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Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, "Socio-economic voter profile and motives for Islamist support in Morocco," Party Politics, 20 (January 2014), 116-133. [Available at http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol20/issue1/ ]

First paragraph:
The nature of Islamist political parties is at the core of debates about the political future of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The relevance of these debates has increased as strong popular pressure for democratization has ousted some MENA regimes and brought others to enact political reforms. Indeed, Islamist parties are the likely beneficiaries of such reforms. Yet, little is known about the sources behind the strength of Islamist political parties. Who votes for Islamist parties and why? To which electorate do Islamist parties respond? In fact, there have been as many surprise victories as surprise failures of Islamist parties in recent years. For lack of data on Islamist voters, most explanations offered are directly drawn from studies on Islamist movement organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan. Movement organizations and parties, however, are two different entities; they operate in different spheres, they obey different logics, and, over time, they might develop different objectives (Wegner, 2011; Wegner and Pellicer, 2009). Similarly, activists--whether of the party or the movement organizations--are different from a larger pool of sympathizers: sympathizers are receptive to the ideas of the party or movement but are not sufficiently mobilized to engage directly in political action. In short, it is a long way from the profile of an activist inside an Islamist movement organization to one of a voter of an Islamist party.

Figures and Tables:
Table 1. Profiles of potential Islamist voters.
Table 2. Summary of variables.
Figure 1. Density of PJD votes 2002 and 2007.
Table 3. Profile of districts with different levels of PJD support.
Figure 2. Relation between literacy and PJD votes 2002 (left panel) and 2007 (right panel).
Table 4. Regression PJD vote-share on urbanization and literacy.
Table 5. Bivariate correlations between literacy, turnout, null votes and party votes.
Figure 3. Percent of literacy and public employees (2007).
Table 6. PJD results by education and inclusion.
Figure 4. Percent of literacy and satellite dishes (2007).
Table 7. PJD results by education and resources
Table 8. OLS regressions of PJD votes on literacy and public employees and resources
Table 9. The grievance profile of the Party of Abstention.
Figure 5. Level of education and PJD support in 2011.
Figure 6. Level of education and PJD support in 2007.
Table 10. OLS regressions of PJD votes on education and social class in 2002 and 2007.

Last Paragraph:
(first paragraph of conclusion) This article studied patterns of electoral support for the Moroccan Islamist party in 2002 and 2007. The key commonality found across time was that voters did not support the PJD for clientelistic reasons: PJD voters were too highly educated to vote for such motives. Besides, the profile of PJD voters was changing between 2002 and 2007, in tandem with the party's mobilization decisions. Whereas the party initially attracted grievance voters, interested in voicing their disaffection with the system and the elites sustaining and benefiting from it, it ceased to do so once it adopted a tamer attitude towards the regime. Instead, the party attracted a middle class type of voter interested in incremental change. Grievances were then voiced either by abstaining or by casting null votes.

Last updated March 2014