations since 1952 (five Republican and four Democratic), only two—those of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama—reduced the annual deficit between their first and last budgets. Both presidents were Democrats. By failing to increase taxes to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Republican George W. Bush actually increased the deficit by over $1.2 trillion dollars. Republicans may not tax, but they do spend.

Conclusion

Republicans have labeled the Democratic Party as the tax and spend party. They charge that Democrats heavily tax citizens and businesses and freely spend government funds on Public Goods. However, that was not true of Democrats in the past. During the party's States' Rights era from 1828 to 1896, the party opposed spending by the national government for "internal improvements" in the states. The party altered its stance on national action during its Cooperative Federalism era beginning in 1900. Initially, Democratic spending was devoted to infrastructure (rivers, dams), land conservation, and agriculture. Party planks proposed little else soon after the 13th Amendment to the Constitution authorized a personal income tax and increased national receipts.

The Great Depression that started in 1929 and lasted through the next decade changed Democrats' approach to national government. Although President Roosevelt proposed his social security program in 1934, legislation was not passed until 1935, and the first taxes were not collected and benefits were not paid until 1937.[230] A poll that year found that 31 percent said they had a Social Security Number.[231] Asked later in 1937 if they approved "of the present Social Security Tax on wages?"—73 percent approved.[232] A 1938 poll found 78 percent approval of "the present social security laws which provide old age pensions and unemployment insurance."[233] By 1948, 82 of respondents agreed that "social security should not cover just some people as it does now, and it should be extended to all people who earn a living."[234]

After World War II, even Republican President Eisenhower expressed "strong support of the social security program" when signing amending legislation in 1956.[235] That year, 83 percent of those surveyed said that the Eisenhower administration was doing a "very good" or "fairly good" job of "improving social security."[236] Nevertheless, in 1960 Republican Senator Barry Goldwater complained, "The government takes 6 % of most payrolls in Social Security Taxes and thus compels millions of individuals to postpone until later years the enjoyment of wealth they might otherwise enjoy today."[237]

Goldwater wrote as an extreme libertarian. When he accepted the Republican Party's nomination for president in 1964, he claimed that his party has "a single resolve, and that is freedom" and that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice." Although libertarianism is still prominent among Republicans, they—like Eisenhower—have come to accept that most Americans value the national government's social security program. When asked "do you expect to rely on social Security" as a source of income after retirement, 33 percent of all Americans in a 2022 survey said it would be a "major source" and 55 percent saw it as a "minor source." The same survey found these percentages reversed for those already retired: 55 percent of saying it was a "major source" of their income and only 34 percent saying it was a "minor source."[238]

CHAPTER 14

Democratic v. Republican Planks

This book documents the Democratic Party's evolution concerning its two central principles. One concerned public policy, the other the philosophy of federal government. Evidence from almost 200 years of Democrats' history and platforms documents that the party evolved from a policy of endorsing human slavery to promoting social equality. The party reversed similarly on federalism, moving from states' rights to national authority. Both changes occurred in tandem over three eras since the party's founding in 1828.

In the first era, from 1828 to 1896, Democrats defended "States' Rights" against national authority. They switched to an era of "Cooperative Federalism" from 1900 to 1948, tolerating segregation in the South while imposing national authority in economic matters. In 1952, the party entered its "National Authority" era in federal government. During their National Authority era, Democrats outlawed racial segregation across the states and passed laws promoting social equality for all ethnic groups, women, the disabled, the elderly, and persons of all genders.

As documented in my earlier book, *The Republican Evolution,* Republicans also reversed party policies concerning social policy and federalism. Republicans, who forcefully governed the nation for decades, are today opposed to exercising national authority in economic and social affairs. Once the party of Order, the GOP became the party of Freedom. The Republican Party also evolved in stages across three eras.

The first two Republican eras were identified and named in John Gerring's sweeping study, *Party Ideologies in America, 1826-1996*. They will only be summarized here. From 1860 to 1924, during Gerring's "Nationalism" era, Republicans wielded national authority. He described the GOP before 1924 as "state builders and economic nationalists who believed that a strong federal government was necessary not only to preserve the union but also to achieve prosperity and preserve the fabric of American society."[239] "Freedom" to them then "meant freedom from foreigners' intrusion—their arms, their goods, their peoples, and their ways - and from civil disorder. . . . Beginning in the 1920s, the threat to liberty was rethought; the danger was no longer anarchy, but rather the state."[240]

Gerring wrote that in the 1920s, Republicans abandoned "Nationalism' for "Neoliberalism," favoring free enterprise over government regulations. He linked their reorientation to Herbert Hoover's 1928 presidential campaign, when he praised ""the emancipation of the individual" and the "ideal of equal opportunity."[241] Although Gerring held that the party's Neoliberalism era continued through the 1990s, I contend that in 1964 Republicans entered a new era, which I labeled "Ethnocentrism." The party expanded the concept of freedom beyond freedom from government regulation of the economy. Freedom now embraced protection from government attempts to promote social equality. In the current decade, Republicans campaign against "woke" politics, vaguely defined as kowtowing to social groups that claim discrimination. This expanded interpretation of freedom marked the Republicans' transition from its Neoliberalism era to its Ethnocentrism era.

The two parties' evolutions over the social policy and federal philosophy proceeded in parallel tracks, but in opposite directions. Nevertheless, my three eras of each party evolution overlapped fairly closely, as shown in Table 14.1.

TABLE 14.1: Pairing Democratic and Republican Eras, 1828-2020

YEAR	DEMOCRATIC	REPUBLICAN		YEAR	DEMOCRATIC	REPUBLICAN
1828	**States' Rights**			1928	|	**Neoliberalism**
1832	|			1932	|	|
1836	|			1936	|	|
1840	|			1940	|	|
1844	|			1944	|	|
1848	|			1948	|	|
1852	|			1952	**National Authority**	|
1856	|	**Nationalism**		1956	|	|
1860	|	|		1960	|	|
1864	|	|		1964	|	**Ethnocentrism**
1868	|	|		1968	|	|
1872	|	|		1972	|	|
1876	|	|		1976	|	|
1880	|	|		1980	|	|
1884	|	|		1984	|	|
1888	|	|		1988	|	|
1892	|	|		1992	|	|
1896	|	|		1996	|	|
1900	**Cooperative Federalism**	|		2000	|	|
1904	|	|		2004	|	|
1908	|	|		2008	|	|
1912	|	|		2012	|	|
1916	|	|		2016	|	|
1920	|	|		2020		|
1924	|	|		2024	|	|

Chronologically, the Democratic eras were interrupted twice: in 1900 and 1952. The two Republican interruptions came in 1928 and 1964. All four correspond to inflection points in the developmental paths of the major issues associated with both parties' evolutions. Here is a brief summary of how the Democratic and Republican eras in Table 14.1 overlapped and related to each other.

- The Democrats' States' Rights era overlapped with the Republicans' Nationalism era for forty years, from 1856 through 1896. The slavery issue highlighted this period, which involved a Civil War, congressional Reconstruction of the South, and white southerners' distrust of Republicans.

- The Democrats' Cooperative Federalism era began in 1900 during the last three decades of Republican Nationalism. Although Republicans held the presidency for most of this time, Democrats introduced some progressive reforms under the two presidential terms of Woodrow Wilson. Ending segregation, however, was not on the Democratic agenda.

- The Democratic Party was still in its Cooperative Federalism era in 1928 when Republicans turned to Neoliberalism. Those two eras overlapped for another two decades. Beginning in 1932, Democrats held the presidency for 16 years and legislated more progressive reforms against Republicans, who espoused free enterprise. Democrats still refused to touch segregation.

- From 1952 to 1964—about a decade—the Democrats' National Authority was concurrent with Republican Neoliberalism. For eight of these years, Republicans held the presidency.

- The Democratic National Authority era and the Republican Ethnocentrism era have coexisted side-by-side for the last six decades—from 1964 to 2020. That stretch of time exceeds the length of the first overlap of Democratic and Republican eras, from 1856 to 1896—an era that held a bloody Civil War over slavery.

The award-winning book by Edward Carmines and James Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*, viewed racial conflict as one possible issue from a larger population of possible issues.[242] Carmines and Stimson focused on evolution of the racial issue. In contrast, I focus on the evolution of the Democratic and Republican parties.

Each party's evolution centered around two different pairs of major issues. Democrats evolved around social discrimination as a policy and the practice of federalism. Republicans also evolved over federalism but differently over the political values of freedom versus order in social relations. Choosing dates for inflection points in both parties' evolutions is problematic but not arbitrary.

To summarize the arguments to this point: Gerring ended the Democrats' States' Rights era in 1892, not 1896.[243] I chose 1896 because that year (1) marked the end of Grover Cleveland's presidency and (2) signaled the end of "free silver" as a Democratic campaign issue. For over a decade, many farmers and others in debt believed that basing the dollar on silver as well as gold would help them by making more money available. It was a popular issue that won William Jennings Bryan the Democratic presidential nomination in 1896. Although the issue had no lasting impact, Bryan and his supporters remained in control of the party and broadened its policy concerns. Ending the Democrats' Cooperative Federalism era in 1948 accords with the party's adoption of its first Civil Rights plank at the party's 1948 convention.

In *The Republican Evolution,* I followed Gerring's choice of 1924-1928 to divide the GOP's Nationalism and Neoliberalism eras, but I ended Neoliberalism in 1960 and began Ethnocentrism in 1964, with Goldwater's presidential campaign. Others might have fixed the start of Ethnocentrism with Ronald Reagan's election in 1980. However, Carmines and Stimson also linked Goldwater to a new era, writing in *Issue Evolution*: "The 1964 presidential election thus marked the decisive turn-point in the political evolution of racial issues," and "It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Barry Goldwater in this partisan transformation."[244]

Comparing the Parties' Planks on the Primary Codes

. Now we can step back and consider the parties' platforms from a broad point of view. We compare Democratic and Republicans usage of Public Goods, Freedom, Order, and Equality planks during each party's three eras. Figure 14.1 displays the distribution of 2,159 Democratic planks and 1,944 Republican planks coded under those headings over three time periods.

FIGURE 14.1: Both Parties Platform Planks for Four Primary Coding Categories



Except for Democrats in their States' Rights era, both parties adopted far more Public Goods planks in all eras than planks coded for Freedom Order, or Equality. That reflects what most political parties do. They campaign for votes by proposing to advance the Public Good. More interesting in Figure 14.1 is how much Democrats and Republicans differed in their Freedom planks. Freedom accounted for the most planks in Democrats' first era and for the least in the party's last era. In contrast, Republican Freedom planks appeared least in the GOP's first era and steadily increased thereafter.

Figure 14.2 strips the middle eras and portrays the parties' plank adoptions at the start and present status of their evolutions—during their first and last eras, the longest for both parties.

FIGURE 14.2: Percentages of Primary Plank Codes for First and Last Party Eras



The next four sections discuss the meaning and review the politics of all four types of primary planks.

Public Goods Planks

Political parties campaign for votes by proposing what they will do for people if elected. Consequently, one should expect most party planks to address the Public Good. Examples are building roads, improving waterways, educating children, funding universities, stabilizing the currency, and so on. Indeed, Figure 14.2 shows that most planks fell into the Public Goods category for both parties.

Democrats:

- **1840 to 1896:** Opposing a strong central government, States' Rights Democrats opposed its spending for Public Goods. Such planks accounted for only 33 percent of all the party's major plank codes; and nearly half of those concerned *banking and currency*.

- **1952 to 2016:** Public Goods planks rose to 53 percent of all primary codes. Three categories each contained over 100 planks. Topping the list were e*ducation* (136 planks), *health* (117), and *labor* (107).

Republicans:

- **1856 to 1924:** Public Goods planks made up 44 percent of major plank codes during Republicans' Nationalism era. Many dealt with *transportation* (20), *banking & currency* (13), and the *economy* (12).

- **1964 to 2016:** Public Goods plank adoption remained stable (43 percent) during Ethnocentrism. Most planks by far (93) dealt with *energy*, but they were split in their objectives: 62 favored *government action* (+ code), while 31 favored *less government* (– code).

More interesting than the parties' differences in content of Public Goods planks from their first to last era is their differences in adopting Freedom planks.

Freedom Planks

The term, "freedom," can mean different things, depending on the context. In government and politics, freedom means absence of government control, but society imposes controls too. Black slaves sought their personal freedom from control by southern white owners. Southern state governments sought freedom from national government threatening to curtail slavery. Freedom codes were applied to planks in that sense of freedom from government, which is how libertarians use "freedom" and how the U.S. House Freedom Caucus got its name.

Democrats

- **1840 to 1896:** Freedom resolutions or planks made up 44 percent of all Democrats' major planks codes during their States' Rights era. By far the most frequent category was *States' rights*, applied to 24 planks.

- **1952 to 2016:** Only 12 percent of Democratic planks were also tagged for Freedom in their National Authority era. *Taxation* drew 48 planks, *Immigration* was named in 28, *Labor* figured in 27 planks, Transgression (unlawful action) captured 25 planks.

Republicans

- **1856 to 1924:** Freedom planks made up only 8 percent of all primary codes in the Republicans' first era, fewer than any other type. The most (7) concerned the *economy*.

- **1964 to 2016:** Freedom planks comprised 27 percent of all major Republican plank codes in the party's last era. Two categories account for almost half the total. Again, most of the party's Freedom planks (77) referred to the *economy*, but almost as many (75) concerned *taxation*.

Over the three eras, Republicans steadily increased their emphasis on freedom from government in their party platforms.

Order Planks

"To govern" means "to control." Government imposes order on people's social behavior by limiting their freedom of action. Ironically, Order can create Freedom, which occurred when government ordered the slaves to be freed. Government actions are also required to secure citizens' civil rights and promote social equality.

Democrats

- **1840 to 1896:** Order planks accounted for only 13 percent of the major planks during the first era. Half (6) restricted *immigration*.

- **1952 to 2016:** Order planks made up about the same percentage (18) in the last era. Most (110) dealt with the *economy*. Far behind were 46 planks on *taxation*, and 36 on *labor*.

Republicans

- **1856 to 1924:** Order planks comprised 31 percent of Republican planks during their Nationalism era, as they fought the Civil War, supervised Reconstruction in the South, and oversaw the nation's growth. This was the highest percentage for either party in any era. The planks scattered over four topics: the *economy* (20), *trade/tariff* (17), *immigration* (16), *labor* (13), and *national rights* (13).

- **1964 to 2016:** Order planks dropped to 18 percent in Republicans' Ethnocentrism era. Over 100 planks fell in three categories: *Life/Death* (41), *transgressions* (33), and *immigration* (31)—generally cultural issues.

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In sum, Democrats adopted somewhat more Order planks from their first to last eras while Republicans adopted significantly fewer.

Equality Planks

Neither party emphasized political or social equality in their platforms. But Democrats moved more steadily over time toward including more equality planks, while Republicans moved away from them.

Democrats

- **1840 to 1896:** Equality planks were rare during Democrats' States' Rights era, appearing only 10 percent of the time. Moreover, 8 "Equality" planks were directed *against* Non-whites.

- **1952 to 2016:** Adoption of Equality planks nearly doubled to 17 percent. Most planks (82) were coded for *Women*. In decreasing order of frequency, other planks favored *Children* (42), *Veterans* (39), the *Elderly* (38), *Handicapped* (27), and positively for *Non-whites* (20).

