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Erik S. Herron,"Mixed Electoral Rules and Party Strategies: Responses to Incentives by Ukraine's Rukh and Russia's Yabloko," Party Politics, 8 (November, 2002), 719-733.

First Paragraph:
The advent of competitive elections in post-communist states has provided scholars with substantial opportunities to investigate the behavior and attitudes of citizens and political elites. The growing literature has addressed many important questions, including how citizen preferences for political parties emerge (Brader and Tucker, 2001; Miller and Klobucar, 2000; White et al., 1997a, b); how political actors make decisions about aligning with parties (Smyth, 1997); how parties recruit candidates (Ishiyama, 2000); how closely elites represent constituents (Kitschelt et al., 1999); how consistently legislators vote with their parties (Ishiyama, 2000; Smith and Remington, 2001) and how electoral rules affect party systems (Moraski and Loewenberg, 1999; Moser, 1999a). Despite the growing literature on post-communist party systems, little work has addressed how the campaign strategies of political parties respond to the unique incentives of mixed electoral systems.

Figures and Tables:
Table 1. Distribution of political parties by SMD placement
Table 2. Rukh regional nomination patterns (1998)
Table 3. Nomination patterns and results for Yabloko and SPS candidates in the 1999 Duma elections (Moscow and St. Petersburg districts)

Last Paragraph:
This article addressed candidate nomination in the SMD portion of mixed electoral systems, evaluating the causes of variation in nomination patterns. After outlining potential incentives and disincentives for maximizing candidate nomination, evidence was presented in the form of two case studies. The studies suggested that Rukh maximized SMD placement in response to the system's incentives and the competitive environment. By contrast, Yabloko limited SMD placement because of possible disincentives to candidate placement, including its strategic arrangement with the Union of Right Forces. By identifying the complex environment facing parties in mixed systems, outlining possible solutions to the puzzle, and illustrating the solutions with evidence from post-communist states, the article points to areas of future research. Expanding the study of mixed systems to incorporate more political parties, different forms of mixed electoral rules and longitudinal data could further contribute to our understanding of how mixed systems influence the behavior of political parties.