Lene Aaroe, "When citizens go against elite directions: Partisan cues and contrast effects on citizens' attitudes," Party Politics, 18 (March, 2012), 215-233. [Available at http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol18/issue2/ ]

First paragraph:
An impressive body of research has demonstrated that cue-taking is one of the most fundamental mechanisms helping citizens form attitudes in the complex world of politics (Arceneaux, 2008: 139; Campbell et al., 1960: 128; Kam, 2005: 165; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006: 232; Mondak, 1993; 186; Zaller, 1992). Political parties and their leaders structure democratic competition (Katz, 1980: 1) and build policy reputations in the eyes of the electorate over time (Arceneaux, 2008: 140). In public debate, partisan elite cues therefore provide citizens who may otherwise lack direct experience or knowledge of political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) with central guidance about the implications of a persuasive message (Campbell et al., 1960: 128; Zaller, 1992: 42). Accordingly, partisan cues constitute 'shortcuts' allowing citizens to make relatively well-grounded political judgments based on limited information (Downs, 1957; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998: 30).

Figures and Tables:

Table 1. Effect of the Kjærsgaard cue by party preference and perception of the DPP leader's likeability

Figure 1. Effect of the Kjærsgaard cue by party preference (A) and perception of the DPP leader's likeability (B)

Table 2. Effect of the Rasmussen cue by party preference and perception of the PM's likeability

Figure 2. Effect of the Rasmussen cue by party preference and perception of his likeability. A.Welfare issue: Effect of the Rasmussen cue by party preference. B.Welfare issue: Effect of the Rasmussen cue by perception of the PM's likeability. C. Iraq issue: Effect of the Rasmussen cue by perception of the PM's likeability.

Last Paragraph:
In a democratic perspective, the current study accentuates the constraints on elite opinion leadership. Thus, Druckman (2001: 1061) argued that the biased attention to successful elite persuasion had nurtured an inflated perception of elite influence on public opinion. The current study corrects this bias by emphasizing that elite influence should not be perceived as unilateral manipulation and that citizens have the capacity to use partisan source cues to go against elite directions.