Republicans

- **1856 to 1924:** Equality was the object of 17 percent of Republican planks during the Nationalism era. Nearly all aimed at three social groups: *non-whites* (16 planks), *veterans* (15), and *women* (14).

- **1964 to 2016:** Equality was the least important objective of Republican platforms during Ethnocentrism, cited only for 12 percent of its planks. Most planks (27) concerned women positively (22), but some (5) were negative.

Early in its history, the Democratic Party extolled Freedom over national government. Since 1952, Democrats have favored national government to impose Equality through national Order. A nascent Republican Party used national government to impose Order on southern states and to initiate Equality for enslaved people; a century later, Republicans elevated Freedom from government above the values of Order and Equality.

Of these two thumbnail descriptions of the parties' evolutions, one may seem more puzzling than the other. If most Democrats' planks fell into the Freedom category during the party's first era, how could it favor slavery AND freedom? Democrats in the early era focused on a particular type of freedom: states' freedom from central rule. That gave whites the freedom to enslave black workers. That was the essence of States' Rights.

In contrast, the graphic display of the GOP's Freedom and Order planks over time is clear. The trend lines fit its evolution from a governing party to an antigovernment party. Republicans adopted more than three times as many Order than Freedom planks during their Nationalism era (1856-1924). Under the party's Ethnocentrism era (1964-2016), the percentage of Order planks was almost cut in half.

Conclusion

Political parties are organizations of partisan activists sharing common principles. Party activists define the principles, not citizens who merely vote for a party's candidates in general elections, or even those who vote to nominate candidates in primary elections. Party activists not only vote reliably for their party, they also set the parameters of the party platform.

Scholars often, and justifiably, study the national Democratic and Republican parties by charting the incidence of their roll-call votes in Congress, "because these frequent and public acts present a clean summary measure of what the parties truly stand for."[245] Of course, party members elected to Congress are party activists and help define party principles. However, members of Congress do not always favor the voting positions they take. Congressional politics influence their votes. Roll-call votes in Congress may not accurately reflect the opinions of party activists across the nation.

Political positions that parties officially adopt in their national quadrennial conventions—as documented herein—provide a more comprehensive and more accurate estimate of its activists' political preferences. How well do data on Democratic and Republican platform planks support my claims about the parties' evolutionary paths? Let us consider the Democrats first. Evidence shows that the party evolved from endorsing slavery to promoting equality. During the Democrats' first era, most of the party's planks defended citizens' freedom to discriminate against Blacks. During the party's current era, Democrats adopted planks to order equality throughout the nation.

Republicans evolved from being a governing party to being an antigovernment party. During the GOP's Nationalism era, Order planks overwhelmed Freedom planks. The party adopted planks that directed the national government to provide Public Goods and accomplish great things for the whole country. During their Ethnocentrism era, Republicans adopted Freedom planks that promoted free enterprise, individual rights, and states' rights over national government.

Why did the Democratic and Republicans parties evolve these ways? We can speculate by consulting evolutionary theory.

PART 4: COMPARING EVOLUTIONS





The first chapter in Part 4 draws on theories of biological and social evolution to explain changes in the Democratic and Republican paths. The second assesses the impact of party leaders on centralism versus decentralism in governance.

Ch. 15 Party Evolutions and Evolution Theories

Ch. 16 Governance Evolution and Party Leaders

CHAPTER 15

Party Evolutions and Evolution Theories

An epigraph at the beginning of this book has a quotation from the evolutionary biologist, John Endler:

> *Evolution may be defined as any net directional change or any cumulative change in the characteristics of organisms or populations over many generations—in other words, descent with modification*.[246]

I am not a biologist and not an expert on evolution, but I do know that evolutionary theory has itself evolved over time. Nineteenth century thinking focused on natural selection. The twentieth century produced a modern synthesis incorporating genetic, mutation, and inheritance. Biologists in this century extended the synthesis to cover more phenomena.[247] Writings on human behavior often refer to basic ideas in evolutionary thought to interpret changes over time in social organizations. Writers and readers need not be expert in evolutionary theory to use it heuristically in framing their understanding of society and politics.

Biological v. Social Evolution

Biological evolution is most popularly associated with Charles Darwin's 1859 book, *The Origin of the Species*, which described how living organisms evolved by adapting to changes in their environment. Darwin focused on changes over time in animal and plant species. Reasoning by analogy from Darwin's work on biological evolution to the evolution of specific political organizations (such as parties) has its limits. A biochemist wrote, "In biological evolution it is the biological population that evolves, not individual biological entities."[248] Nevertheless, as people wonder how organizations evolve over time, they may draw inferences from evolutionary theory. Analysis by analogy is common and can be instructive.

Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Darwin, wrote on *social* evolution—changes over time in human societies and organizations. Spencer "spoke of society as a kind of organism" and defended analogies between biological and social evolution.[249] He is popularly associated with what became known as Social Darwinism:

> according to which the principles of evolution, including natural selection, apply to human societies, social classes, and individuals as well as to biological species developing over geologic time. . In Spencer's day social Darwinism was invoked to justify laissez-faire economics and the minimal state, which were thought to best promote unfettered competition between individuals and the gradual improvement of society through the "survival of the fittest," a term that Spencer himself introduced.[250]

Scholars have written at length about how Darwin's and Spencer's thinking interrelated.[251] Later, we consider their alternative theories for insights concerning the evolution of the Democratic and Republican parties as social organizations. First, we make the case that both parties have survived what Darwin characterized as a "struggle for existence," an expression Darwin used "in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another."[252] In this large and metaphorical sense, we view political parties' struggle for existence in the context of organizational evolution. What must party organizations do to survive?

Parties Competing to Survive

Many millions of adult Americans are eligible to run for president. Entrance is open to natural born United States citizens over 35 years of age who have lived in the country for fourteen years. Becoming a presidential candidate is relatively easy. In 2020, any eligible citizen who raised or spent $5,000 for the campaign could file candidacy with the Federal Election Commission by mail or via its website.[253] *Ballotpedia* listed 1,212 candidates filing for the 2020 presidential election.[254] Many of these hopefuls sought nomination by one of the existing political parties. Aspiring party nominees in 2020 included 323 Democrats, 164 Republicans, 65 Libertarians, and 23 in the Green Party. Each of these four parties eventually nominated a candidate from these aspirants. The FEC listed 27 other presidential candidates representing other parties on state election ballots in 2020.[255]

The quadrennial nature of these political odyssey originated in the Constitutional requirement that presidents be chosen every four years by electoral votes cast by states. Initially, nearly all states opted to have their legislatures choose citizens to cast their electoral votes, a practice most states followed to 1824. Until then, the first two parties (Federalist and Democratic-Republican) courted state legislators to choose friendly electors. By 1828, the electorate had grown to over a million voters, and most states had switched to choosing electors by popular vote. Since then, presidential candidates and political parties have competed against one another to win voters from citizens scattered across the nation.

After presidential elections were entrusted to a mass electorate, presidential hopefuls had no realistic chance of winning the office without being nominated by a major political party. In seven presidential elections from 1828 to 1852, Democrats' percentages of the popular vote ranged from 42.5 to 55.9, with a mean of 50.2.[256] In five of those seven elections, Democrats faced Whig candidates, who averaged 43.9 percent of the vote. Democratic candidates won five elections and Whigs two. Together, the two parties averaged 98.4 percent of the popular vote. Presidential candidates from five other parties won at least one percent of the popular vote in each of these elections.

After the Civil War, presidential hopefuls have had no realistic chance of winning the office without being nominated by either the Democratic or Republican parties. Most candidates who won their parties' nomination but lost the election never ran again. However, both losing parties themselves persisted, nominating presidential aspirants every four years for almost two centuries. The American two-party system was forecast early in the 19th century and established after the Civil War.

From the beginning, constitutional rules for electing a president strongly favored developing a two-party competition for the office. Candidates became president by winning a majority of the federal electoral vote, which was usually cast by state legislatures. To maximize a state's chances of electing a president, its legislature typically gave all the state's electoral votes to one candidate. Today, all but two states (Maine and Nebraska) award all their electoral votes to the candidate who wins a plurality of their popular vote. These electoral rules—majority rule to win the federal electoral vote but plurality rule to win the state electoral vote—are consistent with elementary game theory favoring just two players. Constitutional rules virtually dictate the U.S. two-party system.

Minor parties, and their candidates, have little chance of winning any state's electoral votes, so gain nothing for their efforts. Consequently, presidential aspirants band together in large groups to form major parties, and only the two largest parties stand much chance of winning. So by 1852, the United States was in the process of developing its distinctive two-party system. The American electoral system

is really quite unique. Virtually all other democratic nations have three or more parties participating in government, and no country has had the *same* two parties alternating in power for over 170 years.

Since 1856, Democratic and Republican candidates have run against each other in 42 presidential elections. During this period, Democrats averaged 46.3 percent of the popular vote to the Republicans' 47.9 percent. Together, the two parties accounted for nearly 95 percent of the popular votes cast over all 42 elections. The few remaining percentage points were split mainly among fifteen other parties whose presidential candidates won at least one percent of the popular vote in at least one election from 1856 to 2020.[257] By World War II, eight of those fifteen parties either failed to run a presidential candidate or did not get at least one percent of the presidential vote. (Although Henry Wallace's Progressive Party won 2.4 percent of the presidential vote in 1948, it was a very different party from Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party in 1912 and quickly faded in the 1950s.)

After World War II, six new parties appeared. These were the States' Rights, American Independent, American, Libertarian, Reform, and Green parties. Of those six, only the Green and Libertarian parties are still around, although both have drawn little popular support. Curiously, the Prohibition Party, founded in 1869, continued to nominate presidential candidates, but with little success. Why have Democrats and Republican parties survived and dominated American presidential election for 170 years, while other parties have come—won relatively few votes—and gone?

Party Survival and Evolutionary Theory

Evolutionary theory suggests that survival of plants and animals depends on their adaptability to changing conditions. What adaptability means for party organizations is unclear. Does it mean campaigning in a new way, or raising political issues unmet by other parties? One lengthy review of innovation as a factor in organizational survival "found that organizational change, which in evolutionary approaches is considered the attempt to adapt, *increases* rates of organizational mortality."[258] In that study, innovative organizations did not last longer; they actually died off sooner.

That fits with the brief appearances of these parties founded on unconventional political issues: Anti-Masonic (1832), Greenback (1880, 1884), Union Labor (1888), Communist (1920), States' Rights (1948), and Reform (1992, 1996). One publication, "Why Do Parties Survive?" argued that parties in the aggregate provided unique functions to society.[259] However, the study does not help explain why specific parties survived. Considering why the Democratic and Republican parties survived for so long—and why the Prohibition Party still exists—invites thinking about evolutionary theory.

Animals and plants require nutrients to survive.[260] Analogously, political parties survive by winning votes. As birds dance and display colorful plumage each season to attract mates, parties hold colorful rallies and promise appealing policies each election to win votes. The Democratic and Republican parties have survived since the Civil War by regularly winning votes and elections. In contrast, the 1872 Prohibition Party, which nominated a presidential candidate in all 38 presidential elections since, never came close to winning a presidential election. Prohibition candidates won only 2.2 percent of the popular vote in the party's best years (1888 and 1892). In 2020, moreover, the party's candidate won merely 4,858 votes, 0.0 percent of the total.[261] Yet the Prohibition Party survives, has a website, and nominated a presidential ticket for 2024.[262] What explains its survival?

Evolution theory suggests that the Prohibition Party must have adapted to its environment in order to survive. Clearly the party changed over time. One source provides this thumbnail sketch of it adopting new issues while championing prohibition:

> The party's platform has changed over its existence. Its platforms throughout the 19th century supported progressive and populist positions including women's suffrage, equal racial and gender rights, bimetallism, equal pay, and an income tax. The platform of the party today is liberal on economic issues in that it supports Social Security, animal rights, and free education, but is conservative on social issues, such as supporting temperance, school prayer, and a consistent life ethic, thus making it communitarian.[263]

Another study, "Third-Party Survival versus Success: Why the Prohibition Party Failed and Yet Still Exists," discounted those platform changes. Its authors concluded: "The party found its sustenance from an appeal to a radical niche composed of religious zealots who fed off of moral absolutism and devotion to prohibition."[264] A small core steadfastly opposed to drink kept the party alive. Supporters did not need success at the polls. Instead, "The unusual devotion of the party radicals may be at least partly explained by the transcendent religious motivation underlying their secular political goal."[265] In effect, the Prohibition movement that launched a political party had evolved into a political cult. It did not depend on votes to survive because it was no longer a political party.

Reasoning by analogy from biology, political scientists Gunther and Diamond identified fifteen different species of political parties under the larger genus, or class, of all party organizations.[266] Democrats and Republicans clearly belong to their species of Electoralist "catch-all" parties, whose overriding purpose is "to maximize votes, win elections and govern. To do so, parties of that species seek to aggregate as wide a variety of social interests as possible."[267] In one way or another, contesting elections also figured in the purpose of all other 14 species of political parties identified by Gunther and Diamond. The Prohibition Party, despite its name, does not even seem to belong to the same genus. Instead, it fits into a different class: political organizations with social, political, or religious missions.

The Libertarian Party, which has unsuccessfully backed presidential candidates in eleven elections since 1980, prompts the same question: If it is a political party and wins very few votes, why does it persist? Libertarians' best electoral performance was in 2016, when its presidential candidate Gary Johnson won 3.3 percent of the popular vote. Otherwise, the party's candidates averaged only 0.8 percent of the vote over all eleven elections. Does the Libertarian Party function like a political cult, similar to the Prohibition Party?

The Libertarian Party fits Gunther's and Diamond's classification as a "Post-industrial movement party of the extreme right." Parties of this species "search for more order, tradition, identity and security, at the same time as they attack the state for its intervention in the economy and for its social welfare policies."[268] Unlike the 2020 Prohibition candidate, the Libertarian presidential candidate won 1.2 million votes and was on the ballot in all fifty states plus Washington DC. Moreover, 87 Libertarian candidates in 2020 ran for the House (none won). Libertarians do compete for votes as they criticize government, but they are sustained by political, rather than religious, fervor.

Only the Democratic and Republican parties have survived over a century and a half by periodically competing successfully to win votes from a national electorate. Furthermore, that electorate experienced huge demographic, economic, social, political, and technological changes since 1856. These changes had different impacts on the parties, and both they adapted in different ways. How they adapted might be interpreted in light of Darwin's and Spencer's alternative views of evolution theory and how the parties adapted to the changing electorate.

The Changing Electorate

For more than a century and a half, Democrats and Republicans contested presidential elections every four years. Meanwhile, the national electorate was growing and changing annually, largely due to immigration. The U.S. population inexorably increased from 13 million in 1830 to 331 million in 2020. As waves of immigrants increased America's population, they changed its culture. The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 and Hart-Celler Nationality and Immigration Act of 1965 marked inflection points in foreign-born resident statistics.

At the end of the nineteen century and prior to World War I, millions of people from central and southern Europe had emigrated to the United States. Favoring immigrants from western and northern Europe, Congress set immigration quotas based on national origins. In 1965 at the foot of the Statue of Liberty, President Johnson signed into law an act that ended those quotas.[269] Soon thereafter immigrants from Latin America and Asia exceeded those from Europe. Figure 15.1 displays, separately for the Democratic and Republican eras,[270] the relevant census data[271] for foreign-born population from 1850 to 1990.

