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Robert Harmel and Lars Svåsand, "The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway," Party Politics, 3 (July 1997), 315-340.

First Paragraph:
Over the past few decades, literally hundreds of new parties have been added to established party systems in western democracies (see Harmel and Robertson, 1985). While most have received little attention from media or other political actors, a few, such as Die Grunen and the Front National, have gained a high level of notoriety. And while most have achieved little if any electoral success, some like Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaamse Blok in Belgium and Scandinavia's Progress parties, have captured significant numbers of votes and seats. To those that have won the public's attention have at times been attributed such important and disparate impacts as 'destabilizing' and 'reinvigorating' their party systems (e.g. see Frankland, 1983: 37-9). With such importance attributed to even a small minority of new parties, it is indeed surprising that there has been scant systematic research on new parties' actual impacts. It is the purpose of this paper to contribute such research by drawing upon a couple of Scandinavian experiences to address one key hypothesis related to new party impact.

Figures and Tables:
Table 1: Danish election results, selected parties, 1968-94 (number of seats and percentage of votes).
Table 2: Norwegian election results, selected parties, 1965-93 (number of seats and percentage of votes).
Table 3: Selected issue positions of Danish Conservative Party, 1970-92.
Table 4: Selected issue positions of Norwegian Conservative Party, 1973-93.
Figure 1: Danish party positions on individual freedom for Social Democrats (5), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Figure 2: Danish party positions on income taxes for Social Democrats (5), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Figure 3: Danish party positions on total taxes for Social Democrats (S), Conservatives (C), and Progress (P).
Figure 4: Danish party positions on scope of government for Social Democrats (S), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Figure 5: Norwegian party positions of individual freedom for Labour (L), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Figure 6: Norwegian party positions on income taxes for Labour (L), Conservatives (C), and Progress (P).
Figure 7: Norwegian party positions on total taxes for Labour (L), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Figure 8: Norwegian party positions on scope of government for Labour (L), Conservatives (C) and Progress (P).
Table 5: Selected issue positions of Norwegian Labour Party, 1973-89.
Table 6: Selected issue positions of Danish Social Democratic Party, 1971-92.

Last Paragraph:
Future development of performance theory should take note, though, that the influence of the Norwegian Progress Party was achieved without a decline in the Conservatives' electoral performance. Instead, that party's incentives for change may have resulted from calculating how much better the Conservatives could do in the future if the threat of Progress were removed. (In other words, rather than reacting to actual, poor electoral performance, the party may have been (pro)acting to make its stable [and later, improving] situation even better.) And so, from our comparative analyses of the two Conservative parties, it could reasonably be inferred that the vision of political parties (even those that are clearly electorally motivated) is not necessarily myopic, either in space or in time. They not only can see parties on two sides of them at once, but they can also presumably look to the future as well as the recent past.