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Tapio Raunio,"Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties," Party Politics, 8 (July, 2002), 405-425.

First Paragraph:
Measuring power within parties is a complex task. Studies on party organizations have traditionally focused on election campaigns and candidate or leadership selection. These are arguably also the most important dimensions of party behaviour, as winning votes and gaining office are essential for influencing policy and therefore shape the behaviour of party leaders and MPs (Gallagher et al., 2001: 280-9). However, the question of who formulates party policy between elections or party congresses remains under-researched (Scarrow et al., 2000: 144-5). This is understandable, because measuring the relative power of individuals or party organs is notoriously difficult (Heidar, 1984). Nevertheless, party theorists have been warning about centralizing tendencies within parties at least since the 1960s. While scholars may disagree about the extent and sources of centralization, the actual concentration of power in the party leadership is rarely disputed.

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Last Paragraph:
Finally, European integration will arguably weaken links between national parties and interest groups. This argument is based on two factors. First, an increasing number of important policy decisions are taken at the European level either by the Council or the Commission. Depending on the policy sector, interest groups lobby the Commission and national governments represented in the Council. Establishing direct contacts with EU institutions and national ministries is more important than before, as lobbying individual parties is no longer a successful strategy for influencing the policy process. Much lobbying activity in national politics was concentrated in policy areas that presently belong to the jurisdiction of the EU -- internal market, consumer rights, external trade, agriculture and environmental policy. Second, EU directives and competition rules set limits to patronage. For example, according to Luther and Deschouwer (1999: 261): [N]ot being a member of the EU enabled the Austrian party elites to continue to use the state for purposes of linkage with their own rank and file, for whom they provided selective and policy-based material incentives. EU directives introduce a number of limits, such as the obligation to open the market for state contracts to all European firms, which means that existing agreements on divisions of the internal market can no longer be honoured. Similarly, regional policy is to an increasing extent decided by the EU, not national governments, and this diminishes parties' ability to use regional policy to reward their constituents.