FIGURE 15.1: Foreign-Born Population, 1830-1990



Democrats, especially in urban areas, adapted to the flood of European immigrants better than Republicans. Millions of Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants—predominantly Catholic—were recruited into the Democratic Party and provided with services to insure their loyalty. Urban Republicans, mainly Protestant (as was the nation), were less accommodating.

The 1965 law also led to dramatic changes in America's cultural environment. In 1952, the United States population's ethnicity was almost 90 percent white. Religiously, its citizens were 70 percent Protestant and 20 percent Catholic. Seventy years ago, the nation was overwhelmingly white and Christian. Figure 15.2 displays the changing ethnic and religious composition of the country from 1952 to 2020. By 2020, citizens who were white *and* Christian had declined to 35 percent of the electorate.[272] Those who were non-white *or* non-Christian made up about 65 percent of potential voters. As the proportion of white Christians dwindled in the national electorate, Republicans continued catering to its ethnocentric base, composed mainly of white Christians.

Figure 15.2: Decline in White Christians in American Electorate, 1952-2020*



*Quadrennial American National Election Studies

The 2020 American National Election Study involved more than 8,000 respondents. It found that voters who self-identified as Republicans were 85.3 percent white and 64.9 percent Christian. A clear majority of Republicans—56.7 percent—were both white *and* Christian. Of self-identified Democrats, only 32.4 percent were both white and Christian. Over 65 percent of Democrats were either non-white or non-Christian, mirroring the composition of the American electorate in 2020.

Certainly Hubert Humphrey and his fellow progressives did not anticipate such a demographic transformation in 1948 when they inserted a civil rights plank in the Democratic platform. Nor did Lyndon Johnson in 1965 when he launched a legislative program committed to social equality. Nevertheless, the Democratic Party's programs became increasingly in tune with demographic changes in the electorate. Although Republican identifiers reported voting for president in 2020, about three percentage points higher than Democratic identifiers, presidential challenger Joe Biden outpolled Republican President Donald Trump by seven million votes.

Democrats Adapt to National Changes

Multiple figures in Chapters 3 through 9 graphed the percentages of the popular votes for president won by Democratic candidates over different time periods. Stringing together those data, Figure 15.3 displays the Democratic Party's performance in all presidential elections since 1828. It also provides separate means during the States' Rights era for elections held before facing the Republican Party's candidate in 1856 and after for the remainder of that era.

FIGURE 15.3: Popular Vote for Democratic Presidential Candidates Since 1828



w = Indicates winning the presidency.
w* Woodrow Wilson won only 41.8% of the vote; Republicans split between Taft and Roosevelt.

How the Democratic Party performed in presidential elections over time relates to how they did or did not adapt to changing social conditions. The story is reviewed here by the party's three eras.

1828-1896

Democratic presidential candidates dominated their competitors from 1828 through the 1852 election, winning five of seven elections and averaging over 50 percent of the popular vote. In 1860, Democrats split over the slavery issue and lost to Abraham Lincoln. That loss and the Civil War destroyed the party's dominance and nullified its bedrock principle, slavery. Nevertheless, Democrats contested the 1864 election held in the Union during the war and managed to win 45 percent of the vote against President Lincoln, running for re-election. The party's performance in that election suggested that it might survive as a northern party.

The party managed to maintain some support in the north but did not prosper there. In the next two presidential elections (1868 and 1872), Democratic candidates averaged 45 percent to the Republicans' 55 percent, resulting in two crushing defeats. By the 1876 election, however, white southerners had wrested control of enough state governments to vote in large numbers against Republicans responsible for the South's Reconstruction. Disputed election returns for 1876 showed the Democratic presidential candidate, Samuel Tilden, edging out Republican Rutherford Hayes, 50.1 to 49.9 percent. In 1877, Hayes offered to end Reconstruction if Democrats would accept his victory by one electoral vote. Democrats agreed to the compromise. Republicans continued to dominate the presidency, and Democrats resumed their domination of the South.

After the war, Democratic presidential candidates averaged only 45.5 percent of the popular vote to the end of the nineteenth century. They lost eight of ten presidential elections from 1869 to 1896. The party survived these repeated election losses thanks to federalism. Despite losing federal elections

for president, Democrats regularly won federal elections in the South for the U.S. House and Senate, dominated southern state and local elections, and won often enough in the North at all levels to be competitive. Nationwide, they were eclipsed by the Grand Old Party that had freed the slaves, defeated the rebels, restored the Union, and industrialized the nation. The GOP was clearly the more popular party outside the South. Republicans projected glittering images of manufacturing, transportation, banking, and business. Republicans were urban and northern; Democrats were rural and southern. Just six northern states (New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, and Michigan) had more than a majority of the electoral votes needed to elect a president.

Democrats were not very successful in wooing new voters during this period. As expected of an Electoralist catch-all party, Democrats sought issues that would appeal to the majority of citizens slighted by industrialization. They included farmers, ranchers, and others likely in debt to money-lenders (most likely Republicans). One such issue was minting coins made from silver, which had been banned in 1873. Backed by the agrarian Populist Party in 1892, the "Free silver" issue was appropriated by the Democrats in 1896, when William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech earned him the party's presidential nomination. Nevertheless, Democrats lost again. The party that began the States' Rights era by winning 50.2 percent of the presidential popular vote over seven elections, ended the era averaging only 47.3 percent over the entire period.

1900-1948

Democrats fared no better during the first decade of the twentieth century, losing in 1900, 1904, and 1908. Although Democrat Woodrow Wilson was elected president in 1912, he won only because former president Theodore Roosevelt ran against President William Taft, the Republican nominee. Together, the two Republicans won over 50 percent of the popular vote. Just by retaining the Democrats' customary vote of around 42 percent, Wilson became president. Running for re-election as the president who "kept us out of the war," Wilson managed to win re-election. That the party was lucky to capture the presidency was shown by its losing the next three elections (1920, 1924, and 1928) averaging only 42.3 percent of the vote. Strong in the rural South, the Democratic Party had no substantial following in the populous North.

The Democratic Party acquired its national following after the 1929 stock market crash. Unemployed citizens rejected the reigning business party, and Democrats adapted by effectively wooing both old and new voters. The party registered waves of European immigrants who had been attracted to northern cities, working in jobs created by industrialization, and millions of southern Blacks who migrated to the North for similar employment. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt constructed a diverse coalition of supporters: northern whites, southern whites, and minority groups (Blacks, Catholics, and Jews).

Starting in 1932, the famed "Roosevelt coalition" won the presidency in five straight elections by an average of 55.2 percent of the popular vote. In truth, the party's adaptation was tactical, not strategic. Democrats had already been the anti-business party when the electorate was pro-business. The Great Depression turned millions of voters against businesses. Democrats only needed to address people's grievances and promise a better future. The party promised economic equality but not necessarily more social equality. President Roosevelt accepted racial segregation in return for southerners' support in Congress of his legislative programs. President Harry Truman offered more encouragement to Democrats who sought strategic change in the party's racial policy. Party change began in the 1948 Democratic National Convention, when the party adopted its first ever civil rights plank. In response, the erstwhile Solid South began to dissolve.

1952-2020

When the Democratic Party entered its National Authority era in 1952, progressive leaders urged stronger stands for social equality. Public opinion in northern states had become more favorable toward social rights for women and foreigners, but not for Blacks. Although Jackie Robinson had broken the color line in 1947 by playing baseball for the Brooklyn Dodgers, and other Blacks soon followed in sports, racial prejudice remained widespread in America. Still, in 1955, Sidney Poitier had a major role in the popular 1955 film, *Blackboard Jungle*, as did Harry Belafonte in the successful 1957 movie *Island in the Sun* about an inter-racial romance. American audiences became more accepting of black performers, eroding prejudice to some extent. Despite the lack of public support for racial equality, progressive Democratic leaders sought to fulfill the literal meaning of the party's Jeffersonian legacy, "that all men are created equal," at the cost of losing support from the "Solid South."

Democrats also adapted to the nation's changing cultural environment by expanding their presidential tickets. In 1984, Geraldine Ferraro became the first-major party female running-mate for a male presidential nominee, Walter Mondale. In 2008, Barack Obama became the first Black man nominated for the presidency by a major party and the first ever elected. In 2016, President Obama's former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, became the first woman nominated for the presidency by a major party. In 2020, Kamala Harris became the first woman of color elected Vice president of the United States. Gender and ethnicity were no longer barriers to candidate selection, but positive factors in candidate selection.

Republicans Adapt to National Changes

In 1851, Herbert Spencer published *Social Statics,* which dealt with conditions needed for social order. It discussed the development of human freedom, and defended individual liberties.[273] Inspired by Darwin's 1859 *On the Origin of Species*, Spencer in 1864 published *Principles of Biology*, which coined the expression "survival of the fittest." In 1869, Darwin used Spencer's phrase in the fifth edition of *Origin of the Species* in conjunction with "natural selection."[274]

Spencer's *Principles of Biology* restated his ideas from *Social Statics* in evolutionary context. One historian wrote that Spencer

> saw parallels between his conservative ideas about economics and what Darwin had written about the natural world: "This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called 'natural selection', or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life."[275]

The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defined Spencer's philosophy as social Darwinism and explained:

> He held that the rapid elimination of unfit individuals from society through natural selection would benefit the race biologically and that the state should therefore do nothing to relieve the condition of the poor, whom he believed to be the less fit. Spencer also maintained that the economic system works best if each individual is allowed to seek his own private interests and that consequently the state should not intervene in the economy except to enforce contracts and to see to it that no one infringes upon the rights of others. He believed that in the ensuing competition, the fittest business enterprises and economic institutions would survive.[276]

Another biographer noted the influence of Spencer's thinking during America's Gilded Age in the late nineteenth century and still today on libertarian thinkers.[277] Among them was Robert Nozick (1938-2002), who championed libertarian principles in important books in the latter half of the twentieth century.[278]

1856-1924

The Republican Party was formed to impose order on the nation by preventing the expansion of slavery into territories seeking statehood. Republicans won the presidency; the South responded by seceding from the Union; the North fought to preserve the Union. After the war and President Lincoln's assassination, the victorious party adapted by reconstructing a defeated South, while defending the rights of its former slaves.

Meanwhile, the process of industrialization proceeded inexorably, enticing Republicans away from monitoring their southern reconstruction to developing the national economy. Republican capitalists grew rich and justified their wealth as exemplifying Spencer's social Darwinism. A consequence of "survival of the fittest" was inequalities in achievement.[279] As Republican industrialists got richer, their employees protested against working conditions and called for government regulations. Republicans responded by extolling virtues of free enterprise. When northern Democrats alienated southern Democrats by opposing segregation, Republicans responded by embracing states' rights and reversing their original egalitarianism.

The Grand Old Party dominated national politics during its Nationalism era. Figure 15.4 shows Republicans winning 13 of 18 presidential elections, averaging 48.1 percent of the popular vote.

FIGURE 15.4: Popular Vote for Republican Presidential Candidates Since 1856



W* 1860 Lincoln won with only 40 percent of the popular vote; Democratic Party split.
W** 1912 Combined vote for Republican presidential candidates, Roosevelt and Taft.
W*** 1968 Nixon won with only 43 percent of the popular vote; George Wallace had 14 percent.

1928-1960

The year 1928 marks the transition between Republicans' Nationalism and Neoliberalism eras, but the date is problematic. Neoliberalism was rooted in the rapid economic growth after the end of World War I in 1918 and the steady upward climb of the stock market in the 1920s. Smart individuals could make a fortune by investing wisely in stocks. Foolish investors would lose their money. The fittest would survive and prosper. Government only needed to get out of the way. Campaigning for president in 1928, Herbert Hoover pledged to adhere "to the principles of decentralized government, ordered liberty, and freedom to the individual."[280]

After the 1929 market crash, President Roosevelt expanded the national government's role in the economy. Republicans called for a return to unfettered free enterprise, echoing Hoover's 1928 pledge. A section on "Constitutional Government and Free Enterprise" in the Republican 1936 platform promised "To preserve the American system of free enterprise, private competition, and equality of opportunity, and to seek its constant betterment in the interests of all." Subsequent platforms from 1940 through 1960 routinely praised free enterprise.

If Republicans had sought to adapt successfully to the collapse of business in 1929 by extolling free enterprise in the 1930s and 1940s, they failed. Republican presidential candidates won only three of nine elections during the party's Neoliberalism era, despite averaging 48 percent of the popular vote, equal to the mean percentage during its victorious Nationalism era. Their strong showing in the popular vote was bolstered by the large victories by Hoover in 1928 and by Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956.

1964-2020

Significantly, Eisenhower won four states in the old Confederacy in 1952 and six in 1956, shattering the solidity of the Solid South, which showed that it was no longer "the whipping boy of the Democratic party." Republican Senator Barry Goldwater noted the change in the electoral environment and adapted to it. In 1961, he offered this advice to the Republican Party: "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a block in 1964 or 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are."[281]

A lifetime member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) who voted for the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, Goldwater was no racist.[282] He was a libertarian. He voted against Lyndon Johnson's historic Civil Rights Act in the summer of 1964 because the national government was acting against states' rights. His position aligned with the Democratic Party's view of federalism prior to 1948. Weeks later, Goldwater became the Republican candidate for president and aggressively campaigned for southern votes. He went hunting in the South.

Barry Goldwater launched his party into its Ethnocentrism era. Republicans began appealing culturally to southern white voters and politically to voters with libertarian values. Of Jewish heritage but raised as an Episcopalian, Goldwater did not need to hunt for Christian votes in 1964—almost 90 percent of the electorate was Christian. Nevertheless, he changed Republican election strategy in 1964 by aggressively campaigning in the South. Although he lost the election, subsequent GOP candidates reaped the benefit of his historic adaptation to the Democrats' rejection of segregation. Ronald Reagan took aim at white Christians nationwide, induced them to vote Republican, and his party won five of the six presidential elections from 1968 to 1988.

But then the tide changed against Republicans. After Democrats won in 1992 and 1996 and again in 2008 and 2012, Reince Priebus, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, confronted

the electoral facts.[283] Responding to its presidential losses, the RNC conducted its 2013 Growth and Opportunity Project (its acronym was GOP), explaining:[284]

> Following the 2012 Election, the American people sent a clear message that it was time for the Republican Party to grow. In response, Chairman Priebus issued an assessment of the party by the Growth and Opportunity Project task force. . . .[charged with] making recommendations and assisting in putting together a plan to grow the Party and improve Republican campaigns.[285]

A section titled "America Looks Different" urged the party to recognize "the nation's demographic changes":

> In 1980, exit polls tell us that the electorate was 88 percent white. In 2012, it was 72 percent white. Hispanics made up 7 percent of the electorate in 2000, 8 percent in 2004, 9 percent in 2008 and 10 percent in 2012. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2050, whites will be 47 percent of the country while Hispanics will grow to 29 percent and Asians to 9 percent.
>
> If we want ethnic minority voters to support Republicans, we have to engage them and show our sincerity.[286]

Despite the GOP report, Donald Trump announced his campaign for the Republican nomination on June 16, 2015, by denouncing Mexican immigrants:

> When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.

