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Pradeep Chhibber, Francesca Refsum Jensenius, and Pavithra Suryanarayan, "Party organization and party proliferation in India," Party Politics, 20 (July, 2014), 489-505. [Available at http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol20/issue4/ ]

First paragraph:
Since the publication of Making Votes Count (Cox, 1997) it is widely accepted that social cleavages, political institutions or the interaction of cleavages and institutions jointly influence the nature of a party system (usually understood as the effective number of parties). An analysis of the party systems across Indian states reveals that there is considerable variation in the effective number of parties, both across states and within states over time, and that this variation cannot be accounted for by social cleavages or political institutions alone.

Figures and Tables:
Figure 1. Average effective number of parties in 15 Indian states 1967-2004.
Figure 2. Variation in effective number of parties in 15 Indian States 1967-2004.
Figure 3. Number of parties, effective number of parties, number of organized parties and proportion of organized parties.
Figure 4. Party organization and proposed dependent variables in 15 Indian states 1967-2004.
Table 1. OLS models of the proportion more organized parties on the effective number of parties.
Figure 5. Examples of the social base of parties in India.
Table 2. OLS models of the proportion of more organized parties on electoral volatility.
Table 3. GEE models of the proportion of organized parties on electoral volatility, allowing for dependence among the observations in the same state.
Appendix A. GEE models of the proportion of organized parties on the effective number of parties, allowing for dependence among the observations in the same state.
Appendix B. Party organization coding.

Last Paragraph:
(First paragraph of conclusion) The main claim presented in this article is that the organizational structure of parties can have a large and independent impact on the effective number of parties, since it alters the incentive structure for politicians to stay within a party, to defect to another party, or to form a new party. Assuming that politicians wish to climb the career ladder to get access to power and resources associated with holding office, the career opportunities of politicians in a party determine whether or not they stay loyal to a party. When parties are less organized, politicians are more likely to defect. This will lead to increased electoral volatility, as voters often follow politicians to other parties. However, politicians being more likely to leave their party does not necessarily lead to a higher effective number of parties. If the other parties in the party system are less organized, a politician with a following often has the opportunity to enter other parties laterally. When other parties are more organized this becomes harder. Thus, we expected to find that the most fragmented party systems are mixed systems.

Last updated June 2014