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Jeffrey D. Grynaviski, " The Impact of Electoral Rules on Factional Competition in the Democratic South, 1919-48," Party Politics, 10 (September, 2004), 499-519.

Second Paragraph:
In this article, the impact of electoral rules on the factional systems that emerge in the primaries of a one-party political system is investigated. The objects of analysis are the Democratic primaries in the ëConfederate Southí during the first half of the 20th century. Together, these cases provide the best example of durable unipartism across a substantial area of time and space when nominations were conducted by a primary election. Extending the work of Canon (1978) and Black (1983) on statewide factional structures, this article shows that Key (1949) is correct that at the state level Southern states did not typically follow the Duvergerian logic (Duverger, 1951) that for single-member districts there should be two competitors in plurality-rule primaries and three or fewer competitors in majority-rule with runoff primaries (Cox, 1997). However, the number of candidates in Southern counties and parishes can be predicted by a stateís electoral rules. The latter finding is novel and important because it implies that some form of political communication or organization structured elections at the local level.

Figures and Tables:
Figure 1. ES - Plurality-rule States
Figure 2. ES - Majority-rule with runoff states
Table 1. One-tailed t-tests: ES for gubernatorial elections
Table 2. One-tailed t-tests: ES for senatorial elections
Figure 3. EC - Plurality-rule States
Figure 4. EC - Majority-rule with runoff states
Table 3. One-tailed t-tests: EC for gubernatorial elections
Table 4. One-tailed t-tests: EC for senatorial elections
Table 5. Violations of Duvergerian logic in gubernatorial elections

Last Paragraph:
In Southern Politics, Key conjectures that electoral rules may have been an important influence on the factional structures in the South. However, in the era when he was writing, theories about the influence of electoral laws on political systems had not been fully elaborated, and for more than half a century Keyís insight has gone largely unexamined. This article revisits Keyís conjecture in light of advances in theory and measurement and finds convincing evidence in favor of the influence of electoral laws on local factional systems in the region.