Trump's political slogan, Make America Great Again (MAGA) appealed to native-born white Christians who wanted to roll back immigration, if not to roll back the clock to life in the 1950s. Trump intensified his pursuit of white Christians, won the presidency, and ironically appointed Reince Priebus his chief of Staff. Although Trump managed to squeeze an electoral vote majority out of the party's dwindling followers in 2016, Democrat Hillary Clinton won almost three million more popular votes. Trump lost re-election in 2020, as Democrat Joe Biden won majorities of both the electoral vote and the popular vote—winning by a margin of seven million.

Adapting à la Darwin

Darwin's first edition of *Origin of the Species* in 1859 attributed adaptions to "natural selection." The term's meaning was unclear originally and actually changed over six editions.[287] Originally, Darwin envisioned the process of natural selection as "random in origin, cumulative in effect,"[288] Some of his followers insisted that "the change be continual, or at least frequent or regular."[289] That requirement would proscribe changes caused by a Civil War or induced by the Democrats' abrupt adoption of a civil rights plank in 1948.

However, Darwin in *The Descent of Man* (1871), wrote, "Intellectual and social faculties are themselves adaptive and in their variations make for the greater or lesser survival of the creatures that possess them."[290] Accordingly, humans could initiate organizational change within the Darwinian framework. Cultural evolutionists are apt to view "inventions and discoveries, borrowings, unconscious historical 'accidents,' changes from whatever source, [as] the raw materials for evolutionary change in culture."[291] In sum, cultural and social evolutionary theorists accept "The fundamental postulate of the

modern biological theory of evolution," which "is that the guiding agency of evolutionary changes is adaptation to the environments that a species inhabits."[292]

Clearly, Democratic activist Hubert Humphrey (who proposed the party's historic 1948 civil rights plank) and other progressives were not merely "adapting" to changes in public opinion toward racial discrimination; they sought to change public opinion itself. Knowing that the party would lose southern voters, they did not know whether it would gain many, or any, northern voters. Thus, they were acting more like a political party (uniting on principles) than an electoral team (striving to win elections). How did this change in party policy, from tolerating segregation to pursuing social equality, fare as an adaptive strategy?

After the Democratic Party adopted a civil rights plank at its 1948 convention, Georgia delegate Senator Charles Bloch warned, "The south is no longer going to be the whipping boy of the Democratic party," and angrily predicted, "without the south you cannot elect a President of the United States."[293] In 1952, four southern states did vote for Republican Eisenhower, but their 57 electoral votes would not have changed the outcome. In 1956, five southern states voted for Ike's re-election, again not insuring his victory. Bloch's prediction was tested again in 1960 and finally failed. Democrat (and Catholic) John Kennedy narrowly won election despite losing five southern states. Four years later, Democrat Lyndon Johnson won every state except four in the south plus Barry Goldwater's home state, Arizona.

But the Democrats' electoral success abruptly ended in 1968 with Richard Nixon's victory over Hubert Humphrey. Democratic candidates lost five of six presidential elections from 1968 to 1988. White Christians still formed a majority of the electorate, and Republican Ronald Reagan cultivated and mobilized their support. Beginning in 1992, Democrats won five of the next eight elections. Moreover, in two of their losing elections (2000 and 2016), Democrats won a plurality of the popular vote. Furthermore, Democratic candidates won an absolute majority of the popular vote in 2008, 2012, and 2020. Figure 15.5 displays the clear differences between Democratic performance in Presidential elections before and after 1988.

FIGURE 15.5: Democratic Votes in Thirteen Presidential Elections Since 1972



The 1992 and 1996 elections stand out as deviant in the electoral votes because Ross Perot won 19 and 8 percent of the popular vote, respectively, in those elections. Absent Perot's candidacy, Democrat Bill Clinton who had won over 49 percent of the popular vote in 1996 would almost certainly have captured an absolute majority of the popular vote. Thus Democrats would have won a majority of the popular vote for the fourth time in eight elections after 1988.

In keeping with restatements of Darwin's original theory in *The Origin of the* Species, one can reasonably view changes in Democratic Party planks as adapting to the nation's changing demographic and cultural environment. The Republican Party's evolution invites interpretation from a different theoretical perspective, that of Herbert Spencer.

Adapting à la Spencer

Had he been alive at the time, Spencer might have concluded that Republicans in 1964, led by Barry Goldwater, adapted correctly to their electoral environment by seeking votes from whites and libertarians. It was the smart thing to do. Subsequently, Spencer might have interpreted "survival of the fittest" with "survival of the cleverest" and praised Republicans for batting over .700 by winning five of seven presidential elections from 1980 to 2004. Republicans had countered the Democrats' diverse "Roosevelt coalition" of white and minority voters with their more homogenous coalition of white Christians and libertarians that produced at the polls.

According to Darwinian evolutionary theory, however, Republicans failed to adapt to continuing changes in its electoral environment after 2012. The 2013 RNC–GOP report explicitly acknowledged a changing electorate. It urged that the party adapt by appealing to minority voters. Instead—thanks to the intervention of Donald Trump—the party became even more ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Instead of aiming at Spencer's goal, survival of the fittest (or the cleverest), Republicans became intent on revival of the purest.

Recent national surveys show that voters who identify as Republicans, rather than Democrats, are more likely to be white, Christian, lacking a college degree, and living outside of cities. These cultural differences in partisanship influence how Republicans and Democrats feel about each other. Called "affective polarization," it is defined as "the gap between individuals' positive feelings toward their own political party and negative feelings toward the opposing party," and researchers write that this gap "has increased markedly in the past two decades."[294]

In 1978, the American National Election Survey began using a "feeling thermometer" to ask respondents' about their feelings toward members of other groups. Given a card with the image of a thermometer, respondents were asked how "cold" or "warm" they felt toward those groups according to degrees on the thermometer. For example, picking 100 degrees meant "very warm," 50 meant "no feeling at all," and 0 meant ""very cold."[295] Figure 15.6 reports the mean temperatures of Republicans toward Democrats, and vice versa, for surveys in presidential elections from 1980 to 2020.

FIGURE 15.6: Mean Temperatures of Partisans' Feelings toward Opponents



From 1980 to 2000, both sets of partisans felt lukewarm toward their opponents. By 2020, both sets had frozen them out.

Are we approaching the level of partisan animosity that led to a Civil War? Absent survey data for that time, we cannot tell, but we should understand how the two parties arrived at their present positions. Chapters 11, 12, 13, and 14 in Part 3 looked at many hundreds of planks in Democratic platforms since 1840. Comparable chapters in *The Republican Evolution* analyzed many hundreds of planks in all Republican platforms since 1856. The data provide clear evidence of the parties' evolution.

Conclusion

Formed nearly 200 years ago to defend states' rights and preserve slavery in the South, the Democratic Party's first five platforms (from 1840 to 1856) proclaimed "That the federal government is one of limited powers." Today the Democratic Party asserts national authority and promotes social equality.

Formed nearly 170 years ago to govern the practice of slavery and then fighting a war against rebellious southern states, Republicans relied on national government at the start. Not until 1964 did a Republican platform propose limiting national powers. The party echoed Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign with a section titled "Faith in Limited Government," stating "that the Federal Government have effective but limited powers." The Republican Party today holds tightly to that philosophy.

Saying that both parties have evolved past each other may not make sense in evolutionary theory but it reflects the current state of party politics. In Chapter 1, I cite a reference to the parties having "flipped" their original ideologies. They also flipped their distinguishing colors. The GOP historically owned the color blue, while red was associated with radical and revolutionary forces. Appendix A explains how abruptly that switch came about in 2000.

When I wrote *The Republican Evolution* and began to write *The Democratic Evolution*, I used "evolution" as a common expression for gradual change over time. Not until writing these concluding chapters did I view the parties' evolution in their principles in the scholarly context of evolutionary theory. While I do not think that biological theories of evolution bear on these parties' evolutions in a scientific way, theories of cultural and social evolution do relate to both parties' experiences. Clearly, both parties "struggled for existence" in competing for votes and both survived after 42 presidential elections, each averaging somewhat less than 50 percent of the total votes cast in each one. Confronted along the way with major demographic, political, social, and technological changes, both had adapted reasonably to the changes up to 2016.

Viewing the political scene in 2024, one senses that federalism is insuring the Republican Party's survival today, just as federalism insured the Democrats' survival for decades after the Civil War. However, federalism has benefitted each party quite differently. During Democrats' lean years from 1860 through 1928, they won only four of twenty presidential elections. The party survived by winning elections to the House and Senate and by winning state offices. During Republicans' lean years after 1988 they—like Democrats—survived by winning non-presidential elections at the federal and state levels but also by winning the presidency despite losing in the popular vote in four elections shown in Table 15.1.

TABLE 15.1: Presidencies Won While Losing the Popular Vote

	Popular vote		**Electoral Vote**
Year	Democrat %	Republican %	Republican %
1876	50.9	47.9	50.1
1888	48.6	47.8	58.1
2000	48.3	47.9	50.4
2016	48.0	45.9	56.5

Of the 42 presidential elections from 1856 to 2020, Republicans won a majority of the electoral vote, and thus the presidency, 24 times. Democrats won the electoral vote only 18 times. However, Democrats won a plurality of the popular vote 22 times, versus 18 for Republicans.

The 1876 election results were disputed for months. In 1877, Democrats agreed to a Republican presidency if Republicans would remove Union troops and end Reconstruction. In 1888, southern Democrats rolled up huge margins to re-elect Democratic President Grover Cleveland, which accounts for his popular vote plurality. In 2000, George W. Bush carried 30 states to Al Gore's 21 states plus DC. Although Bush's states had fewer people, each had two senators (conferring two electoral votes)—the same as states with far larger populations. In 2016, Donald Trump carried 31 states to Hillary Clinton's 20 states plus DC. Republican won states; Democrats won popular votes. No Democratic candidate ever won a majority of the electoral vote while losing the popular vote.

CHAPTER 16

Governance Evolution and Party Leaders

Here, "evolving" simply means changing gradually over time, generally in the same direction. As such, the term does not invoke evolutionary theory, but it does evoke thinking about forces that push change in the same direction despite occasional deviations. Two different directions of change are reflected in alternative theories of democratic governance, labeled Centralism and Decentralism:

> The centralist theory . . . presumes that good governance flows from institutions that centralize power in a single locus of sovereignty. The decentralist theory . . . supposes that good governance arises from the diffusion of power among multiple independent bodies.[296]

Note that both theories assume popular participation in democratic government. They differ not over the quality of democracy but the quality of governance.

Imagine a continuum of democratic governance, with Decentralism and Centralism at either end. Then consider how each party moved through its three eras.

- Democrats began at the Decentralized end, extolling States' Rights. They moved to Cooperative Federalism (granting national rule in economic policy), then ended at National Authority,

- Republicans began at the Centralized end, governing strongly under Nationalism. They moved briefly to Neoliberalism (limiting the nation's role in economic affairs), and then arrived at Ethnocentrism (limiting the nation's role in cultural matters).

Democrats and Republicans reacted to different forces when moving from their original positions on the continuum. Democrats responded to global and national changes in social values. Republicans responded to provincial defenses of state and local cultures. We identify the forces behind the Democratic evolution first.

Democrats: From Decentralism to Centralism

Transatlantic trade in human slaves began in the 1600s and was widely practiced over two centuries. So it was not unusual that the 1787 U.S Constitution tacitly accepted slavery. Although organized opposition to slavery in France began in the latter 1700s, the French did not ban slavery until their 1795 constitution.[297] Britain did not abolish slavery until 1833. In the United States, all northern states by 1804 had either abolished or were abolishing slavery.[298] Worried that Congress might act to restrict slavery, southerners fiercely defended "states' rights" to preserve their plantation economy. The Civil War and a Republican president ended slavery, but the southern wing of the Democratic Party ensured that white supremacy reigned throughout the party's States' Rights era. Decentralism in government served the party's economic and social objectives.

By 1900, southern Democrats had established legal racial segregation throughout the eleven states in the old Confederacy and in most bordering states. Northern Democrats, many racially discriminatory themselves, tolerated southern segregation in the party's Cooperative Federalism era, during which Democratic presidents Wilson and Roosevelt introduced some national progressive political and economic legislation. Social equality, however, was not a party priority. Although

Congress passed and the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment establishing women's suffrage in 1920 during a Democratic administration, the Amendment was pushed by Republicans, not by Democrats. Republicans proposed amending the Constitution to guarantee equal rights for women in 1940, before Democrats adopted their own equal rights amendment in 1944. The era of Cooperative Federalism ended with the party somewhere between Decentralism and Centralism as a governing philosophy.

The Allied Powers' victory over fascism in World War II unleashed a massive change in public opinion toward human rights that culminated in 1948 and launched the party's National Authority era in 1952. Even before the war, economic development and spread of education in advanced industrial countries had produced widespread social changes. Ronald Inglehart, the leading scholar on postmodern values, cataloged "a gradual but fundamental shift in the basic values and goals of the people."[299] Foremost was a change in the status and role of women. Across the world, economic growth brought declining birth rates as more women entered the economy.

Late in 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaiming that

> Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Being universal, the Declaration, theoretically, applied to all cases.

Eleanor Roosevelt, who headed the commission that drew up the Declaration,[300] also backed the civil rights plank adopted at the Democratic Party's 1948 National Convention. In the summer and winter of 1948, the party had focused on discrimination against Blacks and not on social equality "without distinction of any kind." President Johnson's 1964 Civil Rights Act embraced equality in the broader sense, when he sought "not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result." He committed the party to pursue social equality not just theoretically but realistically. John Gerring's book, *Party Ideologies in America*, refers to "the extension of rights to all aggrieved claimants and a general rhetoric of inclusion" after 1952 as the Democrats' Universalism era.[301] I call it the party's National Authority era.

National Authority is logically linked to social equality. If social equality is a universal principle, it must apply to the entire nation, countermanding states' rights. Within a federal system, therefore, national legislation on social equality must be supreme. For Democrats, social equality became elevated to a Public Good, a view now adopted by scholars.[302] Scholars wrote that governments created Public Goods in response to collective action by political parties.[303] As Democrats prioritized the pursuit of social equality as a Public Good, the party moved steadily toward Centralism throughout the National Authority era.

That encapsulates the Democratic Party's movement from Decentralism to Centralism, from Federal to National. Because the Democrats' evolution was tied to changes in world and national public opinion, it was somewhat more complicated than the Republican story.

Republicans: From Centralism to Decentralism

Republicans burst into politics in 1854 to prevent the expansion of slavery into new territories. They remained united in forcing reconstruction upon the South after the Civil War. In existence for only twenty-five years, the Republican Party was called the Grand Old Party in an 1879 *Chicago Tribune* story:

> Col Ricaby came up and thanked the Convention for the complement paid him, coming as it did from the Chicago representatives of the **grand old party** which erased the blighting stain of slavery from the national escutcheon, and the **grand old party** which would never cease its aggressive action until every American citizen, —white, red, black, or yellow, —no matter what his creed or nationality, should be permitted to walk forth as a man and exercise his right of conscience in his political views independently of rifle-clubs, mobs, or ex-rebels. (Great applause.) [emphasis added][304]

Throughout the nineteenth century and the industrial age, the GOP exercised national power in a grand way. Republicans claimed eleven of the thirteen U.S. presidents from Lincoln to Coolidge. The Republican Party was the nation's party. Nationalism and governmental Centralism served the party's economic and social goals.

