Ora John Reuter and
Rostislav Turovsky, "Dominant party rule and legislative
leadership in authoritarian regimes," Party Politics,
20 (September, 2014), 663-674. [Available at
In the past ten years, political scientists have learned a
great deal about institutional variation in non-democratic
regimes. Important studies of authoritarian legislatures
(Gandhi, 2008), elections (Blaydes, 2011; Magaloni, 2006)
and parties (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008) have
demonstrated how these nominally democratic institutions can
both fortify authoritarian rule and provide opportunities
for opponents to undermine the regime. Yet many questions
remain about how these institutions operate, and about the
conditions under which they can bolster, as opposed to
undermine, authoritarian rule.
- Figures and
- Figure 1. Cumulative Moving Average of Share of
Mandates and SMD Seats Won by United Russia in Regional
- Table 1. Logit models of determinants of receiving
leadership position in Russian regional
- Figure 2. Substantive Effects of Key Variables.
Note: Incumbency is held at a value of 1. All
other variables are held at their means.
Finally, the findings in this article have important
implications for the comparative study of ruling parties in
hybrid and authoritarian regimes. By empirically
illustrating how such parties reward loyalty with career
advancement, we show how these parties keep elites loyal.
The findings are especially relevant, given the fact that
United Russia is less institutionalized than the handful of
long-lived dominant parties, such as the PRI, that have
received attention in the literature. Most dominant parties,
like United Russia, are authoritarian institutions that
coexist alongside clientelistic mechanisms of spoil
management. In such regimes, the dominant party is not a
closed shop, but, for many elites, party loyalty does offer
special opportunities for career advancement.