Republican manufacturers, businessmen, and other entrepreneurs had benefitted from GOP governance in the late 1800s. Early in the 1900s, party leaders came to believe that even more money could be made if government would get out of the way. The party entered its Neoliberalism era in the 1920s as it elected a president, Herbert Hoover, who extolled the virtues of free enterprise. Centralism was all right in its day, but Decentralism could be more enriching.

The party began its Nationalism era to keep slavery from spreading to new states. Activists were not drawn to the party in 1856 by thirst for election victories. Electorally triumphant in 1928, Republicans did not shift to Neoliberalism in order to win more votes. That era reflected a desire for relaxed government regulations, which adequately explains its shift from Centralism toward Decentralism. Wanting to win, however, was a factor leading to the party entering its Ethnocentrism era in 1964.

Barry Goldwater was both principled and calculating. His principles were libertarian: they extended beyond objecting to government intervention in business life to objecting to its intervention in social life. Goldwater's calculations were pragmatic: Republicans should campaign for votes in the South, where whites valued libertarian principles. Later, Ronald Reagan benefitted from Goldwater's (and Nixon's) pursuit of southern white votes plus his own courtship of northern white Christian voters. Donald Trump exploited the party's cultural contraction.

As the party extended its appeal to narrower cultural values—emphasizing the "we" over "they"—Republican voters' calculations became more personal. Accordingly, Republican ethnocentrism fits with fragmentation and Decentralism. Republicans moved from Centralism to Decentralism, from national to federal, from governing party to antigovernment party.

How Party Ideology Changes

A party's ideology can be defined as a coherent and consistent set of values and beliefs about the proper purpose and scope of government.[305] "Coherent" means that the values and beliefs are organized and logically constrain one another. "Consistent" means the party's view of the proper role of government at any given election accords with its view in previous and subsequent elections.

Democrats and Republicans have not been coherent and consistent in their governmental views over time. They also have been incoherent and inconsistent at given times. Consider the issues of gun control and abortion today. Briefly, Democrats favor more government control over possession and use of firearms and less government restriction of women's ability to abort a pregnancy. Republicans favor the opposite. At their origin, Democrats favored limited government while Republicans exercised government. As parties change, their ideologies evolve.

Of the various attempts to explain changes in American party ideologies,[306] John Gerring's seems the most persuasive. His last chapter in *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996* asks, "What Drives Ideological Change?" Gerring considers four general theoretical explanations, which he calls *classical, social-class, realignment,* and *ethnocultural.*[307]

- His classical explanation pits elites against outside usurpers, and harkens to Federalists versus Jeffersonian Republicans.
- Social-class theory relates to farmers and agricultural workers (Democrats) versus entrepreneurial businessmen (Republicans) after the Civil War and into the twentieth century.
- Realignment theories identify specific elections that sparked widespread switches in partisanship. They typically cite the 1860, 1896, 1932, and 1964 elections. After their extensive reviewing of such research, Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale wrote that realignment theory seems to document electoral changes better than explain them.[308]
- In contrast, ethnocultural explanations attribute ideological change "more often on questions of ethnicity and religion than on income, occupation, or, for that matter, slavery."[309] Ethnocultural theory resonates with Republicans' entry into Ethnocentrism in 1964.

In the end, Gerring found such general theoretic explanations unsatisfying, saying "the contributing causes of party change are many and various. . . . There is, in short, no general factor at work that might explain the development of American party ideologies."[310] He did, however, state as an obvious fact: "party ideologies were formulated, disseminated, and executed by party leaders. They did not rise spontaneously from *le peuple*. It was party leaders who proposed, and voters who responded, yea or nay."[311] Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale agree that "the role of the electorate is essentially reactive."

> Whether or not the potential realignment comes to fruition lies in the hands of the partisan leadership and its ability to make the kinds of policy decisions that win the long-term support of the newly eligible, weakly identified or unidentified, and formerly apolitical members of the electorate.[312]

A "party leader" explanation has some relevance for the Republican evolution. Abraham Lincoln certainly launched the party on its Nationalism path in 1860, but no specific politician led it into Neoliberalism in 1928. Herbert Hoover's election exemplified the party's free enterprise orientation, but he did not direct the party into the era. Goldwater in 1964, however, clearly set the party on electoral strategy and ideological appeal into white Ethnocentrism. Ronald Reagan narrowed its course to attract Evangelical Christians. Donald Trump flamboyantly followed that course.

Trump's role as party leader has been different. Running for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, Donald Trump prevented the party from adapting to the new electorate, which by 2020 had a non-white, non-Christian majority. Instead, he kept it on its Ethnocentrism path. Consequently, Trump did not cause the GOP to change; he prevented it from changing. Most Republican voters are still fervent Trump supporters, and many are activists who will write the 2024 Republican Platform. So the party's future is still in question.

A "party leader" account of party change fits the Democratic Party somewhat better. Clearly, the Democrats' States' Rights and pro-slavery orientation originated with Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. The party's switch to Cooperative Federalism can be linked to a thrice-defeated Democratic presidential nominee, William Jennings Bryan. Party historian Jules Witcover wrote that Bryan, still young after his first defeat in 1896 and very influential in the Democratic Party, focused on "a progressive agenda that included election and campaign finance reform, abolition of child labor, railroad and stock regulation, and new food and drug protection laws."[313] Such issues marked the party's entrance into Cooperative Federalism and fit the policies of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt; both were attuned to economic equality, not social equality.

Nevertheless, FDR through his skillful exercise of national authority had a huge impact on the Democrats' march toward social equality. Speaking in Denver on October 12, 1936, President Roosevelt said:

> In the complete stagnation of business, of mines and of farms, there was only one agency capable of starting things going again —the Government—not local government, not forty-eight State Governments, because they, strive as they would, had reached the limit of their resources, but the Federal [national] Government itself.

Not only did Roosevelt assert the national government's authority to promote the general welfare but its responsibility to do so. Eventually, that carried over to the Democrats' pursuit of social equality.

While Hubert Humphrey was not a party leader in 1948 when he introduced the civil rights plank that provoked the party's southern wing to rebel, he initiated the party's pursuit of social equality that Lyndon Johnson completed during Democrats' National Authority era.

Conclusion

Overall, a case can be made that specific party leaders had profound effects on the direction in which their parties evolved. One can argue that:

- Jefferson and Jackson fixed the Democrats at Decentralism.
- William Jennings Bryan redirected the Democrats away from Decentralism, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt directed it toward Centralism.
- Almost unnoticed, then (and even today), Hubert Humphrey led Democrats away from segregation, to social equality and Centralism—policies inherited by John Kennedy but defined and established by Lyndon Johnson.
- Although not the Republican Party's founder, Abraham Lincoln made it the party of Centralism.
- Hubert Hoover interrupted the leadership pattern. Although he presided over Republicans' redirection away from Centralism, he did not initiate the party's transition.
- Barry Goldwater launched the Republicans' transition to Ethnocentrism, Ronald Reagan continued on the path, and Donald Trump exploited the passage.

Counting one origin and two era changes for each party, there are six decision points in the Democratic and Republican evolutions. Party leaders were prominent (if not decisive) in five of the six—all but the 1924-1928 Republican transition from Nationalism to Neoliberalism.

Gerring was correct in describing the causes of party change as "many and various." He was also right in saying that most party changes were "formulated, disseminated, and executed by party leaders" responding to changes in the electoral environment, to changes in voters' values. Democrats had failed to respect changing opinions of slavery, but they eventually adapted to changing views of social equality, changes they helped lead. Republicans adapted early to changing opinions of slavery, but they failed later to respect the nature of a changed electorate.

In a nutshell, Democratic leaders "failed early" but "adapted later," while Republican leaders "adapted early" but "failed later."

APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A

How Parties Swapped Colors in 2000

In 2000, American television networks abruptly reversed the two parties' historic colors, turning Republicans red and Democrats blue. This obscure fact relates to the parties' evolutions. In politics across the world and across time, "blue" has been associated with ruling governments and "red" with the ruled rabble. Aristocrats were "blue bloods," and "royal blue" has historical connections to the British throne. "The Colors of Ideology," by Casiraghi, Curini, and Cusumano, studied more than 300 parties in 35 democracies. It found "a strong relationship . . . between ideology and the use of certain color hues: left-wing party logos mainly display hues at the red end of the color spectrum, while blue hues prevail among right-wing parties."[314]

That color pallet also fit American history. Blue was the Republican color in 1860. The Union Army fought in blue uniforms against Confederate forces in gray. Afterward, union soldiers enforcing reconstruction were called "the blues." The speaker at an 1888 Republican rally in Chicago praised the weather "as clear as the record of the Republican party" and the glorious blue sky, which was "True Republican blue at that."

In contrast, red symbolized the 1917 Russian Revolution, and red was linked with communism and socialism. The "Red Scare" filled American media. After World War II, Republican Senator Joe McCarthy led a second "Red Scare." In response, the Cincinnati Reds baseball team's nationalistic owner officially changed its name to Redlegs in 1953. The team did not reclaim its original name until 1961. No Republican wanted to be colored red in the twentieth century.

That history of hues led many political scientists to color Republican wins blue and Democratic wins red on election maps. Created decades ago on the internet, the *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections* website still plots election results since 1789 in blue for Republicans and in red for Democrats. What caused the color reversal in 2000?

During the disputed 2000 election between Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore, television honchos ignored political history (or were ignorant of it) and reversed the parties' colors. TV networks blithely portrayed Bush states in red and Gore states in blue, startling knowledgeable observers. Jodi Enda wrote in the *Smithsonian Magazine*: "The 2000 election dragged on until December, until the Supreme Court declared Bush the victor [by 527 votes]. For weeks, the maps were ubiquitous. Perhaps that's why the 2000 colors stuck." The anomalous state of political colors in American politics today is captured by this couplet:

Leftists are red, rightists are blue,
Bush versus Gore, mixed up the two.

Or perhaps TV executives did not mix-up party politics out of ignorance. Perhaps they had read all the party platforms—as I did—and were simply confirming that Democrats and Republicans had flipped their political principles by 2000.

APPENDIX B

Chronological List of Selected Research on American Party Platforms

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APPENDIX C

Codes For 2,722 Republican Platform Planks, 1856-2016

I used essentially the same coding categories as those used in *The Republican Evolution; From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860*-2020, published in 2022. Tables 2.3 and 2.8 in this book respectively account for 3,392 Democratic planks and 2,722 Republican planks. For convenience, Table C.1 reprints the information in Table 2.8. [All the Republican planks are available at www.janda.org/GOP/.]

Table C.1: Distribution of 2,722 Republican Planks over Major Code Headings

1st DIGIT	HEADING TYPE	CODING CATEGORY DESCRIPTIONS	N	%
	Primary Code			
1 – –	Freedom	Policies limiting government	439	16%
2 – –	Order	Policies restricting citizens' freedom	374	14%
3 – –	Equality	Policies benefitting disadvantaged people	260	10%
4 – –	Public Goods	Policies benefitting the public	871	32%
		Totals	1.944	72%
	Secondary Code			
5 – –	Government	Actions pertaining to the government	244	9%
6 – –	Military	Actions benefitting the military	114	4%
7 – –	Foreign Policy	Relations with foreign states	402	15%
8 – –	Symbolic	Expressions of support, regret	18	1%
		Totals	778	29%
		GRAND TOTALS	2,722	101%

Partisanship appeared most clearly in planks with Primary code categories. Table C.2 shows the distribution of the Freedom and Order codes under the Primary heading in the coding framework.

TABLE C.2: Freedom and Order Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

FREEDOM codes	N	%	ORDER codes	N	%
100 Expression/Privacy	18	4.1	200 Expression/Privacy	20	5.3
101 Religion	26	5.9	201 Religion	4	1.1
102 Ethnicity	1	.2	202 Ethnicity	0	
103 Immigration	7	1.6	203 Immigration	49	13.1
104 Education	29	6.6	204 Education	30	8.0
105 Economy	101	23.0	205 Economy	47	12.6
106 Taxation	81	18.5	206 Taxation	4	1.1
107 Trade/Tariff	44	10.0	207 Trade/Tariff	36	9.6
108 Labor	42	9.6	208 Labor	25	6.7
109 Agriculture	9	2.1	209 Agriculture	0	
110 States' rights	48	10.9	210 National rights'	19	5.1
111 Transgressions	9	2.1	211 Transgressions	37	9.9
112 Alcohol/Drugs	3	.7	212 Alcohol/Drugs	26	7.0
113 Life/Death	0		213 Life/Death	41	11.0
114 Firearms	21	4.3	214 Firearms	9	2.4
115 Lifestyle		0	215 Lifestyle	27	7.2
Totals	439	100.0	Totals	374	100.0

The Freedom and Order plank codes in Table C.2 usually reflect positive or negative governmental actions, so none had positive or negative signs. However, some Equality codes in Tables C.3 were flagged as positive or negative expressions of government action, because some Republican planks opposed expressions of social equality. For example, in 1992 Republicans opposed placing women in combat positions (Equality code –302), and in 1996 they opposed lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military (Equality code –309). Negative signs accounted for less than five percent of Republicans' Equality codes.

TABLE C.3: Equality Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

EQUALITY codes	N	%
300 Non-whites +	44	16.9
301 Non-whites –	5	1.9
+302 Women	45	17.3
–302 Women	5	1.9
+303 Disadvantaged	27	10.4
–303 Disadvantaged	7	2.7
304 Handicapped	13	5.0
305 Low income	7	2.7
306 Elderly	6	2.3
307 Children	24	9.2
308 Veterans	42	16.2
–309 LGBTQ	6	2.3
310 Indigenous	29	11.2
Total	260	100.0

The story was different concerning Public Plank codes. Table C.4 shows negative signs attached to almost 20 percent of Republican planks.

TABLE C.4: Public Goods Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

PUBLIC GOODS codes	N	%
+400 Education	64	7.3
–400 Education	7	.8
+401 Transportation	47	5.4
–401 Transportation	15	1.7
+402 Environment	49	5.6
–402 Environment	14	1.6
+403 Conservation	36	4.1
–403 Conservation	3	.3
+404 Welfare	50	5.7
–404 Welfare	27	3.1
+405 Housing	22	2.5
–405 Housing	21	2.4
+406 Health	42	4.8
–406 Health	37	4.2
+407 Labor	33	3.8
–407 Labor	4	.5

+408 Communication	21	2.4
–408 Communication	2	.2
+409 Agriculture	74	8.5
–409 Agriculture	1	.1
+410 Energy	69	7.9
–410 Energy	32	3.7
411 Shipping		
412 Merchant Marine	22	2.5
413 Indebtedness	14	1.6
414 Economy	54	6.2
415 Spending/Deficit	50	5.7
416 Banking & Currency	18	2.1
417 Public Lands +	12	1.4
418 Public Lands –	11	1.3
419 Immigration	20	2.3
Total	871	100.0

Some of the negative signs reflected my coding decisions about the politics of the issue, especially concerning "tax credits" instead of tax deductions or government grants or subsidies. Recipients of a government grant or subsidy pay no tax on the award. Recipients of a tax credit claim benefits only by claiming a tax deduction when filing their annual tax forms. Tax credits reduce a filer's actual tax bill, may save more than the actual expense, and even return a refund. They typically favor filers who owe a substantial tax bill—usually wealthier taxpayers. Five of the seven planks coded -400 were attached to tax credits.

Negative codes were also given if the plank were judged to oppose the Public Good. That was done for all 14 planks tagged -492 Environment.

Secondary Codes

Planks with Secondary codes usually reflected far less partisanship. Secondary Codes 5 -- Government, were used for planks that dealt with political structure and administration, which ordinarily had no consistent partisan nature. Table C.5 lays out the Government codes and their frequencies. Most of the -- 505 Election codes were used for planks that opposed voter registration or public funding of campaigns.

TABLE C.5: Government Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

GOVERNMENT codes	N	%
500 Congress	20	8.2
501 Constitution	20	8.2
502 Civil/Postal Service	29	11.9
503 Expand government	28	11.5
504 Reorganize government	13	5.3
+505 Elections	27	11.1
–505 Elections	13	5.3
506 Interior, pro-public		
+507 Statehood	20	8.2
–507 Statehood	34	13.9
508 Territories	7	2.9
509 Native populations	4	1.6
510 Washington DC	12	4.9
511 Legal	7	2.9
512 Federal courts	10	4.1
Total	244	100.0

Secondary Codes 6 -- Military also had showed little consistent partisanship, flip-flopping according to whether the conflict at hand had Democratic or Republican ownership. Table C.6 presents the codes and data.

TABLE C.6: Military Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

MILITARY codes	N	%
600 More spending	34	29.8
601 Less spending	1	0.9
602 Navy	17	14.9
603 Army	1	0.9
604 Air Force	4	3.5
605 National Guard	0	
606 Nuclear	5	4.4
607 Missiles	12	10.5
608 Space	15	13.2
609 Intelligence	7	6.1
610 Command	12	10.5
611 Service	6	5.3
Total	114	100.0

Secondary Codes 7 -- Foreign Policy (like Military) also had showed little consistent partisanship, changing according to whether the policy at hand had Democratic or Republican ownership. Table C.7 presents the codes and data.

TABLE C.7: Foreign Policy Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

FOREIGN POLICY codes	N	%
+700 World Organizations, pro	20	5.0
-700 World Organizations,anti	19	4.7
701 Europe	23	5.7
+702 NATO, etc., favorable	20	5.0
–702 NATO, etc., unfavorable	3	.7
703 Asia	34	8.5
704 Americas	50	12.4
705 Africa	19	4.7
706 Soviet/Russia	36	9.0
707 China/Taiwan	21	5.2
708 Middle East	43	10.7
709 Wars post WW2	16	4.0
710 Foreign aid	24	6.0
711 Treaties	12	3.0
712 Monroe Doctrine	11	2.7
713 Protect Citizens	4	1.0
714 Avoid war	22	5.5
715 World Leader	25	6.2
Total	402	100.0

Secondary Codes 8 -- Symbolic were used for specific planks that often praised people or countries. Such planks occurred more often in earlier platforms adopted by Democrats. Table C.8 presents the codes and data.

TABLE C.8: Symbolic Republican Plank Codes and Usage, 1856-2016

SYMBOLIC codes	N	%
800 Presidents	6	33.3
801 Nation	4	22.2
802 Discrimination	2	11.1
803 Atrocities		
804 Politicians	2	11.1
805 Treaties		
806 Political Acts	3	16.7
807 Peace		
808 War		
809 Other	1	5.6
Total	18	100.0

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All platform texts were obtained from the website of the American Presidency Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara. David Leip's "Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections" provided the percentages of popular and electoral votes cast for presidents and parties. I am grateful to both sources for providing that information. I alone am responsible for the data collection and analysis.

A scholar whom I never met, but whose paths crossed mine in history, inspired me to build a database of the parties' platform planks. In 1936, Richard G. Browne earned his PhD from Northwestern University for his dissertation, "National Party Platforms and Their Significance." He cataloged 1,666 platform planks for virtually *all* American political parties to 1936. In 1957, I got my Bachelor's degree in social science from Illinois State Normal University, where Browne had served as department head. In 1961, I joined the faculty at Northwestern, the same department that granted Browne's degree.

Another scholar whom I never met, John Gerring at the University of Texas, wrote a book that provided the foundation for this analysis. In *Party Ideologies in America, 1826-1996* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), Gerring used party platforms and presidential speeches to identify how the Democratic and Whig/Republican parties were guided by different basic principles in distinct "epochs" over time. My analysis of the Democratic Party supports his in broad outlines, but I dated the time periods slightly differently and labeled them quite differently.

Although I had met Rutgers University professor Gerald Pomper and knew of his celebrated publications on whether parties delivered on their platform pledges, I did not fully appreciate his pioneering research until working on this book. I drew heavily on Pomper's original framework and then benefitted from his constructive advice and encouragement. I also I benefited from counsel provided by Northeastern University professor William Crotty, an authority on the Democratic Party and my former colleague at Northwestern University.

Edward Carmines and James Stimson talked with me about their 1989 award-winning book, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*, which led me to rethink the parties' changes in light of biological and sociological evolutionary theories. A Twin Cities friend and academic colleague, University of Minnesota biochemist John Anderson, cautioned me about overdrawing the fit of biological evolution to political parties while not entirely rejecting the relevance of sociological evolutionary theory.

Once again, my Twin Cities neighbor, John Flynn, Professor Emeritus of History and Geography at Saint Catherine University, carefully read the first draft of my manuscript, caught far more errors than I thought I made, constructively questioned some historical interpretations, and kept me from some inaccurate judgments. I owe him a lot.

Kenneth Janda
Roseville, Minnesota

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ENDNOTES

[1] *The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860-2020* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022). See www.partypolitics.com.
[2] The Great Switch: How the Republican & Democratic Parties Flipped Ideologies, *Students of History* at https://www.studentsofhistory.com/ideologies-flip-Democratic-Republican-parties.
[3] Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S." *Perspectives on Politics*, 6 (September 2008), 433-450.
[4] Kenneth Janda, *The Republican Evolution: From Governing Party to Antigovernment Party, 1860-2020* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022).
[5] Sections of this chapter draw heavily from *The Republican Evolution,* Chapter 3.
[6] According to the 1937 *Oxford Universal English Dictionary*, "platform"—meaning a plan or representation on a plane [flat] surface—was used in 16th century England.
[7] William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1978), 537-538.
[8] American Presidency Project at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/elections-and-transitions/party-platforms.
[9] Perhaps the best known is Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, *National Party Platforms 1840-1980* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982). This appears to have been the last edition.
[10] Edward F. Cooke, "Origin and Development of Party Platforms," *The Social Studies*, 51 (1960), 174-177 at p. 175.
[11] Kimberly H. Conger, "Party Platforms and Party Coalitions: The Christian Right and State-Level Republicans," *Party Politics,* 16 (2010), 651–668 at p. 652.
[12] Terri Susan Fine, "Party platforms as tools of presidential agenda setting," *White House Studie*s, 3 (Spring 2003), online.
[13] L. Sandy Maisel, "The Platform-Writing Process: Candidate-Centered Platforms in 1992," *Political Science Quarterly,* 108, (Winter, 1993-1994), 671-698 at p. 671.
[14] Gerald Pomper, "'If Elected, I Promise': American Party Platforms," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (August, 1967), 318-352 at p. 319.
[15] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth, Volume II* (London: MacMillan, 1888), p. 331.
[16] Moisey Ostrogorsky, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. 2* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), pp. 138-139.
[17] Richard G. Browne, p. 115.
[18] Theodore White, *The Making of the President* (New York: Atheneum, 1961), 7.
[19] Browne (p. 7) credited his professor, Kenneth Colegrove, for the popular phrases, "point with pride" and "view with alarm," which authors often substitute for points 1 and 2.
[20] Browne, pp. 9-10.
[21] Browne, pp. 10-11.
[22] Pomper, 1967, pp. 325-326. This list is identical to that contained later in Gerald M. Pomper with Susan S. Lederman. *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics, 2nd Edition* (New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 133-135.
[23] Pomper with Lederman, 1980.
[24] Lee W. Payne, "'If Elected, I [Still] Promise': American Party Platforms - 1980-2008," *The Journal of Political Science*, 41 (2013), 33-60.
[25] Judith Bara, "A Question of Trust: Implementing Party Manifestos" *Parliamentary Affairs,* 58 (2005), 585–599; Lucy Mansergh and Robert Thomson, "Election Pledges, Party Competition, and Policymaking," *Comparative Politics*, 39 (April, 2007), 311-329; and Lee W. Payne, "'If Elected, I [Still] Promise': American Party Platforms—1980-2008," *The Journal of Political Science*, 41 (2013),

33-60.

[26] T. J. Royed, and S. A. Borelli, "Parties and Economic Policy in the USA: Pledges and Performance, 1976-1992." *Party Politics,* 5 (1999), 115-127.

[27] Edina Szöcsik, Christina Isabel Zuber, and Philip J, Howe reported on a Habsburg Manifesto Dataset, "created through the computer assisted qualitative content analysis of the party manifestos published by nearly all of the dozens of Czech and German parties that ran in the 1897, 1900/1901, 1907, and/or 1911 legislative elections" in Austria0Hungary. See "Lipset and Rokkan's missing case: Introducing the Habsburg Manifesto Dataset,' *Party Politics* (posted July 12, 2023 at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/13540688231185671#fn2-1354068823118567.

[28] Kostas Gemenis, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with the Comparative Manifestos Project Data," *Political Studies,* 61 (S1, 2013), 3–23 at p. 3, traces the history of the Manifesto Project: "Ian Budge and his colleagues who established the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) in 1979.The MRG embarked on an ambitious task, namely to collect and code the manifestos of all major political parties in nineteen countries. Ten years later, the project was renamed the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and under the direction of Hans-Dieter Klingemann its coverage was extended to include parties in Central and Eastern European countries. In 2009, the project was once more renamed as Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) with plans to extend its coverage to political parties in Asia and Latin America under a twelve-year grant from the German Science Foundation (DFG)." In 2001, 2006, and 2013 Budge, Klinemann, and Andrea Volkens—in turn—were principal editors of three volumes beginning with the title: *Mapping Policy Preferences . . . "* and dealt with methodological issues in manifesto research.

[29] Francois Petry and Benoıt Collette, "Measuring How Political Parties Keep Their Promises: A Positive Perspective from Political Science," Paper dated October, 2007, p. 17, later published with the same title in L.M. Imbeau (ed.), *Do They Walk Like They Talk?* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2009).

[30] Robert Thomson et al, "The Fulfillment of Parties' Election Pledges: A Comparative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing," *American Journal of Political Science*, 61 (July, 2017), 527-542 at pp. 527 and 540.

[31] David Thackeray and Richard Toye, " An Age of Promises: British Election Manifestos and Addresses 1900–97," *Twentieth Century British History*, 31, No. 1, (March, 2020), 1–26 at p. 9.

[32] Thackeray and Toye, at p. 10 and p. 2.

[33] Thackeray and Toye, p. 11. Word counts for American party platforms come from the American Presidency Project.

[34] Allan Brimicombe, "Text Mining the Election Manifestos, *British Society of Criminology Newsletter*, No. 76, (Summer 2015), Table 1.

[35] Many studies have documented the decentralized nature of American political parties compared with parties in other countries. This literature is reviewed in Robert Harmel, Matthew Biebert, and Kenneth Janda, *American Parties in Context: Comparative and Historical Analysis* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

[36] Craig Allen Smith and Kathy B. Smith. "A Rhetorical Perspective on the 1997 British Party Manifestos," *Political Communication*, 17 (2000), 457–473 at 460.

[37] "Formal responsibility for deciding what goes into "Labour's programme lies with the annual Conference. . . . Within the Conservative Party the ultimate authority of the leader is clear." Dennis Kavanagh, "The Politics of Manifestos," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 34 (Winter 1981), 7–27, at p. 15 and p. 19.

[38] Browne, p. 71.

[39] Edward F. Cooke, "Drafting the 1952 Platforms," *Western Political Quarterly*, 9 (September, 1956), pp. 699-712 at p. 708.

[40] Cooke, p. 710.
[41] Paul T. David, "Party Platforms as National Plans," *Public Administration Review*, 31 (May - Jun., 1971), 303-315 at p. 306.
[42] Jeff Fishel, *Presidents & Promises* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), pp. 63 and 64.
[43] Susan Fine, "Interest Groups & the Framing of the 1988 Democratic & Republican Party Platforms," *Polity*, 26, (Spring, 1994), 517-530 at p. 517.
[44] Fine, p. 524.
[45] Maisel, p. 696.
[46] Maisel, p. 687.
[47] Browne, p. 63.
[48] Jennifer Nicoll Victor and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, "Competing for the platform: How organized interests affect party positioning in the United States," *Party Politics,* 24 (2018) 265–277 at 275.
[49] "The Democratic Party Platform and DNC Platform Committees, 2016." *Ballotpedia* at https://ballotpedia.org/The_Democratic_Party_Platform_and_DNC_Platform_Committees,_2016.
[50] Caitlin Oprysko, "Biden, Sanders unity task forces release policy recommendations," *Politico* (July 8, 2020) at https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/08/biden-sanders-unity-task-force-recommendations-353225.
[51] See https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/handbooks. "Plank" is also unmentioned in Kostas Gemenis, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with the Comparative Manifestos Project Data," *Political Studies,* 61 (S1, 2013), 3–23.
[52] Robert Harmel, "The how's and why's of party manifestos: Some guidance for a cross-national research agenda," *Party Politics,* 24 (November, 2018), 229-239.
[53] Houghton at p. 416.
[54] Browne, "National Party Platforms and Their Significance," pp. 57-58.
[55] American Presidency Project at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/elections-and-transitions/party-platforms.
[56] Dating the first party platform is debatable. Thomas Hudson McKee in *The National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 1789 to 1905, 6th Edition* (Baltimore: Friedenwald Company, 1906) credited a group of National Republicans with creating the first party platform in 1831, but that was not at the party's national convention. Published compilations of American party platforms begin with the Democrats' in 1840.
[57] Scott Appelrouth, *Envisioning America and the American Self: Republican and Democratic Platforms*, *1840-2016* (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 4.
[58] Appelrouth, p. 41.
[59] *Ibid*., pp. 42-43/
[60] *Ibid*., pp. 41 and 47.
[61] John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1992* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
[62] In a brief epilogue, Gerring lapsed into talking about the parties moving left or right, but he saw no essential changes at the 1996 election. Gerring, pp. 283-286.
[63] John E. Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America*, p. 62.
[64] John E. Gerring, "The Development of American Party Ideology, 1828-1992," (Berkeley: University of California, 1994), Appendix D.
[65] Richard G. Browne, "National Party Platforms and Their Significance" (Evanston: Northwestern University: Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 1936). Dr. Browne had a long and distinguished career as a teacher and academic administrator, but he apparently never published anything afterward on party platforms. Only one of the many sources consulted in my study cited Dr. Browne's painstaking research. See Edward F. Cooke, "Origin and Development of Party Platforms," *The Social Studies*, 51 (1960), 174-177.

[66] Browne, Appendix A, p. 256.
[67] However, Browne's thesis was dated May 25—before the Democratic Convention on June 23-27. In a footnote, Browne seems to have resolved the problem: he relied on a tentative draft of the platform, which was certain to meet with President Roosevelt's approval and unlikely to be changed at the convention. His footnote 2 on page 66 stated: "The tentative draft of the Democratic platform in 1936 was prepared by Senator Wagner of New York."
[68] There is a controversy over the Republicans' place of origin in 1854. Residents of Ripon, Wisconsin, and people in Jackson, Michigan both claim the honor, for both towns held organizational meetings of "Republicans" in March and July of 1854.
[69] Lewis L. Gould, *Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 14.
[70] Pauline Maier, "The Struggle for Democracy, 1776-1800," in *Of the People—The 200 Year History of the Democratic Party, chronicled by America's foremost historians*. Los Angeles: General Publishing Group, 1992, 17-34. Lewis Gould added that "Republican" also related to romantic English and Italian ideas of a "republic"—citizens acting in the political sphere. Gould, p. 14. Jules Witcover wrote, "By some accounts, the original name "Republican" was chosen out of sentiment for the French Republicans and their own revolution. Jules Witcover, *Party of the People: A History of the Democratic Party*. New York: Random House, 2003, at p. 26.
[71] Unless otherwise stated, all quotations of political party platforms come from the American Presidency Project at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/app-categories/elections-and-transitions/party-platforms.
[72] *Of the People—The 200 Year History of the Democratic Party, chronicled by America's foremost historians*. Los Angeles: General Publishing Group, 1992.
[73] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volumes 1-IV: 1790-1972*. New York. Chelsea House, 1973.
[74] Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "The Parties' Origins," in *Of the People—The 200 Year History of the Democratic Party, chronicled by America's foremost historians*. (Los Angeles: General Publishing Group, 1992), pp. 13-16, at p. 14.
[75] Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., "The Jeffersonian Republican Party," in (ed.), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volume 1: 1789-1860.* (New York. Chelsea House, 1973), 239-330.
[76] Michael F. Holt, "The Democratic Party 1828-1860," in (ed.), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volume 1: 1789-1860.* (New York. Chelsea House, 1973), 497-571.
[77] Edmund Burke, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770).
[78] "The History of the Parliamentary Franchise," (House of Commons Library, Research Paper 13.14, March, 2013), p. 19.
[79] Schlesinger, 1992, p. 14.
[80] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957), p. 25.
[81] "United States Presidential election Results," at https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html.
[82] Jules Witcover, *Party of the People: A History of the Democratic Party*. (New York: Random House, 2003), at p. 135.
[83] Harry S. Truman, "Address at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner," *National Archives* (February 16, 1950).
[84] Ashley Southall, "Jefferson-Jackson Dinner Will Be Renamed," *New York Times* (August. 8, 2015) at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/us/jefferson-jackson-dinner-will-be-renamed.html.
[85] "Jefferson-Jackson Dinner," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jefferson–Jackson_Dinner accessed on August 18, 2022.
[86] Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers* (New York; Vintage Books, 2002), won a Pulitzer Prize.
[87] Ellis, p. 106.

[88] "Missouri Compromise (1820)," *National Archives* at https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/missouri-compromise.
[89] Cunningham, Noble E., Jr., "The Jeffersonian Republican Party," in (ed.), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volume 1: 1789-1860.* (New York. Chelsea House, 1973), 239-330, at pp. 253-254.
[90] Walter Houghton, p. 81.
[91] Although Harry Truman was the only other U.S. president who had risen to become a Grand Master, many other presidents were Masons. On source list twelve, the most recent being Gerald Ford. See Murse, Tom. "List of Presidents Who Were Masons." ThoughtCo, Sep. 1, 2021, thoughtco.com/presidents-who-were-masons-4058555.
[92] Glyndon G. Van Deuse, "The Whig Party," in (ed.), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volume 1: 1789-1860.* (New York. Chelsea House, 1973), 333-363, at p. 338.
[93] Walter R. Houghton, *History of American Politics (Non-Partisan) Embracing a History of the Federal Government and of Political Parties in the Colonies and United States from 1607 to 1882* (Chicago: F.T. Neely, 1883), 226.
[94] "Free-Soil Party," *Britannica* at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Free-Soil-Party.
[95] "Compromise of 1850," in Eric Foner and John A. Garraty (eds.), *The Reader's Companion to American History.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 209-210.
[96] "Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854)," *National Archives* at https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/kansas-nebraska-(act.
[97] "Franklin Pierce," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franklin_Pierce#1856_election.
[98] Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, *National Party Platforms 1840-1964.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966, at 28-29.
[99] Houghton, 1883, p. 275.
[100] Porter and Johnson, 22.
[101] Houghton, 1883, pp. 321-325.
[102] "Reconstruction and Its Aftermath," *African American Odyssey* at https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/aaohtml/aopart5.html.
[103] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow, Third Revised Edition*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). p. 12.
[104] "Wade-Davis Bill (1864)," *Milestone Documents* at https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/wade-davis-bill.
[105] "Andrew Johnson," *The White House* at https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/andrew-johnson/.
[106] Eric Foner, "Reconstruction," in Eric Foner and John A. Garraty (eds.), *The Reader's Companion to American History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 917-921 at p. 918.
[107] *Ibid*.
[108] William Safire. *Safire's Political Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1978). 121.
[109] "DC Compensated Emancipation Act," The Civil War: *The Senate's Story* at https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/civil_war/DCEmancipationAct_FeaturedDoc.htm.
[110] "The Civil Rights Bill of 1866" at https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1851-1900/The-Civil-Rights-Bill-of-1866/.
[111] Foner, "Reconstruction," p. 919.
[112] *Ibid.*
[113] *Ibid.*
[114] Foner, "Reconstruction," p. 920.

[115] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow, Third Revised Edition*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
[116] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[118] *Ibid.,* pp. 53-54.
[119] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[120] *Ibid*., p. 59.
[121] *Ibid*., p. 84.
[122] For a "Chronological Table" showing number of presidential electors by state and year, see "United States Electoral College," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College#Chronological_table,
[123] The percentage of votes for Democratic presidential candidates inside and outside of the eleven confederates states was computed from data for each presidential election published by Wikipedia.
[124] "Grover Cleveland and Civil Rights," *LiveJournal* at https://potus-geeks.livejournal.com/162119.html?.
[125] Alyn Brodsky, *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Character* (New York: Truman Tally Books, 2000), p. 452.
[126] Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow,* p. 41.
[127] "The Civil War: The Senate's Story," United States Senate at https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/civil_war/LincolnEmergencySession_FeaturedDoc.htm#:~:text=On%20April%2015%2C%201861%2C%20just,order%20to%20suppress%20the%20rebellion.
[128] C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 21.
[129] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, Volume 2: The Negro Social Structure* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 599.
[130] Myrdal, p.
[131] *Merriam-Webster* at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/segregation.
[132] Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, Volume 2*, p. 599.
[133] Woodward wrote in a footnote (p. 7): "The origin of the term 'Jim Crow' applied to Negroes is lost in obscurity. Thomas D. Rice wrote a song and dance called 'Jim Crow' in 1832, and the term had become an adjective by 1838. The first example of 'Jim Crow law* listed by the *Dictionary of American English* is dated 1904. But the expression was used by writers in the 1890's."
[134] *Ibid*., p. 97.
[135] "The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow," *Thirteen* at https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_uncivil.html.
[136] Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, Volume 2*, p. 579.
[137] *Ibid*., p. 581.
[138] D'Souza, p. 142.
[139] The percentage of votes for Democratic presidential candidates inside and outside of the eleven confederates states was computed from data for each presidential election published by Wikipedia.
[140] Robert M. Crunde, "Progressivism," in *Reader's Companion,* 867-871 at p. 868.
[141] Witcover, p. 308.
[142] "President Wilson Authorizes Segregation Within Federal Government," *A History of Racial Injustice* at https://calendar.eji.org/racial-injustice/apr/11. Also see "Wilson and Race," *President Wilson House* at https://www.woodrowwilsonhouse.org/wilson-topics/wilson-and-race/.
[143] "*The Birth of a Nation*," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Birth_of_a_Nation.

[144] There were four exceptions to the rule that from 1900 to 1928 southern senators were always Democrats. In the previous century, Florida had elected a Republican to a six-year term in the Senate, and North Carolina had elected a Republican and a Populist. They served in 1900, and one held over to serve in 1902. See Wikipedia's tallies, beginning with "56th United States Congress" at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/56th_United_States_Congress.

[145] "Black-American Members by Congress," *U.S. House of Representatives* at https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Temporary-Farewell/Introduction/.

[146] "The Negroes' Temporary Farewell: Jim Crow and the Exclusion of African Americans from Congress, 1887–1929," *U.S. House of Representatives* at https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Temporary-Farewell/Introduction/.

[147] "Primary Election Today," *Chicago Tribune* (August 30, 1892), p. 5.

[148] Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, p 85.

[149] "Power Of The Southern Bloc In Congress," *U.S. House of Representatives* at https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Temporary-Farewell/Southern-Bloc/.

[150] Pauli Murray, *States' Laws on Race and Color* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1997). It was a reprint of Murray's 1950 book published by the Women's Division of Christian Service.

[151] *Ibid*., p. 7.

[152] Davidson M. Douglas, "Foreword," in Pauli Murray, *States' Laws on Race and Color* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1997), p. xiii.

[153] Theodore G. Bilbo, *Take Your Choice: Separation of Mongrelization* (Popularville, MS: Dream House Publishing Company, 1947).

[154] *Ibid*., p. 272.

[155] Ta-Nehisi Coates, "A History of Liberal White Racism, Cont.," The Atlantic (April 18, 2013) at https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/a-history-of-liberal-white-racism-cont/275129/.

[156] East Tennessee provided the only notable exception, regularly electing two Republicans during the period.

[157] Progressive and Farmer-Labor candidates won a small number of seats in 1934 and 1936.

[158] Otis L. Graham, Jr., "The Democratic Party, 1932-1945," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (ed.), *History of U.S. Political Parties, Volume III: 1910-1945.* (New York. Chelsea House, 1973), 1939-1964 at p. 1960.

[159] *Ibid*.

[160] *Ibid.,* p. 1946.

[161] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma, Volume 1* (New York:: McGraw=Hill, 1964), p.496.

[162] *Ibid*., p. 1949.

[163] Jules Witcover, *Party of the People: History of the Democrats* (New York: Random House, 2003), ZP. 375.

[164] James Naremore, "Uptown Folk: Blackness and Entertainment in Cabin in the Sky," *Arizona Quarterly: A Journal of American Literature, Culture, and Theory*, 48 (Winter 1992), 99-124 at p. 103.

[165] *Ibid*., p. 426.

[166] *Ibid*., p 429.

[167] *Ibid*.

[168] For a recent detailed account of the1948 convention fight over the civil rights plank, see John M. Murphy, "The Sunshine of Human Rights: Hubert Humphrey at the 1948 Democratic Convention," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 23 (Spring, 2020), 77-106.

[169] *Ibid*., p.430.

[170] W. H. Lawrence, "Truman, Barkley Named by Democrats; South Loses on Civil Rights, 35 Walk Out; President Will Recall Congress July 26," *New York Times* (July 15, 1948) at https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/politics/camp/480715convention-dem-ra.html,
[171] "Executive Order 9981: Desegregation of the Armed Forces (1948)," *Milestone Documents, National Archives*,
[172] Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, *Politics without Power: The National Party Committees*. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 14.
[173] It seems that Tennessee's James K. Polk, nominated in 1844, was the last Democratic presidential candidate nominated from one of the eleven states of the 1861-1865 Confederacy. John Davis, nominated in 1924, was from West Virginia, which was not in the Confederacy. Georgia's Jimmy Carter in 1976 was the next.
[174] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. See also Alexander P. Lamis and Nathan C. Goldman, "V. O. Key's "*Southern Politics*: The Writing of a Classic, V. O. Key's Southern Politics, *The Georgia Historical Quarterly*, 71 (Summer, 1987), 261-285; and David A., Bateman, Ira Katznelson, John Lapinski, "Southern Politics Revisited: On V. O. Key's "South in the House" *Studies in American Political Development*, 29 (October 2015), 154-184.
[175] Key, *Southern Politics*, p. 387.
[176] *Ibid*., p. 3
[177] *Ibid*., p. 5.
[178] *Ibid*., p. 392.
[179] Witcover, p. 437.
[180] Samuel G. Freedman's book, *Into the Bright Sunshine: Young Hubert Humphrey and the Fight for Civil Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023) duly acknowledges the historic political significance of Humphrey's 1948 convention speech in its Prologue citing "What he said on that day" four times on the last page of the Prologue.
[181] The *Chicago Tribune* content is available at www.newspapers.com.
[182] V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), pp. 8-9.
[183] The vote was reported as 651½–582½, following which scores of delegates from Mississippi and Alabama walked out of the convention hall. See "1948 Democratic National Convention,"" *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Democratic_National_Convention.
[184] Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington Books, 1969), p. 74.
[185] Jonathan Day, "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité: The Meaning and History of France's National Motto," *Liberties* (May 18, 2021) at https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/liberte-egalite-fraternite/43532.
[186] See https://www.freedom-now.org.
[187] Political theorists sometimes distinguish between *positive* and *negative* freedom (or liberty). They view the absence of government restraints as positive freedom—freedom to *do*, as in freedom to speak. In contrast, negative freedom is freedom *from*, as in protection from invasions of privacy. In that context, I view freedom positively: the absence of government restrictions means freedom to act. If society imposes restrictions, however, then government may need to insure freedom of action. See "Positive and Negative Liberty," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.
[188] "The Emancipation Proclamation," *National Archives* at https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/emancipation-proclamation.
[189] A fuller yet succinct discussion of freedom, order, and equality is given in Chapter 1 of Kenneth Janda *et al*., *The Challenge of Democracy: American Government in Global Politics* (Boston: Cengage, 2023).

[190] *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* mentions the 1952 election only three times and only in passing.
[191] Details on congressional voting come from "Civil Rights Act of 1964," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Rights_Act_of_1964#Vote_totals.
[192] Earl Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 2–3.
[193] "Defense of Marriage Act," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_of_Marriage_Act#Enactment_and_role_of_President_Clinton.
[194] "Paddy Bauler," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paddy_Bauler.
[195] Michael D. Shear, "Biden Signs Bill to Protect Same-Sex Marriage," *New York Times*, (December 14, 2022), p. A15.
[196] Annie Karni, "Prominent Gay Republicans Helped Smooth Way for Marriage Bill," *New York Times* (December 11, 2022), p. 28.
[197] One Republican Congressman who backed the Respect for Marriage Bill was Arizona's Jim Kolbe, my former student at Northsestern University.
[198] "Police powers," Cornell Legal Information Institute at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/police_powers.
[199] "States' rights," *Britannica* at https://www.britannica.com/topic/states-rights.
[200] "Cooperative Federalism," *Center for the Study of Federalism* at https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Cooperative_Federalism.
[201] *Ibid*.
[202] Lyndon Johnson, Howard University Commencement Address, June 6, 1965.
[203] *Ibid*.
[204] "Reagan, Ronald, *Center for the Study of Federalism* at https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php?title=Reagan,_Ronald.
[205] Reagan's 'new federalism'. (1981). *Editorial research reports 1981* at http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1981040300.
[206] See Gerald M. Pomper, "Classification of Presidential Elections," *Journal of Politics,* 29 (August 1967): 535–66; Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970); and Jonathan Knuckley, "Classification of Presidential Elections: An Update," *Polity* 31 (Summer 1999): 639–53.
[207] One scholar identified five different party systems: 1796-1800, 1828-36, 1854-60, 1894-6, 1932-6, and 1968-72. See Joel H. Silbey, "American Political Parties: History, Votes, Critical Elections, and Party Systems," in L. Sandy Maisel and Jeffrey M. Berry (eds.). *American Political Parties and Interest Groups* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2010), 97-120.
[208] John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1826-1996* (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
[209] *Ibid.*.
[210] Gerring, p. 294.
[211] The information was extracted from Table 2 in Gerring, p. 17.
[212] Gerring, p. 15.
[213] Gerring, pp. 204 and 40.
[214] Troy Senik, *A Man of Iron The Turbulent Life and Improbable Presidency of Grover Cleveland* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2022), pp. 104 and 213.
[215] Wlliam E. Leuchtenburg, "A Call for Compassion," in *Of the People—The 200 Year History of the Democratic Party, chronicled by America's foremost historians* (Los Angeles: General Publishing Group, 1992), 157-166 at 160-163.
[216] "Federalism," Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, at https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federalism.

[217] John E. Gerring, "The development of American party ideology, 1828-1992," (Berkeley, University of California, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 1994), p. 372
[218] T.R. Reid, "Democrats' Platform Is Short, Subtle," *Washington Post* (June 28, 1988).
[219] Technically, a Military is a Public Good, but military spending can be huge, grows with technology over time, and is not consistently Democratic or Republican, so it is treated separately from Public goods.
[220] "Revenue Sharing," *Center for the Study of Federalism* at https://encyclopedia.federalism.org/index.php/Revenue_Sharing.
[221] Eric Foner, *The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution.* (New York. W.W. Norton, 2019).
[222] Foner, 2019 pp. 6-7 for all the extracts.
[223] Scott Appelrouth, *Envisioning America and the American Self: Republican and Democratic Platforms*, *1840-2016*. (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 91.
[224] Strictly speaking, a public good has two characteristics: "nonrivalry in consumption and nonexcludability." Nonrivalry means that one person's consumption does not reduce that of another, and nonexcludability means that people cannot be prevented from consuming it. John B. Taylor, *Economics, 4th Edition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), p. 375. Gareth D. Myles, *Public Economics* (Cambridge University Press, 1995, October 2001 edition) p. 258; at https://people.exeter.ac.uk/gdmyles/papers/pdfs/pubec.pdf
[225] "Public Goods," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/public=goods.,
[226] Michael A. Martorelli, "From Tariffs to Taxes," *Financial History* (Spring, 2019), 20-23, at p. 21.
[227] "Federal Tax Revenue by Source, 1934-2018 (Table 2)," *Tax Foundation*
[228] "Contribution and Benefit Base," *Social Security* at www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html.
[229] According to *Wikipedia,* the term appeared in a *New York Times* article on October 18, 1938 about one of President Roosevelt's advisors. See "Tax and Spend" at www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_and_spend.
[230] "Historical Background and Development of Social Security" at www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html.
[231] March 12 to March 19, 1937, Gallup Poll of 2,929 respondents, available through iPoll at the Roper Center.
[232] December 30, 1937, to January 4, 1938 Gallup Poll of 2,957 respondents, available through iPoll at the Roper Center.
[233] July 4 to July 9, 1938 Gallup Poll of 5,151 respondents, available through iPoll at the Roper Center.
[234] July 19 to July 26, 1948, The Roper Organization poll of 3,014 respondents, available through iPoll at the Roper Center.
[235] "Eisenhower's Statements on Social Security," *Presidential Statements* at www.ssa.gov/history/ikestmts.html#1956a.
[236] August 29 to September 15, 1956, poll of 1,471 respondents, available through iPoll at the Roper Center.
[237] Barry M. Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative* (Princeton University Press, 1960), at 12-13.
[238] "Social Security" *Gallup Poll* April 1-19, 2022.
[239] John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1826-1996* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.15.
[240] Gerring, p. 125. Elsewhere, Gerring said that for Republicans, "as well as most economists of the day, it was axiomatic that the art of government involved successful intervention into the marketplace." (p. 66)
[241] Gerring, p. 125. Gerring also contrasts Calvin Coolidge's campaign speech on September 21,1924 to a group in Washington with Herbert Hoover's speech on October 22, 1928. Coolidge chided those

who "rebel at the idea of service, and therefore lack the fellowship and cooperation of others. Our conception of authority, of law and liberty, of property and service, ought not to be that they imply rules of action for the mere benefit of someone else, but that they are primarily for the benefit of ourselves." (p. 105). Hoover specifically said, "I am defining a general policy." While "no system of laissez faire," his policy would adhere "to the principles of decentralized government, ordered liberty, and freedom to the individual." See Herbert Hoover, *American Presidency Project*.

[242] Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1989) noted that "large numbers of potential issues compete with one another," which "leads us to think of issue evolution as biological evolution." (p. 4)

[243] However, Gerring referred to the Democrats;' first era controversially As its epoch of "egalitarianism."

[244] Carmines and Stimson, pp. 47 and 57.

[245] Carmines and Stimson,p. 162.

[246] John Endler, *Natural Selection in the Wild* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 5.

[247] John D. Thorpe, "The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES), The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis (MS), 'One Long Argument'? 'Unfinished Business'"? (2024) at https://www.academia.edu/119675566/The_Extended_Evolutionary_Synthesis_EES_The_Modern_Evolutionary_Synthesis_MS_One_Long_Argument_Unfinished_Business_; and "Modern synthesis (2oth century), *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_synthesis_(20th_century).

[248] "In biological evolution it is the biological population that evolves, not individual biological entities (i.e., an individual person or a particular animal or plant). Although the individual may undergo physiological changes, it is the genetic complement encoded in DNA that is transmitted to the next generation." John S. Anderson, Professor Emeritus**,** Biochemistry Molecular Biology and Biophysics, University of Minnesota (Personal email on January 17, 2024).

[249] Robert L. Carneiro, "Spencer, Herbert," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 15* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 121-135 at p. 124.

[250]"Herbert Spencer, "*Britannica* at https://www.britannica.com/biography/Herbert-Spencer.

[251] Valerie A. Haines, "Spencer, Darwin, and the Question of Reciprocal Influence," *Journal of the History of Biology*, 24, (Autumn, 1991), 409-431; and Derek Freeman, et al., "The Evolutionary Theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer [and Comments and Replies." *Current Anthropology*, 15, (September, 1974), 211-237.

[252] Charles Darwin, "Darwin on the Struggle for Existence," *Population and Development Review*, 15 (March, 1989),139-145.

[253] "House, Senate and presidential candidate registration," *Federal Elections Commission* at https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/registering-candidate/house-senate-president-candidate-registration/.

[254] "Presidential Candidates, 2020," *Ballotpedia* at https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_candidates,_2020#Potential_presidential_candidates.

[255] "Official 2020 Presidential General Election Results General Election Date: 11/03/2020," *Federal Election Commission* at https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2020presgeresults.pdf.

[256] Data on percent of popular vote won by parties in presidential elections come from David Leip's "Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections" at https://uselectionatlas.org/.

[257] Excluded from this analysis are the 1980 and 1992 independent candidacies, respectively, of John B. Anderson (who won 6.6 percent of the popular vote) and Ross Perot (who won 19 percent). From earliest to latest, here are the fifteen parties (other than Democratic and Republican) winning at least one percent of the presidential vote since 1860: Constitutional Union, Greenback, Populist,

Prohibition, Union Labor, Socialist, Progressive, Union, Farmer-Labor, State's Rights, American Independent, American, Reform, Green, and Libertarian.

[258] See for example Eleanor D. Glor and Mario A. Rivera, "Innovation and Organizational Survival Research," Chapter 3 in James D. Ward (ed.) *Leadership and Change in Public Sector Organizations* (New York: Routledge, 2017). Emphasis added in the quotation. Available on the internet.

[259] Nathan Yanai, Why Do Political Parties Survive? An Analytical Discussion," *Party Politics*, 5, No.1 (January, 1999), 5-17.

[260] "The term nutrition combines all processes that ensure the supply of substances that contain energy to a living organism," Kurt W. Alt, et al., "Nutrition and Health in Human Evolution–Past to Present," National Institute of Medicine, Published online (August 31, 2022) at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9460423/.

[261] According to Ballotpedia, nearly all of his votes came from Arkansas (2,812), Mississippi (1,317), and Colorado (568).

[262] See https://www.prohibitionparty.org/ for the Prohibition Party website. Its 2024 presidential nominee is Michael Wood.

[263] "Prohibition Party," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibition_Party.

[264] Adrienne Martin and Amanda Conley, "Third-Party Survival versus Success: Why the Prohibition Party Failed and Yet Still Exists," (Normal, IL: Illinois State University, Fall, 2008) at https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/about.illinoisstate.edu/dist/e/34/files/2019/09/Conley-and-Martin-Fall-2008.pdf.

[265] "Our definition of radical also included religious references, as the general populace considered religious arguments and rhetoric as apocalyptic and falling short of sound reasoning. Religious references pervade party discourse with the highest levels of frequency, with the most references to God, then 'evil', Christianity and various other Christian references."

[266] Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology," *Party Politics,* 9 (February, 2003), 167–199.

[267] Gunther and Diamond, p. 185-186.

[268] Gunther and Diamond, p. 189.

[269] "Fifty Years On, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Continues to Reshape the United States," *Migration Information source* at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fifty-years-1965-immigration-and-nationality-act-continues-reshape-united-states.

[270] Prior to the Civil War, the slave population was four million, but—as provided in the Constitution—only 3/5 counted for representation, and they could not vote anyway. See "Slavery, United States," Library of Congress at https://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/placesinhistory/archive/2011/20110318_slavery.html.

[271] "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990," U.S. Census at https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/1999/demo/POP-twps0029.html. Tables 1 and 2. Counts for "Oceania" and "Not reported" are not included. Data were not available for 1940-1950.

[272] The ANES Data Guide at https://electionstudies.org/data-tools/anes-guide/ reports just over 38 percent Protestant in 2020, but it used a question that teased out Protestant links after respondents had denied religious affiliation to question V201435: "What is your present religion, if any?" When people said "none" or "nothing in particular," researchers scoured the interview text searching for denominational connections. Those responses were summarized in variable V20158x, used in the Data Guide. Scholars argue that the first question alone provides a better estimate of religious identification.

[273] "Herbert Spencer (1820—1903)," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at https://iep.utm.edu/spencer/.

[274] "Evolution," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evolution/#ModeEvol.
[275] Dan Falk, "The Complicated Legacy of Herbert Spencer, the Man Who Coined 'Survival of the fittest," *Smithsonian Magazine* (April 29, 2020) at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/herbert-spencer-survival-of-the-fittest-180974756/,
[276] Robert L. Carneiro, "Spencer, Herbert," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 15* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 121-135 at p. 126.
[277] Herbert Spencer (1820-1903)
[278] "Robert Nozick (1938-2002)," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at https://iep.utm.edu/nozick/#H2**.**
[279] "Capital and Labor," The Guilded Age to the Present, at https://mlpp.pressbooks.pub/ushistory2/chapter/chapter-1/.
[280] See Herbert Hoover, American Presidency Project.
[281] Thomas A. Johnson, "Alienating the Negro Vote," *New York Times* (August 18, 1968),
[282] Barry Goldwater, who had a Jewish heritage but was raised as an Episcopalian, was a lifetime member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
[283] This section on the 2013 GOP "Growth and Opportunity Project" draws heavily from my book, *The Republican Evolution*, pp. 233-235.
[284] Parts of this chapter draw heavily from Kenneth Janda, *A Tale of Two Parties: Living Amongst Democrats and Republicans Since 1952* (New York: Routledge, 2021), Chapter 3.
[285] "The Growth and Opportunity Project," at https://gop.com/growth-and-opportunity-project.
[286] *Ibid*., p. 7.
[287] "The concept of Natural Selection," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-selection/.
[288] Charles C. Glllispie, "Darwin, Charles." in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 4* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 7-14 at p. 9.
[289] R. C. Lewontin, "The Concept of Evolution," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 5* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 202-210 at p. 203.
[290] Gillispie, at p. 11.
[291] Elman R. Service, "Cultural Evolution," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 5* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 221-228 at p. 225.
[292] Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Evolution And Behavior," in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 5* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), 234-238 at p. 224.
[293] *Chicago Tribune* (July 15, 1948), pp. 2-3.
[294] James Druckman and Jeremy Levy, "Affective Polarization in the American Public." *IPR Working Paper Series, WP-21-27* (Northwestern University: May 17, 2021), p. 1.
[295] The ANES feeling thermometer's scale is described at https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2007ANES_Gallup_QuestionComparisons.pdf.
[296] John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno, "Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, 99 (November 2005), 567-581. John Gerring and Strom C. Thacker elaborated their theory in *A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance* **(**Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[297] "Slavery in France," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slavery_in_France.
[298] "Abolishionism in the United States," *Wikipedia* at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abolitionism_in_the_United_States.
[299] Ronald Inglehart, "Globalization and Postmodern Values" *The Washington Quarterly*, 23 (Winter 2000), 215-228 at 219.

[300] Mary A. Glendon, "Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," *Notre Dame Law Review*. 73 Rev.1153 (1998). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss5/18.
[301] John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 18.
[302] C. Mark Blackden, "Gender Equality and Global Public Goods: Some Reflections on Shared Priorities," *OECD DAC Network on Gender Equality* at https://www.oecd.org/social/gender-development/43882963.pdf; and J. Mohan Rao, "Equity in a Global Public Goods Framework," in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern (eds.) *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 68–87.
[303] Philip Keefer, "Collective Action, Political Parties and Pro-Development Public Policy," *The World Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team* (June, 2011), p. 21 at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Collective-Action%2C-Political-Parties%2C-and-Public-Keefer/983a277250199b2342ce02ae0f61a2f2604d8a50.
[304] *Chicago Tribune* (March 12, 1879), p. 7.
[305] Philip E. Converse thoroughly explores the importance of coherence to ideology in "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261. Converse wrote about individual voters. I adapted his definition to apply to political parties.
[306] My coauthors and I attempt to explain changes in both American and European parties in Kenneth Janda, Robert Harmel, Christine Edens, and Patricia Goff, "Changes in Party Identity: Evidence from Party Manifestos," *Party Politics,* 1 (April, 1995), 171-196.
[307] Gerring, p. 257.
[308] "A massive literature effectively demonstrates on numerous fronts that the evidence of voting behavior does not provide a direct and reliable basis for inferences about the structure and distribution of individual partisan attitudes," is a major conclusion of Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 267.
[309] Gerring, p. 261.
[310] Gerring, p. 274.
[311] Gerring, p. 272.
[312] Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, pp. 269 and 268.
[313] Jules Witcover, *Party of the People: A History of the Democratic Party*. (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 292.
[314] Matteo CM, Casiraghi, Luigi Curini, and Eugenio Cusumano, "The colors of ideology: Chromatic isomorphism and political party logos," *Party Politics,* 29 (May, 2023), 463–474.